## CryptoDB

### Vinod Vaikuntanathan

#### Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2022
EUROCRYPT
The question of minimizing the {\em computational overhead} of cryptography was put forward by the work of Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky and Sahai (STOC 2008). The main conclusion was that, under plausible assumptions, most cryptographic primitives can be realized with {\em constant} computational overhead. However, this ignores an additive term that may depend polynomially on the (concrete) computational security parameter $\lambda$. In this work, we study the question of obtaining optimal efficiency, up to polylogarithmic factors, for {\em all} choices of $n$ and $\lambda$, where $n$ is the size of the given task. In particular, when $n=\lambda$, we would like the computational cost to be only $\tilde O(\lambda)$. We refer to this goal as {\em asymptotically quasi-optimal} (AQO) cryptography. We start by realizing the first AQO semi-honest batch oblivious linear evaluation (BOLE) protocol. Our protocol applies to OLE over small fields and relies on the near-exponential security of the ring learning with errors (RLWE) assumption. Building on the above and on known constructions of AQO PCPs, we design the first AQO zero-knowledge (ZK) argument system for Boolean circuit satisfiability. Our construction combines a new AQO ZK-PCP construction that respects the AQO property of the underlying PCP along with a technique for converting statistical secrecy into soundness via OLE reversal. Finally, combining the above results, we get AQO secure computation protocols for Boolean circuits with security against malicious parties under RLWE.
2022
CRYPTO
We construct a classically verifiable succinct interactive argument for quantum computation (BQP) with communication complexity and verifier runtime that are poly-logarithmic in the runtime of the BQP computation (and polynomial in the security parameter). Our protocol is secure assuming the post-quantum security of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and Learning with Errors (LWE). This is the first succinct argument for quantum computation in the plain model; prior work (Chia-Chung-Yamakawa, TCC ’20) requires both a long common reference string and non-black-box use of a hash function modeled as a random oracle. At a technical level, we revisit the framework for constructing classically verifiable quantum computation (Mahadev, FOCS ’18). We give a self-contained, modular proof of security for Mahadev’s protocol, which we believe is of independent interest. Our proof readily generalizes to a setting in which the verifier’s first message (which consists of many public keys) is compressed. Next, we formalize this notion of compressed public keys; we view the object as a generalization of constrained/programmable PRFs and instantiate it based on indistinguishability obfuscation. Finally, we compile the above protocol into a fully succinct argument using a (sufficiently composable) succinct argument of knowledge for NP. Using our framework, we achieve several additional results, including – Succinct arguments for QMA (given multiple copies of the witness), – Succinct non-interactive arguments for BQP (or QMA) in the quantum random oracle model, and – Succinct batch arguments for BQP (or QMA) assuming post-quantum LWE (without iO).
2022
CRYPTO
Aggregate signatures (Boneh, Gentry, Lynn, Shacham, Eu- rocrypt 2003) enable compressing a set of N signatures on N different messages into a short aggregate signature. This reduces the space com- plexity of storing the signatures from linear in N to a fixed constant (that depends only on the security parameter). However, verifying the aggregate signature requires access to all N messages, resulting in the complexity of verification being at least Ω(N). In this work, we introduce the notion of locally verifiable aggregate signatures that enable efficient verification: given a short aggregate sig- nature σ (corresponding to a set M of N messages), the verifier can check whether a particular message m is in the set, in time independent of N. Verification does not require knowledge of the entire set M. We demon- strate many natural applications of locally verifiable aggregate signature schemes: in the context of certificate transparency logs; in blockchains; and for redacting signatures, even when all the original signatures are produced by a single user. We provide two constructions of single-signer locally verifiable aggre- gate signatures, the first based on the RSA assumption and the second on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion assumption, both in the random oracle model. As an additional contribution, we introduce the notion of compressing cryptographic keys in identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes, show applications of this notion, and construct an IBE scheme where the secret keys for N identities can be compressed into a single aggregate key, which can then be used to decrypt ciphertexts sent to any of the N identities.
