## CryptoDB

### Alex Lombardi

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2023

EUROCRYPT

SNARGs and PPAD Hardness from the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Abstract

We construct succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) for bounded-depth computations assuming that the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is sub-exponentially hard. This is the first construction of such SNARGs from a Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our SNARG is also unambiguous: for every (true) statement x, it is computationally hard to find any accepting proof for x other than the proof produced by the prescribed prover strategy.
We obtain our result by showing how to instantiate the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, under DDH, for a variant of the Goldwasser-Kalai-Rothblum (GKR) interactive proof system. Our new technical contributions are (1) giving a TC0 circuit family for finding roots of cubic polynomials over a special family of characteristic 2 fields (Healy-Viola, STACS 2006) and (2) constructing a variant of the GKR protocol whose invocations of the sumcheck protocol (Lund-Fortnow-Karloff-Nisan, STOC 1990) only involve degree 3 polynomials over said fields.
Along the way, since we can instantiate Fiat-Shamir for certain variants of the sumcheck protocol, we also show the existence of (sub-exponentially) computationally hard problems in the complexity class PPAD, assuming the sub-exponential hardness of DDH. Previous PPAD hardness results all required either bilinear maps or the learning with errors assumption.

2023

CRYPTO

SNARGs for Monotone Policy Batch NP
Abstract

We construct a succinct non-interactive argument ($\mathsf{SNARG}$) for the class of monotone policy batch $\mathsf{NP}$ languages, under the Learning with Errors ($\mathsf{LWE}$) assumption. This class is a subclass of $\mathsf{NP}$ that is associated with a monotone function~$f:\{0,1\}^k\rightarrow\{0,1\}$ and an $\mathsf{NP}$ language $\mathcal{L}$, and contains instances $(x_1,\ldots,x_k)$ such the $f(b_1,\ldots,b_k)=1$ where $b_j=1$ if and only if $x_j\in \mathcal{L}$. Our $\mathsf{SNARG}$s are arguments of knowledge in the non-adaptive setting, and satisfy a new notion of somewhere extractability against adaptive adversaries.
This is the first $\mathsf{SNARG}$ under standard hardness assumptions for a sub-class of $\mathsf{NP}$ that is not known to have a (computational) non-signaling $\mathsf{PCP}$ with parameters compatible with the standard framework for constructing $\mathsf{SNARG}$s dating back to [Kalai-Raz-Rothblum, STOC '13]. Indeed, our approach necessarily departs from this framework.
Our construction combines existing quasi-arguments for $\mathsf{NP}$ (based on batch arguments for $\mathsf{NP}$) with a new type of cryptographic encoding of the instance and a new analysis going from local to global soundness. The main novel ingredient used in our encoding is a {\em predicate-extractable hash} ($\mathsf{PEH}$) family, which is a primitive that generalizes the notion of a somewhere extractable hash. Whereas a somewhere extractable hash allows to extract a single input coordinate, our $\mathsf{PEH}$ extracts a {\em global} property of the input. We view this primitive to be of independent interest, and believe that it will find other applications.

2022

CRYPTO

Succinct Classical Verification of Quantum Computation
📺
Abstract

We construct a classically verifiable succinct interactive argument for quantum computation (BQP) with communication complexity and verifier runtime that are poly-logarithmic in the runtime of the BQP computation (and polynomial in the security parameter). Our protocol is secure assuming the post-quantum security of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and Learning with Errors (LWE). This is the first succinct argument for quantum computation in the plain model; prior work (Chia-Chung-Yamakawa, TCC ’20) requires both a long common reference string and non-black-box use of a hash function modeled as a random oracle.
At a technical level, we revisit the framework for constructing classically verifiable quantum computation (Mahadev, FOCS ’18). We give a self-contained, modular proof of security for Mahadev’s protocol, which we believe is of independent interest. Our proof readily generalizes to a setting in which the verifier’s first message (which consists of many public keys) is compressed. Next, we formalize this notion of compressed public keys; we view the object as a generalization of constrained/programmable PRFs and instantiate it based on indistinguishability obfuscation.
Finally, we compile the above protocol into a fully succinct argument using a (sufficiently composable) succinct argument of knowledge for NP. Using our framework, we achieve several additional results, including
– Succinct arguments for QMA (given multiple copies of the witness),
– Succinct non-interactive arguments for BQP (or QMA) in the quantum random oracle model, and
– Succinct batch arguments for BQP (or QMA) assuming post-quantum LWE (without iO).

