International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Sanjam Garg

Affiliation: UC Berkeley

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2020
EUROCRYPT
Two-Round Oblivious Transfer from CDH or LPN
We show a new general approach for constructing maliciously-secure two-round oblivious transfer (OT). Specifically, we provide a generic sequence of transformations to upgrade a very basic notion of two-roundOT, which we call elementary OT, to UC-secure OT. We then give simple constructions of elementary OT under the Computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) assumption or the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption, yielding the first constructions of malicious (UC-secure) two-round OT under these assumptions. Since two-round OT is complete for two-round 2-party and multi-party computation in the malicious setting, we also achieve the first constructions of the latter under these assumptions.
2020
EUROCRYPT
Formalizing Data Deletion in the Context of the Right to be Forgotten
The right of an individual to request the deletion of their personal data by an entity that might be storing it -- referred to as \emph{the right to be forgotten} -- has been explicitly recognized, legislated, and exercised in several jurisdictions across the world, including the European Union, Argentina, and California. However, much of the discussion surrounding this right offers only an intuitive notion of what it means for it to be fulfilled -- of what it means for such personal data to be deleted. In this work, we provide a formal definitional framework for the right to be forgotten using tools and paradigms from cryptography. In particular, we provide a precise definition of what could be (or should be) expected from an entity that collects individuals' data when a request is made of it to delete some of this data. Our framework captures most, though not all, relevant aspects of typical systems involved in data processing. While it cannot be viewed as expressing the statements of current laws (especially since these are rather vague in this respect), our work offers technically precise definitions that represent possibilities for what the law could reasonably expect, and alternatives for what future versions of the law could explicitly require. Finally, with the goal of demonstrating the applicability of our framework and definitions, we consider various natural and simple scenarios where the right to be forgotten comes up. For each of these scenarios, we highlight the pitfalls that arise even in genuine attempts at implementing systems offering deletion guarantees, and also describe technological solutions that provably satisfy our definitions. These solutions bring together techniques built by various communities.
2020
EUROCRYPT
Candidate iO From Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
We propose a new approach to construct general-purpose indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). Our construction is obtained via a new intermediate primitive that we call split fully-homomorphic encryption (split FHE), which we show to be sufficient for constructing iO. Specifically, split FHE is FHE where decryption takes the following two-step syntactic form: (i) A secret decryption step uses the secret key and produces a hint which is (asymptotically) shorter than the length of the encrypted message, and (ii) a public decryption step that only requires the ciphertext and the previously generated hint (and not the entire secret key), and recovers the encrypted message. In terms of security, the hints for a set of ciphertexts should not allow one to violate semantic security for any other ciphertexts. Next, we show a generic candidate construction of split FHE based on three building blocks: (i) A standard FHE scheme with linear decrypt-and-multiply (which can be instantiated with essentially all LWE-based constructions), (ii) a linearly homomorphic encryption scheme with short decryption hints (such as the Damgard-Jurik encryption scheme, based on the DCR problem), and (iii) a cryptographic hash function (which can be based on a variety of standard assumptions). Our approach is heuristic in the sense that our construction is not provably secure and makes implicit assumptions about the interplay between these underlying primitives. We show evidence that this construction is secure by providing an argument in an appropriately defined oracle model. We view our construction as a big departure from the state-of-the-art constructions, and it is in fact quite simple.
2019
PKC
Registration-Based Encryption from Standard Assumptions
The notion of Registration-Based Encryption (RBE) was recently introduced by Garg, Hajiabadi, Mahmoody, and Rahimi [TCC’18] with the goal of removing the private-key generator (PKG) from IBE. Specifically, RBE allows encrypting to identities using a (compact) master public key, like how IBE is used, with the benefit that the PKG is substituted with a weaker entity called “key curator” who has no knowledge of any secret keys. Here individuals generate their secret keys on their own and then publicly register their identities and their corresponding public keys to the key curator. Finally, individuals obtain “rare” decryption-key updates from the key curator as the population grows. In their work, they gave a construction of RBE schemes based on the combination of indistinguishability obfuscation and somewhere statistically binding hash functions. However, they left open the problem of constructing RBE schemes based on standard assumptions.In this work, we resolve the above problem and construct RBE schemes based on standard assumptions (e.g., CDH or LWE). Furthermore, we show a new application of RBE in a novel context. In particular, we show that anonymous variants of RBE (which we also construct under standard assumptions) can be used for realizing abstracts forms of anonymous messaging tasks in simple scenarios in which the parties communicate by writing messages on a shared board in a synchronized way.