2021
EUROCRYPT
MiniQCrypt is a world where quantum-secure one-way functions exist, and quantum communication is possible. We construct an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol in MiniQCrypt that achieves simulation-security against malicious quantum polynomial-time adversaries, building on the foundational work of Bennett, Brassard, Crepeau and Skubiszewska (CRYPTO 1991). Combining the OT protocol with prior works, we obtain secure two-party and multi-party computation protocols also in MiniQCrypt. This is in contrast to the classical world, where it is widely believed that OT does not exist in MiniCrypt.
2021
TCC
We present a construction of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) that relies on the learning with errors (LWE) assumption together with a new notion of succinctly sampling pseudo-random LWE samples. We then present a candidate LWE sampler whose security is related to the hardness of solving systems of polynomial equations. Our construction improves on the recent iO candidate of Wee and Wichs (Eurocrypt 2021) in two ways: first, we show that a much weaker and simpler notion of LWE sampling suffices for iO; and secondly, our candidate LWE sampler is secure based on a compactly specified and falsifiable assumption about random polynomials, with a simple error distribution that facilitates cryptanalysis.
2021
CRYPTO
Block ciphers such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (Rijndael) are used extensively in practice, yet our understanding of their security continues to be highly incomplete. This paper promotes and continues a research program aimed at {\em proving} the security of block ciphers against important and well-studied classes of attacks. In particular, we initiate the study of (almost) $t$-wise independence of concrete block-cipher construction paradigms such as substitution-permutation networks and key-alternating ciphers. Sufficiently strong (almost) pairwise independence already suffices to resist (truncated) differential attacks and linear cryptanalysis, and hence this is a relevant and meaningful target. Our results are two-fold. Our first result concerns substitution-permutation networks (SPNs) that model ciphers such as AES. We prove the almost pairwise-independence of an SPN instantiated with concrete S-boxes together with an appropriate linear mixing layer, given sufficiently many rounds and independent sub-keys. Our proof relies on a {\em characterization} of S-box computation on input differences in terms of sampling output differences from certain subspaces, and a new randomness extraction lemma (which we prove with Fourier-analytic techniques) that establishes when such sampling yields uniformity. We use our techniques in particular to prove almost pairwise-independence for sufficiently many rounds of both the AES block cipher (which uses a variant of the patched inverse function $x \mapsto x^{-1}$ as the $S$-box) and the MiMC block cipher (which uses the cubing function $x \mapsto x^3$ as the $S$-box), assuming independent sub-keys. Secondly, we show that instantiating a key-alternating cipher (which can be thought of as a degenerate case of SPNs) with most permutations gives us (almost) $t$-wise independence in $t + o(t)$ rounds. In order to do this, we use the probabilistic method to develop two new lemmas, an {\em independence-amplification lemma} and a {\em distance amplification lemma}, that allow us to reason about the evolution of key-alternating ciphers.
2021
TCC
The main conceptual contribution of this paper is a unification of two leading paradigms for constructing succinct argument systems, namely Kilian's protocol and the BMW (Biehl-Meyer-Wetzel) heuristic. We define the notion of a multi-extractable somewhere statistically binding (meSSB) hash family, an extension of the notion of somewhere statistically binding hash functions (Hubacek and Wichs, ITCS 2015), and construct it from LWE. We show that when instantiating Kilian's protocol with a meSSB hash family, the first two messages are simply an instantiation of the BMW heuristic. Therefore, if we also instantiate it with a PCP for which the BMW heuristic is sound, e.g., a computational non-signaling PCP, then the first two messages of the Kilian protocol is a sound instantiation of the BMW heuristic. This leads us to two technical results. First, we show how to efficiently convert any succinct non-interactive argument (SNARG) for BatchNP into a SNARG for any language that has a computational non-signaling PCP. Put together with the recent and independent result of Choudhuri, Jain and Jin (Eprint 2021/808) which constructs a SNARG for BatchNP from LWE, we get a SNARG for any language that has a computational non-signaling PCP, including any language in P, but also any language in NTISP (non-deterministic bounded space), from LWE. Second, we introduce the notion of a somewhere statistically sound (SSS) interactive argument, which is a hybrid between a statistically sound proof and a computationally sound proof (a.k.a. an argument), and * prove that Kilian's protocol, instantiated as above, is an SSS argument; * show that the soundness of SSS arguments can be proved in a straight-line manner, implying that they are also post-quantum sound if the underlying assumption is post-quantum secure; and * conjecture that constant-round SSS arguments can be soundly converted into non-interactive arguments via the Fiat-Shamir transformation.