2022

TCC

Post-Quantum Insecurity from LWE
Abstract

We show that for many fundamental cryptographic primitives, proving classical security under the learning-with-errors (LWE) assumption, does \emph{not} imply post-quantum security. This is despite the fact that LWE is widely believed to be post-quantum secure, and our work does not give any evidence otherwise. Instead, it shows that post-quantum insecurity can arise inside cryptographic constructions, even if the assumptions are post-quantum secure.
Concretely, our work provides (contrived) constructions of pseudorandom functions, CPA-secure symmetric-key encryption, message-authentication codes, signatures, and CCA-secure public-key encryption schemes, all of which are proven to be classically secure under LWE via black-box reductions, but demonstrably fail to be post-quantum secure. All of these cryptosystems are stateless and non-interactive, but their security is defined via an interactive game that allows the attacker to make oracle queries to the cryptosystem. The polynomial-time quantum attacker can break these schemes by only making a few \emph{classical} queries to the cryptosystem, and in some cases, a single query suffices.
Previously, we only had examples of post-quantum insecurity under post-quantum assumptions for stateful/interactive protocols. Moreover, there appears to be a folklore belief that for stateless/non-interactive cryptosystems with black-box proofs of security, a quantum attack against the scheme should translate into a quantum attack on the assumption. This work shows otherwise. Our main technique is to carefully embed interactive protocols inside the interactive security games of the above primitives.
As a result of independent interest, we also show a 3-round \emph{quantum disclosure of secrets (QDS)} protocol between a classical sender and a receiver, where a quantum receiver learns a secret message in the third round but, assuming LWE, a classical receiver does not.

2022

TCC

PPAD is as Hard as LWE and Iterated Squaring
Abstract

One of the most fundamental results in game theory is that every game has a Nash equilibrium, an assignment of (randomized) strategies to players with the stability property that no individual player can benefit from deviating from the assigned strategy. It is not known how to efficiently *compute* such a Nash equilibrium --- the computational complexity of this task is characterized by the class PPAD, but the relation of PPAD to other problems and well-known complexity classes is not precisely understood. In recent years there has been mounting evidence, based on cryptographic tools and techniques, showing the hardness of PPAD.
We continue this line of research by showing that PPAD is as hard as *learning with errors* and the *iterated squaring* problem, two standard problems in cryptography. Our work improves over prior hardness results that relied either on (1) sub-exponential assumptions, or (2) relied on ``obfustopia,'' which can currently be based on a particular combination of three assumptions. Our work additionally establishes *public-coin* hardness for PPAD (computational hardness for a publicly sampleable distribution of instances) that seems out of reach of the obfustopia approach.
Following the work of Choudhuri et al. (STOC 2019) and subsequent works, our hardness result is obtained by constructing an *unambiguous and incrementally-updateable* succinct non-interactive argument for IS, whose soundness relies on polynomial hardness of LWE. The result also implies a verifiable delay function with unique proofs, which may be of independent interest.

2021

CRYPTO

Does Fiat-Shamir Require a Cryptographic Hash Function?
📺
Abstract

The Fiat-Shamir transform is a general method for reducing interaction in public-coin protocols by replacing the random verifier messages with deterministic hashes of the protocol transcript. The soundness of this transformation is usually heuristic and lacks a formal security proof. Instead, to argue security, one can rely on the random oracle methodology, which informally states that whenever a random oracle soundly instantiates Fiat-Shamir, a hash function that is ``sufficiently unstructured'' (such as fixed-length SHA-2) should suffice. Finally, for some special interactive protocols, it is known how to (1) isolate a concrete security property of a hash function that suffices to instantiate Fiat-Shamir and (2) build a hash function satisfying this property under a cryptographic assumption such as Learning with Errors.
In this work, we abandon this methodology and ask whether Fiat-Shamir truly requires a cryptographic hash function. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that in two of its most common applications --- building signature schemes as well as (general-purpose) non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments --- there are sound Fiat-Shamir instantiations using extremely simple and non-cryptographic hash functions such as sum-mod-$p$ or bit decomposition. In some cases, we make idealized assumptions (i.e., we invoke the generic group model), while in others, we prove soundness in the plain model.
On the negative side, we also identify important cases in which a cryptographic hash function is provably necessary to instantiate Fiat-Shamir. We hope this work leads to an improved understanding of the precise role of the hash function in the Fiat-Shamir transformation.