2019
EUROCRYPT
New Techniques for Efficient Trapdoor Functions and Applications 📺
We develop techniques for constructing trapdoor functions (TDFs) with short image size and advanced security properties. Our approach builds on the recent framework of Garg and Hajiabadi [CRYPTO 2018]. As applications of our techniques, we obtainThe first construction of deterministic-encryption schemes for block-source inputs (both for the CPA and CCA cases) based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. Moreover, by applying our efficiency-enhancing techniques, we obtain CDH-based schemes with ciphertext size linear in plaintext size.The first construction of lossy TDFs based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption with image size linear in input size, while retaining the lossiness rate of [Peikert-Waters STOC 2008]. Prior to our work, all constructions of deterministic encryption based even on the stronger DDH assumption incurred a quadratic gap between the ciphertext and plaintext sizes. Moreover, all DDH-based constructions of lossy TDFs had image size quadratic in the input size.At a high level, we break the previous quadratic barriers by introducing a novel technique for encoding input bits via hardcore output bits with the use of erasure-resilient codes. All previous schemes used group elements for encoding input bits, resulting in quadratic expansions.
2019
CRYPTO
Trapdoor Hash Functions and Their Applications 📺
We introduce a new primitive, called trapdoor hash functions (TDH), which are hash functions $$\mathsf {H}: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda $$ with additional trapdoor function-like properties. Specifically, given an index $$i\in [n]$$, TDHs allow for sampling an encoding key $$\mathsf {ek}$$ (that hides i) along with a corresponding trapdoor. Furthermore, given $$\mathsf {H}(x)$$, a hint value $$\mathsf {E}(\mathsf {ek},x)$$, and the trapdoor corresponding to $$\mathsf {ek}$$, the $$i^{th}$$ bit of x can be efficiently recovered. In this setting, one of our main questions is: How small can the hint value $$\mathsf {E}(\mathsf {ek},x)$$ be? We obtain constructions where the hint is only one bit long based on DDH, QR, DCR, or LWE.This primitive opens a floodgate of applications for low-communication secure computation. We mainly focus on two-message protocols between a receiver and a sender, with private inputs x and y, resp., where the receiver should learn f(x, y). We wish to optimize the (download) rate of such protocols, namely the asymptotic ratio between the size of the output and the sender’s message. Using TDHs, we obtain:1.The first protocols for (two-message) rate-1 string OT based on DDH, QR, or LWE. This has several useful consequences, such as:(a)The first constructions of PIR with communication cost poly-logarithmic in the database size based on DDH or QR. These protocols are in fact rate-1 when considering block PIR.(b)The first constructions of a semi-compact homomorphic encryption scheme for branching programs, where the encrypted output grows only with the program length, based on DDH or QR.(c)The first constructions of lossy trapdoor functions with input to output ratio approaching 1 based on DDH, QR or LWE.(d)The first constant-rate LWE-based construction of a 2-message “statistically sender-private” OT protocol in the plain model.2.The first rate-1 protocols (under any assumption) for n parallel OTs and matrix-vector products from DDH, QR or LWE. We further consider the setting where f evaluates a RAM program y with running time $$T\ll |x|$$ on x. We obtain the first protocols with communication sublinear in the size of x, namely $$T\cdot \sqrt{|x|}$$ or $$T\cdot \root 3 \of {|x|}$$, based on DDH or, resp., pairings (and correlated-input secure hash functions).
2019
TCC
Leveraging Linear Decryption: Rate-1 Fully-Homomorphic Encryption and Time-Lock Puzzles
We show how to combine a fully-homomorphic encryption scheme with linear decryption and a linearly-homomorphic encryption schemes to obtain constructions with new properties. Specifically, we present the following new results. (1)Rate-1 Fully-Homomorphic Encryption: We construct the first scheme with message-to-ciphertext length ratio (i.e., rate) $$1-\sigma $$ for $$\sigma = o(1)$$. Our scheme is based on the hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem and $$\sigma $$ is proportional to the noise-to-modulus ratio of the assumption. Our building block is a construction of a new high-rate linearly-homomorphic encryption.One application of this result is the first general-purpose secure function evaluation protocol in the preprocessing model where the communication complexity is within additive factor of the optimal insecure protocol.(2)Fully-Homomorphic Time-Lock Puzzles: We construct the first time-lock puzzle where one can evaluate any function over a set of puzzles without solving them, from standard assumptions. Prior work required the existence of sub-exponentially hard indistinguishability obfuscation.