2020
EUROCRYPT
We revisit the well-studied problem of extracting nearly uniform randomness from an arbitrary source of sufficient min-entropy. Strong seeded extractors solve this problem by relying on a public random seed, which is unknown to the source. Here, we consider a setting where the seed is reused over time and the source may depend on prior calls to the extractor with the same seed. Can we still extract nearly uniform randomness? In more detail, we assume the seed is chosen randomly, but the source can make arbitrary oracle queries to the extractor with the given seed before outputting a sample. We require that the sample has entropy and differs from any of the previously queried values. The extracted output should look uniform even to a distinguisher that gets the seed. We consider two variants of the problem, depending on whether the source only outputs the sample, or whether it can also output some correlated public auxiliary information that preserves the sample's entropy. Our results are: * Without Auxiliary Information: We show that every pseudo-random function (PRF) with a sufficiently high security level is a good extractor in this setting, even if the distinguisher is computationally unbounded. We further show that the source necessarily needs to be computationally bounded and that such extractors imply one-way functions. * With Auxiliary Information: We construct secure extractors in this setting, as long as both the source and the distinguisher are computationally bounded. We give several constructions based on different intermediate primitives, yielding instantiations based on the DDH, DLIN, LWE or DCR assumptions. On the negative side, we show that one cannot prove security against computationally unbounded distinguishers in this setting under any standard assumption via a black-box reduction. Furthermore, even when restricting to computationally bounded distinguishers, we show that there exist PRFs that are insecure as extractors in this setting and that a large class of constructions cannot be proven secure via a black-box reduction from standard assumptions.
2020
EUROCRYPT
Dwork and Naor (FOCS '00) defined ZAPs as 2-message witness-indistinguishable proofs that are public-coin. We relax this to \emph{ZAPs with private Randomness} (ZAPRs), where the verifier can use private coins to sample the first message (independently of the statement being proved), but the proof must remain publicly verifiable given only the protocol transcript. In particular, ZAPRs are \emph{reusable}, meaning that the first message can be reused for multiple proofs without compromising security. Known constructions of ZAPs from trapdoor permutations or bilinear maps are only computationally WI (and statistically sound). Two recent results of Badrinarayanan-Fernando-Jain-Khurana-Sahai and Goyal-Jain-Jin-Malavolta [EUROCRYPT '20] construct the first \emph{statistical ZAP arguments}, which are statistically WI (and computationally sound), from the quasi-polynomial LWE assumption. Here, we construct \emph{statistical ZAPR arguments} from the quasi-polynomial decision-linear (DLIN) assumption on groups with a bilinear map. Our construction relies on a combination of several tools including Groth-Ostrovsky-Sahai NIZK and NIWI [EUROCRYPT '06, CRYPTO '06, JACM '12], sometimes-binding statistically hiding commitments'' [Kalai-Khurana-Sahai, EUROCRYPT '18] and the MPC-in-the-head'' technique [Ishai-Kushilevitz-Ostrovsky-Sahai, STOC '07].