2020

EUROCRYPT

Statistical ZAPR Arguments from Bilinear Maps
📺
Abstract

Dwork and Naor (FOCS '00) defined ZAPs as 2-message witness-indistinguishable proofs that are public-coin. We relax this to \emph{ZAPs with private Randomness} (ZAPRs), where the verifier can use private coins to sample the first message (independently of the statement being proved), but the proof must remain publicly verifiable given only the protocol transcript. In particular, ZAPRs are \emph{reusable}, meaning that the first message can be reused for multiple proofs without compromising security.
Known constructions of ZAPs from trapdoor permutations or bilinear maps are only computationally WI (and statistically sound). Two recent results of Badrinarayanan-Fernando-Jain-Khurana-Sahai and Goyal-Jain-Jin-Malavolta [EUROCRYPT '20] construct the first \emph{statistical ZAP arguments}, which are statistically WI (and computationally sound), from the quasi-polynomial LWE assumption. Here, we construct \emph{statistical ZAPR arguments} from the quasi-polynomial decision-linear (DLIN) assumption on groups with a bilinear map. Our construction relies on a combination of several tools including Groth-Ostrovsky-Sahai NIZK and NIWI [EUROCRYPT '06, CRYPTO '06, JACM '12], ``sometimes-binding statistically hiding commitments'' [Kalai-Khurana-Sahai, EUROCRYPT '18] and the ``MPC-in-the-head'' technique [Ishai-Kushilevitz-Ostrovsky-Sahai, STOC '07].

2020

CRYPTO

Fiat-Shamir for Repeated Squaring with Applications to PPAD-Hardness and VDFs
📺
Abstract

The Fiat-Shamir transform is a methodology for compiling a (public-coin) interactive proof system for a language $L$ into a {\em non-interactive} argument system for $L$. Proving security of the Fiat-Shamir transform in the standard model, especially in the context of \emph{succinct} arguments, is largely an unsolved problem. The work of Canetti et al. (STOC 2019) proved the security of the Fiat-Shamir transform applied to the Goldwasser-Kalai-Rothblum (STOC 2008) succinct interactive proof system under a very strong ``optimal learning with errors'' assumption. Achieving a similar result under standard assumptions remains an important open question.
In this work, we consider the problem of compiling a different succinct interactive proof system: Pietrzak's proof system (ITCS 2019) for the iterated squaring problem. We construct a hash function family (with evaluation time roughly $2^{\lambda^{\epsilon}}$) that guarantees the soundness of Fiat-Shamir for this protocol assuming the sub-exponential ($2^{-n^{1-\epsilon}}$)-hardness of the $n$-dimensional learning with errors problem. (The latter follows from the worst-case $2^{n^{1-\epsilon}}$ hardness of lattice problems.) More generally, we extend the ``bad-challenge function'' methodology of Canetti et al. for proving the soundness of Fiat-Shamir to a class of protocols whose bad-challenge functions are {\em not} efficiently computable.
As a corollary (following Choudhuri et al., ePrint 2019 and Ephraim et al., EUROCRYPT 2020), we construct hard-on-average problems in the complexity class $\mathbf{CLS}\subset \mathbf{PPAD}$ under the $2^{\secp^\epsilon}$-hardness of the repeated squaring problem and the $2^{-n^{1-\epsilon}}$-hardness of the learning with errors problem. Under the additional assumption that the repeated squaring problem is ``inherently sequential'', we also obtain a Verifiable Delay Function (Boneh et al., EUROCRYPT 2018) in the standard model. Finally, we give additional PPAD-hardness and VDF instantiations demonstrating a broader tradeoff between the strength of the repeated squaring assumption and the strength of the lattice assumption.

