International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

S. Dov Gordon

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2021
EUROCRYPT
The More The Merrier: Reducing the Cost of Large Scale MPC 📺
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows multiple parties to perform secure joint computations on their private inputs. Today, applications for MPC are growing with thousands of parties wishing to build federated machine learning models or trusted setups for blockchains. To address such scenarios we propose a suite of novel MPC protocols that maximize throughput when run with large numbers of parties. In particular, our protocols have both communication and computation complexity that decrease with the number of parties. Our protocols build on prior protocols based on packed secret-sharing, introducing new techniques to build more efficient computation for general circuits. Specifically, we introduce a new approach for handling \emph{linear attacks} that arise in protocols using packed secret-sharing and we propose a method for unpacking shared multiplication triples without increasing the asymptotic costs. Compared with prior work, we avoid the $\log |C|$ overhead required when generically compiling circuits of size $|C|$ for use in a SIMD computation, and we improve over folklore ``committee-based'' solutions by a factor of $O(s)$, the statistical security parameter. In practice, our protocol is up to $10X$ faster than any known construction, under a reasonable set of parameters.
2019
JOFC
Leakage Resilience from Program Obfuscation
The literature on leakage-resilient cryptography contains various leakage models that provide different levels of security. In the bounded leakage model (Akavia et al.—TCC 2009 ), it is assumed that there is a fixed upper bound L on the number of bits the attacker may leak on the secret key in the entire lifetime of the scheme. Alternatively, in the continual leakage model (Brakerski et al.—FOCS 2010 , Dodis et al.—FOCS 2010 ), the lifetime of a cryptographic scheme is divided into “time periods” between which the scheme’s secret key is updated. Furthermore, in its attack the adversary is allowed to obtain some bounded amount of leakage on the current secret key during each time period. In the continual leakage model, a challenging problem has been to provide security against leakage on key updates , that is, leakage that is a function of not only the current secret key but also the randomness used to update it. We propose a modular approach to overcome this problem based on program obfuscation. Namely, we present a compiler that transforms any public key encryption or signature scheme that achieves a slight strengthening of continual leakage resilience, which we call consecutive continual leakage resilience, to one that is continual leakage resilient with leakage on key updates, assuming indistinguishability obfuscation (Barak et al.—CRYPTO 2001 , Garg et al.—FOCS 2013 ). Under stronger forms of obfuscation, the leakage rate tolerated by our compiled scheme is essentially as good as that of the starting scheme. Our compiler is derived by making a connection between the problems of leakage on key updates and so-called sender-deniable encryption (Canetti et al.—CRYPTO 1997 ), which was recently constructed based on indistinguishability obfuscation by Sahai and Waters (STOC 2014 ). In the bounded leakage model, we give an approach to constructing leakage-resilient public key encryption from program obfuscation based on the public key encryption scheme of Sahai and Waters (STOC 2014 ). In particular, we achieve leakage-resilient public key encryption tolerating L bits of leakage for any L from $${\mathsf {iO}} $$ iO and one-way functions. We build on this to achieve leakage-resilient public key encryption with optimal leakage rate of $$1-o(1)$$ 1 - o ( 1 ) based on stronger forms of obfuscation and collision-resistant hash functions. Such a leakage rate is not known to be achievable in a generic way based on public key encryption alone. We then develop additional techniques to construct public key encryption that is (consecutive) continual leakage resilient under appropriate assumptions, which we believe is of independent interest.
2018
ASIACRYPT
Secure Computation with Low Communication from Cross-Checking
We construct new four-party protocols for secure computation that are secure against a single malicious corruption. Our protocols can perform computations over a binary ring, and require sending just 1.5 ring elements per party, per gate. In the special case of Boolean circuits, this amounts to sending 1.5 bits per party, per gate. One of our protocols is robust, yet requires almost no additional communication. Our key technique can be viewed as a variant of the “dual execution” approach, but, because we rely on four parties instead of two, we can avoid any leakage, achieving the standard notion of security.
2018
ASIACRYPT
Simple and Efficient Two-Server ORAM
S. Dov Gordon Jonathan Katz Xiao Wang
We show a protocol for two-server oblivious RAM (ORAM) that is simpler and more efficient than the best prior work. Our construction combines any tree-based ORAM with an extension of a two-server private information retrieval scheme by Boyle et al., and is able to avoid recursion and thus use only one round of interaction. In addition, our scheme has a very cheap initialization phase, making it well suited for RAM-based secure computation. Although our scheme requires the servers to perform a linear scan over the entire data, the cryptographic computation involved consists only of block-cipher evaluations.A practical instantiation of our protocol has excellent concrete parameters: for storing an N-element array of arbitrary size data blocks with statistical security parameter $$\lambda $$, the servers each store 4N encrypted blocks, the client stores $$\lambda +2\log N$$ blocks, and the total communication per logical access is roughly $$10 \log N$$ encrypted blocks.
2016
PKC
2015
TCC
2015
CRYPTO
2014
EUROCRYPT
2013
EUROCRYPT
2010
TCC
2010
ASIACRYPT
2010
EUROCRYPT
2009
TCC

Program Committees

Crypto 2018
Crypto 2016
PKC 2014
PKC 2013
PKC 2012