2020
CRYPTO
The Fiat-Shamir transform is a methodology for compiling a (public-coin) interactive proof system for a language $L$ into a {\em non-interactive} argument system for $L$. Proving security of the Fiat-Shamir transform in the standard model, especially in the context of \emph{succinct} arguments, is largely an unsolved problem. The work of Canetti et al. (STOC 2019) proved the security of the Fiat-Shamir transform applied to the Goldwasser-Kalai-Rothblum (STOC 2008) succinct interactive proof system under a very strong optimal learning with errors'' assumption. Achieving a similar result under standard assumptions remains an important open question. In this work, we consider the problem of compiling a different succinct interactive proof system: Pietrzak's proof system (ITCS 2019) for the iterated squaring problem. We construct a hash function family (with evaluation time roughly $2^{\lambda^{\epsilon}}$) that guarantees the soundness of Fiat-Shamir for this protocol assuming the sub-exponential ($2^{-n^{1-\epsilon}}$)-hardness of the $n$-dimensional learning with errors problem. (The latter follows from the worst-case $2^{n^{1-\epsilon}}$ hardness of lattice problems.) More generally, we extend the bad-challenge function'' methodology of Canetti et al. for proving the soundness of Fiat-Shamir to a class of protocols whose bad-challenge functions are {\em not} efficiently computable. As a corollary (following Choudhuri et al., ePrint 2019 and Ephraim et al., EUROCRYPT 2020), we construct hard-on-average problems in the complexity class $\mathbf{CLS}\subset \mathbf{PPAD}$ under the $2^{\secp^\epsilon}$-hardness of the repeated squaring problem and the $2^{-n^{1-\epsilon}}$-hardness of the learning with errors problem. Under the additional assumption that the repeated squaring problem is inherently sequential'', we also obtain a Verifiable Delay Function (Boneh et al., EUROCRYPT 2018) in the standard model. Finally, we give additional PPAD-hardness and VDF instantiations demonstrating a broader tradeoff between the strength of the repeated squaring assumption and the strength of the lattice assumption.
2019
EUROCRYPT
We present a worst case decoding problem whose hardness reduces to that of solving the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem, in some parameter regime. Prior to this work, no worst case hardness result was known for LPN (as opposed to syntactically similar problems such as Learning with Errors). The caveat is that this worst case problem is only mildly hard and in particular admits a quasi-polynomial time algorithm, whereas the LPN variant used in the reduction requires extremely high noise rate of $1/2-1/\mathrm{poly}(n)$ . Thus we can only show that “very hard” LPN is harder than some “very mildly hard” worst case problem. We note that LPN with noise $1/2-1/\mathrm{poly}(n)$ already implies symmetric cryptography.Specifically, we consider the (n, m, w)-nearest codeword problem ((n, m, w)-NCP) which takes as input a generating matrix for a binary linear code in m dimensions and rank n, and a target vector which is very close to the code (Hamming distance at most w), and asks to find the codeword nearest to the target vector. We show that for balanced (unbiased) codes and for relative error $w/m \approx {\log ^2 n}/{n}$ , (n, m, w)-NCP can be solved given oracle access to an LPN distinguisher with noise ratio $1/2-1/\mathrm{poly}(n)$ .Our proof relies on a smoothing lemma for codes which we show to have further implications: We show that (n, m, w)-NCP with the aforementioned parameters lies in the complexity class $\mathrm {{Search}\hbox {-}\mathcal {BPP}}^\mathcal {SZK}$ (i.e. reducible to a problem that has a statistical zero knowledge protocol) implying that it is unlikely to be $\mathcal {NP}$ -hard. We then show that the hardness of LPN with very low noise rate $\log ^2(n)/n$ implies the existence of collision resistant hash functions (our aforementioned result implies that in this parameter regime LPN is also in $\mathcal {BPP}^\mathcal {SZK}$ ).