2019

CRYPTO

New Constructions of Reusable Designated-Verifier NIZKs
📺
Abstract

Non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments (NIZKs) for $$\mathsf {NP}$$ are an important cryptographic primitive, but we currently only have instantiations under a few specific assumptions. Notably, we are missing constructions from the learning with errors (LWE) assumption, the Diffie-Hellman (CDH/DDH) assumption, and the learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption.In this paper, we study a relaxation of NIZKs to the designated-verifier setting (DV-NIZK), where a trusted setup generates a common reference string together with a secret key for the verifier. We want reusable schemes, which allow the verifier to reuse the secret key to verify many different proofs, and soundness should hold even if the malicious prover learns whether various proofs are accepted or rejected. Such reusable DV-NIZKs were recently constructed under the CDH assumption, but it was open whether they can also be constructed under LWE or LPN.We also consider an extension of reusable DV-NIZKs to the malicious designated-verifier setting (MDV-NIZK). In this setting, the only trusted setup consists of a common random string. However, there is also an additional untrusted setup in which the verifier chooses a public/secret key needed to generate/verify proofs, respectively. We require that zero-knowledge holds even if the public key is chosen maliciously by the verifier. Such reusable MDV-NIZKs were recently constructed under the “one-more CDH” assumption, but constructions under CDH/LWE/LPN remained open.In this work, we give new constructions of (reusable) DV-NIZKs and MDV-NIZKs using generic primitives that can be instantiated under CDH, LWE, or LPN.

2019

TCC

Lattice Trapdoors and IBE from Middle-Product LWE
Abstract

Middle-product learning with errors (MP-LWE) was recently introduced by Rosca, Sakzad, Steinfeld and Stehlé (CRYPTO 2017) as a way to combine the efficiency of Ring-LWE with the more robust security guarantees of plain LWE. While Ring-LWE is at the heart of efficient lattice-based cryptosystems, it involves the choice of an underlying ring which is essentially arbitrary. In other words, the effect of this choice on the security of Ring-LWE is poorly understood. On the other hand, Rosca et al. showed that a new LWE variant, called MP-LWE, is as secure as Polynomial-LWE (another variant of Ring-LWE) over any of a broad class of number fields. They also demonstrated the usefulness of MP-LWE by constructing an MP-LWE based public-key encryption scheme whose efficiency is comparable to Ring-LWE based public-key encryption. In this work, we take this line of research further by showing how to construct Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) schemes that are secure under a variant of the MP-LWE assumption. Our IBE schemes match the efficiency of Ring-LWE based IBE, including a scheme in the random oracle model with keys and ciphertexts of size $$\tilde{O}(n)$$ (for n-bit identities).We construct our IBE scheme following the lattice trapdoors paradigm of [Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan, STOC’08]; our main technical contributions are introducing a new leftover hash lemma and instantiating a new variant of lattice trapdoors compatible with MP-LWE.This work demonstrates that the efficiency/security tradeoff gains of MP-LWE can be extended beyond public-key encryption to more complex lattice-based primitives.

2018

TCC

Succinct Garbling Schemes from Functional Encryption Through a Local Simulation Paradigm
Abstract

We study a simulation paradigm, referred to as local simulation, in garbling schemes. This paradigm captures simulation proof strategies in which the simulator consists of many local simulators that generate different blocks of the garbled circuit. A useful property of such a simulation strategy is that only a few of these local simulators depend on the input, whereas the rest of the local simulators only depend on the circuit.We formalize this notion by defining locally simulatable garbling schemes. By suitably realizing this notion, we give a new construction of succinct garbling schemes for Turing machines assuming the polynomial hardness of compact functional encryption and standard assumptions (such as either CDH or LWE). Prior constructions of succinct garbling schemes either assumed sub-exponential hardness of compact functional encryption or were designed only for small-space Turing machines.We also show that a variant of locally simulatable garbling schemes can be used to generically obtain adaptively secure garbling schemes for circuits. All prior constructions of adaptively secure garbling that use somewhere equivocal encryption can be seen as instantiations of our construction.

#### Program Committees

- Crypto 2024
- Eurocrypt 2022
- TCC 2022
- TCC 2021

#### Coauthors

- Prabhanjan Ananth (1)
- James Bartusek (1)
- Nir Bitansky (1)
- Zvika Brakerski (2)
- Maya Farber Brodsky (1)
- Yilei Chen (1)
- Arka Rai Choudhuri (1)
- Justin Holmgren (1)
- Yael Tauman Kalai (3)
- Chethan Kamath (1)
- Alex Lombardi (13)
- Fermi Ma (2)
- Giulio Malavolta (1)
- Ethan Mook (1)
- Omer Paneth (2)
- Willy Quach (3)
- Ron D. Rothblum (2)
- Gil Segev (1)
- Vinod Vaikuntanathan (7)
- Thomas Vidick (1)
- Thuy Duong Vuong (1)
- Daniel Wichs (3)
- David J. Wu (1)
- Lizhen Yang (1)