2019
ASIACRYPT
The Broadcast Message Complexity of Secure Multiparty Computation
We study the broadcast message complexity of secure multiparty computation (MPC), namely, the total number of messages that are required for securely computing any functionality in the broadcast model of communication.MPC protocols are traditionally designed in the simultaneous broadcast model, where each round consists of every party broadcasting a message to the other parties. We show that this method of communication is sub-optimal; specifically, by eliminating simultaneity, it is, in fact, possible to reduce the broadcast message complexity of MPC.More specifically, we establish tight lower and upper bounds on the broadcast message complexity of n-party MPC for every $$t<n$$ corruption threshold, both in the plain model as well as common setup models. For example, our results show that the optimal broadcast message complexity of semi-honest MPC can be much lower than 2n, but necessarily requires at least three rounds of communication. We also extend our results to the malicious setting in setup models.
2019
ASIACRYPT
Rate-1 Trapdoor Functions from the Diffie-Hellman Problem
Trapdoor functions (TDFs) are one of the fundamental building blocks in cryptography. Studying the underlying assumptions and the efficiency of the resulting instantiations is therefore of both theoretical and practical interest. In this work we improve the input-to-image rate of TDFs based on the Diffie-Hellman problem. Specifically, we present: (a)A rate-1 TDF from the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, improving the result of Garg, Gay, and Hajiabadi [EUROCRYPT 2019], which achieved linear-size outputs but with large constants. Our techniques combine non-binary alphabets and high-rate error-correcting codes over large fields.(b)A rate-1 deterministic public-key encryption satisfying block-source security from the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. While this question was recently settled by Döttling et al. [CRYPTO 2019], our scheme is conceptually simpler and concretely more efficient. We demonstrate this fact by implementing our construction.
2018
EUROCRYPT
2018
EUROCRYPT
2018
EUROCRYPT
2018
CRYPTO
Two-Round Multiparty Secure Computation Minimizing Public Key Operations 📺
We show new constructions of semi-honest and malicious two-round multiparty secure computation protocols using only (a fixed) $$\mathsf {poly}(n,\lambda )$$ poly(n,λ) invocations of a two-round oblivious transfer protocol (which use expensive public-key operations) and $$\mathsf {poly}(\lambda , |C|)$$ poly(λ,|C|) cheaper one-way function calls, where $$\lambda $$ λ is the security parameter, n is the number of parties, and C is the circuit being computed. All previously known two-round multiparty secure computation protocols required $$\mathsf {poly}(\lambda ,|C|)$$ poly(λ,|C|) expensive public-key operations.
2018
CRYPTO
Limits on the Power of Garbling Techniques for Public-Key Encryption 📺
Understanding whether public-key encryption can be based on one-way functions is a fundamental open problem in cryptography. The seminal work of Impagliazzo and Rudich [STOC’89] shows that black-box constructions of public-key encryption from one-way functions are impossible. However, this impossibility result leaves open the possibility of using non-black-box techniques for achieving this goal.One of the most powerful classes of non-black-box techniques, which can be based on one-way functions (OWFs) alone, is Yao’s garbled circuit technique [FOCS’86]. As for the non-black-box power of this technique, the recent work of Döttling and Garg [CRYPTO’17] shows that the use of garbling allows us to circumvent known black-box barriers in the context of identity-based encryption.We prove that garbling of circuits that have OWF (or even random oracle) gates in them are insufficient for obtaining public-key encryption. Additionally, we show that this model also captures (non-interactive) zero-knowledge proofs for relations with OWF gates. This indicates that currently known OWF-based non-black-box techniques are perhaps insufficient for realizing public-key encryption.