2019
CRYPTO
We consider the problem of Non-Interactive Two-Party Secure Computation (NISC), where Rachel wishes to publish an encryption of her input x, in such a way that any other party, who holds an input y, can send her a single message which conveys to her the value f(x, y), and nothing more. We demand security against malicious parties. While such protocols are easy to construct using garbled circuits and general non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, this approach inherently makes a non-black-box use of the underlying cryptographic primitives and is infeasible in practice.Ishai et al. (Eurocrypt 2011) showed how to construct NISC protocols that only use parallel calls to an ideal oblivious transfer (OT) oracle, and additionally make only a black-box use of any pseudorandom generator. Combined with the efficient 2-message OT protocol of Peikert et al. (Crypto 2008), this leads to a practical approach to NISC that has been implemented in subsequent works. However, a major limitation of all known OT-based NISC protocols is that they are subject to selective failure attacks that allows a malicious sender to entirely compromise the security of the protocol when the receiver’s first message is reused.Motivated by the failure of the OT-based approach, we consider the problem of basing reusable NISC on parallel invocations of a standard arithmetic generalization of OT known as oblivious linear-function evaluation (OLE). We obtain the following results:We construct an information-theoretically secure reusable NISC protocol for arithmetic branching programs and general zero-knowledge functionalities in the OLE-hybrid model. Our zero-knowledge protocol only makes an absolute constant number of OLE calls per gate in an arithmetic circuit whose satisfiability is being proved. We also get reusable NISC in the OLE-hybrid model for general Boolean circuits using any one-way function.We complement this by a negative result, showing that reusable NISC is impossible to achieve in the OT-hybrid model. This provides a formal justification for the need to replace OT by OLE.We build a universally composable 2-message reusable OLE protocol in the CRS model that can be based on the security of Paillier encryption and requires only a constant number of modular exponentiations. This provides the first arithmetic analogue of the 2-message OT protocols of Peikert et al. (Crypto 2008).By combining our NISC protocol in the OLE-hybrid model and the 2-message OLE protocol, we get protocols with new attractive asymptotic and concrete efficiency features. In particular, we get the first (designated-verifier) NIZK protocols for NP where following a statement-independent preprocessing, both proving and verifying are entirely “non-cryptographic” and involve only a constant computational overhead. Furthermore, we get the first statistical designated-verifier NIZK argument for NP under an assumption related to factoring.
2019
TCC
Middle-product learning with errors (MP-LWE) was recently introduced by Rosca, Sakzad, Steinfeld and Stehlé (CRYPTO 2017) as a way to combine the efficiency of Ring-LWE with the more robust security guarantees of plain LWE. While Ring-LWE is at the heart of efficient lattice-based cryptosystems, it involves the choice of an underlying ring which is essentially arbitrary. In other words, the effect of this choice on the security of Ring-LWE is poorly understood. On the other hand, Rosca et al. showed that a new LWE variant, called MP-LWE, is as secure as Polynomial-LWE (another variant of Ring-LWE) over any of a broad class of number fields. They also demonstrated the usefulness of MP-LWE by constructing an MP-LWE based public-key encryption scheme whose efficiency is comparable to Ring-LWE based public-key encryption. In this work, we take this line of research further by showing how to construct Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) schemes that are secure under a variant of the MP-LWE assumption. Our IBE schemes match the efficiency of Ring-LWE based IBE, including a scheme in the random oracle model with keys and ciphertexts of size $\tilde{O}(n)$ (for n-bit identities).We construct our IBE scheme following the lattice trapdoors paradigm of [Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan, STOC’08]; our main technical contributions are introducing a new leftover hash lemma and instantiating a new variant of lattice trapdoors compatible with MP-LWE.This work demonstrates that the efficiency/security tradeoff gains of MP-LWE can be extended beyond public-key encryption to more complex lattice-based primitives.
2019
TCC
We initiate a systematic study of pseudorandom functions (PRFs) that are computable by simple matrix branching programs; we refer to these objects as “matrix PRFs”. Matrix PRFs are attractive due to their simplicity, strong connections to complexity theory and group theory, and recent applications in program obfuscation.Our main results are:We present constructions of matrix PRFs based on the conjectured hardness of computational problems pertaining to matrix products.We show that any matrix PRF that is computable by a read-c, width w branching program can be broken in time poly$(w^c)$; this means that any matrix PRF based on constant-width matrices must read each input bit $\omega (\log (\lambda ))$ times. Along the way, we simplify the “tensor switching lemmas” introduced in previous IO attacks.We show that a subclass of the candidate local-PRG proposed by Barak et al. [Eurocrypt 2018] can be broken using simple matrix algebra.We show that augmenting the CVW18 IO candidate with a matrix PRF provably immunizes the candidate against all known algebraic and statistical zeroizing attacks, as captured by a new and simple adversarial model.
2019
TCC
We construct private-key and public-key functional encryption schemes in the bounded-key setting; that is, secure against adversaries that obtain an a-priori bounded number of functional keys (also known as the collusion bound).An important metric considered in the literature on bounded-key functional encryption schemes is the dependence of the running time of the encryption algorithm on the collusion bound $Q=Q(\lambda )$ (where $\lambda$ is the security parameter). It is known that bounded-key functional encryption schemes with encryption complexity growing with $Q^{1-\varepsilon }$ , for any constant $\varepsilon > 0$ , implies indistinguishability obfuscation. On the other hand, in the public-key setting, it was previously unknown whether we could achieve encryption complexity growing linear with Q, also known as optimal bounded-key FE, based on well-studied assumptions.In this work, we give the first construction of an optimal bounded-key public-key functional encryption scheme under the minimal assumption of the existence of any public-key encryption scheme. Moreover, our scheme supports the class of all polynomial-size circuits.Our techniques also extend to the private-key setting. We achieve a construction of an optimal bounded-key functional encryption in the private-key setting based on the minimal assumption of one-way functions, instead of learning with errors as achieved in prior works.
2018
EUROCRYPT
2018
EUROCRYPT
2018
CRYPTO
We carry out a systematic study of the GGH15 graded encoding scheme used with general branching programs. This is motivated by the fact that general branching programs are more efficient than permutation branching programs and also substantially more expressive in the read-once setting. Our main results are as follows:Proofs. We present new constructions of private constrained PRFs and lockable obfuscation, for constraints (resp. functions to be obfuscated) that are computable by general branching programs. Our constructions are secure under LWE with subexponential approximation factors. Previous constructions of this kind crucially rely on the permutation structure of the underlying branching programs. Using general branching programs allows us to obtain more efficient constructions for certain classes of constraints (resp. functions), while posing new challenges in the proof, which we overcome using new proof techniques.Attacks. We extend the previous attacks on indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) candidates that use GGH15 encodings. The new attack simply uses the rank of a matrix as the distinguisher, so we call it a “rank attack”. The rank attack breaks, among others, the iO candidate for general read-once branching programs by Halevi, Halevi, Shoup and Stephens-Davidowitz (CCS 2017).Candidate Witness Encryption and iO. Drawing upon insights from our proofs and attacks, we present simple candidates for witness encryption and iO that resist the existing attacks, using GGH15 encodings. Our candidate for witness encryption crucially exploits the fact that formulas in conjunctive normal form (CNFs) can be represented by general, read-once branching programs.
2018
TCC
A traitor tracing scheme is a public key encryption scheme for which there are many secret decryption keys. Any of these keys can decrypt a ciphertext; moreover, even if a coalition of users collude, put together their decryption keys and attempt to create a new decryption key, there is an efficient algorithm to trace the new key to at least one the colluders.Recently, Goyal, Koppula and Waters (GKW, STOC 18) provided the first traitor tracing scheme from LWE with ciphertext and secret key sizes that grow polynomially in $\log n$, where n is the number of users. The main technical building block in their construction is a strengthening of (bounded collusion secure) secret-key functional encryption which they refer to as mixed functional encryption (FE).In this work, we improve upon and extend the GKW traitor tracing scheme:We provide simpler constructions of mixed FE schemes based on the LWE assumption. Our constructions improve upon the GKW construction in terms of expressiveness, modularity, and security.We provide a construction of attribute-based traitor tracing for all circuits based on the LWE assumption.
2017
EUROCRYPT
2017
PKC
2017
CRYPTO
2017
CRYPTO
2017
TCC
2017
TCC
2016
CRYPTO
2016
CRYPTO
2016
TCC
2016
TCC
2016
TCC
2016
PKC
2015
TCC
2015
TCC
2015
TCC
2015
CRYPTO
2015
CRYPTO
2015
ASIACRYPT
2014
EUROCRYPT
2013
CRYPTO
2013
CRYPTO
2013
ASIACRYPT
2013
JOFC
We show a general framework for constructing password-based authenticated key-exchange protocols with optimal round complexity—one message per party, sent simultaneously—in the standard model, assuming the existence of a common reference string. When our framework is instantiated using bilinear-map-based cryptosystems, the resulting protocol is also (reasonably) efficient. Somewhat surprisingly, our framework can be adapted to give protocols in the standard model that are universally composable while still using only one (simultaneous) round.
2012
TCC
2012
TCC
2012
EUROCRYPT
2012
CRYPTO
2012
PKC
2012
PKC
2011
PKC
2011
TCC
2011
CRYPTO
2011
ASIACRYPT
2011
JOFC
2010
TCC
2010
ASIACRYPT
2010
CRYPTO
2010
EUROCRYPT
2010
EUROCRYPT
2010
EUROCRYPT
2009
TCC
2009
TCC
2009
TCC
2009
ASIACRYPT
2009
ASIACRYPT
2008
CRYPTO
2008
CRYPTO
2008
CRYPTO
2007
ASIACRYPT
2007
ASIACRYPT
2007
EUROCRYPT
2007
TCC
2006
CRYPTO

#### Program Committees

TCC 2022 (Program chair)
Eurocrypt 2021
TCC 2018
Eurocrypt 2018
TCC 2016
Crypto 2014
TCC 2014
PKC 2013
Asiacrypt 2013
TCC 2012
Eurocrypt 2012
Crypto 2012
Asiacrypt 2010
TCC 2010
Crypto 2010

#### Coauthors

Shweta Agrawal (4)
Prabhanjan Ananth (2)
James Bartusek (1)
Nir Bitansky (4)
Dan Boneh (1)
Xavier Boyen (1)
Zvika Brakerski (9)
Ran Canetti (3)
Nishanth Chandran (1)
Melissa Chase (2)
Hao Chen (1)
Yilei Chen (3)
Aloni Cohen (1)
Ronald Cramer (2)
Dana Dachman-Soled (1)
Leo de Castro (1)
Akshay Degwekar (2)
Yevgeniy Dodis (4)
Cynthia Dwork (1)
Sebastian Faust (1)
David Freeman (1)
Craig Gentry (4)
Shafi Goldwasser (6)
Sergey Gorbunov (4)
S. Dov Gordon (1)
Rishab Goyal (1)
Alex B. Grilo (1)
Robbert de Haan (1)
Shai Halevi (4)
Goichiro Hanaoka (1)
Carmit Hazay (1)
Minki Hhan (1)
Dennis Hofheinz (1)
Susan Hohenberger (2)
Hideki Imai (1)
Yuval Ishai (2)
Abhishek Jain (1)
Yael Tauman Kalai (5)
Jonathan Katz (5)
Eike Kiltz (1)
Daniel Kraschewski (1)
Huijia Lin (2)
Tianren Liu (5)
Alex Lombardi (6)
Fermi Ma (1)
Giulio Malavolta (1)
Moni Naor (1)
Valeria Nikolaenko (1)
Rafail Ostrovsky (1)
Omkant Pandey (1)
Omer Paneth (1)
Bryan Parno (1)
Rafael Pass (4)
Chris Peikert (3)
Raluca A. Popa (1)
Willy Quach (1)
Tal Rabin (1)
Srinivasan Raghuraman (1)
Mariana Raykova (1)
Leonid Reyzin (1)
Silas Richelson (1)
Guy N. Rothblum (4)
Gil Segev (3)
Abhi Shelat (5)
Fang Song (1)
Stefano Tessaro (2)
Eran Tromer (2)
Rotem Tsabary (1)
Marten van Dijk (1)
Prashant Nalini Vasudevan (2)
Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam (1)
Thomas Vidick (1)
Dhinakaran Vinayagamurthy (1)
Panagiotis Voulgaris (1)
Thuy Duong Vuong (1)
Brent Waters (2)
Hoeteck Wee (12)
Daniel Wichs (7)
Lizhen Yang (1)
Nickolai Zeldovich (1)
Rachel Yun Zhang (1)