2018
CRYPTO
On the Round Complexity of OT Extension 📺
We show that any OT extension protocol based on one-way functions (or more generally any symmetric-key primitive) either requires an additional round compared to the base OTs or must make a non-black-box use of one-way functions. This result also holds in the semi-honest setting or in the case of certain setup models such as the common random string model. This implies that OT extension in any secure computation protocol must come at the price of an additional round of communication or the non-black-box use of symmetric key primitives. Moreover, we observe that our result is tight in the sense that positive results can indeed be obtained using non-black-box techniques or at the cost of one additional round of communication.
2018
CRYPTO
Adaptive Garbled RAM from Laconic Oblivious Transfer
We give a construction of an adaptive garbled RAM scheme. In the adaptive setting, a client first garbles a “large” persistent database which is stored on a server. Next, the client can provide garbling of multiple adaptively and adversarially chosen RAM programs that execute and modify the stored database arbitrarily. The garbled database and the garbled program should reveal nothing more than the running time and the output of the computation. Furthermore, the sizes of the garbled database and the garbled program grow only linearly in the size of the database and the running time of the executed program respectively (up to poly logarithmic factors). The security of our construction is based on the assumption that laconic oblivious transfer (Cho et al., CRYPTO 2017) exists. Previously, such adaptive garbled RAM constructions were only known using indistinguishability obfuscation or in random oracle model. As an additional application, we note that this work yields the first constant round secure computation protocol for persistent RAM programs in the malicious setting from standard assumptions. Prior works did not support persistence in the malicious setting.
2018
CRYPTO
Trapdoor Functions from the Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption 📺
Sanjam Garg Mohammad Hajiabadi
Trapdoor functions (TDFs) are a fundamental primitive in cryptography. Yet, the current set of assumptions known to imply TDFs is surprisingly limited, when compared to public-key encryption. We present a new general approach for constructing TDFs. Specifically, we give a generic construction of TDFs from any Chameleon Encryption (Döttling and Garg [CRYPTO’17]) satisfying a novel property which we call recyclability. By showing how to adapt current Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) based constructions of chameleon encryption to yield recyclability, we obtain the first construction of TDFs with security proved under the CDH assumption. While TDFs from the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption were previously known, the possibility of basing them on CDH had remained open for more than 30 years.
2018
PKC
New Constructions of Identity-Based and Key-Dependent Message Secure Encryption Schemes
Recently, Döttling and Garg (CRYPTO 2017) showed how to build identity-based encryption (IBE) from a novel primitive termed Chameleon Encryption, which can in turn be realized from simple number theoretic hardness assumptions such as the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (in groups without pairings) or the factoring assumption. In a follow-up work (TCC 2017), the same authors showed that IBE can also be constructed from a slightly weaker primitive called One-Time Signatures with Encryption (OTSE).In this work, we show that OTSE can be instantiated from hard learning problems such as the Learning With Errors (LWE) and the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problems. This immediately yields the first IBE construction from the LPN problem and a construction based on a weaker LWE assumption compared to previous works.Finally, we show that the notion of one-time signatures with encryption is also useful for the construction of key-dependent-message (KDM) secure public-key encryption. In particular, our results imply that a KDM-secure public key encryption can be constructed from any KDM-secure secret-key encryption scheme and any public-key encryption scheme.
2018
TCC
Registration-Based Encryption: Removing Private-Key Generator from IBE
In this work, we introduce the notion of registration-based encryption (RBE for short) with the goal of removing the trust parties need to place in the private-key generator in an IBE scheme. In an RBE scheme, users sample their own public and secret keys. There will also be a “key curator” whose job is only to aggregate the public keys of all the registered users and update the “short” public parameter whenever a new user joins the system. Encryption can still be performed to a particular recipient using the recipient’s identity and any public parameters released subsequent to the recipient’s registration. Decryption requires some auxiliary information connecting users’ public (and secret) keys to the public parameters. Because of this, as the public parameters get updated, a decryptor may need to obtain “a few” additional auxiliary information for decryption. More formally, if n is the total number of identities and $$\mathrm {\kappa }$$κ is the security parameter, we require the following.Efficiency requirements: (1) A decryptor only needs to obtain updated auxiliary information for decryption at most $$O(\log n)$$O(logn) times in its lifetime, (2) each of these updates are computed by the key curator in time $${\text {poly}}(\mathrm {\kappa },\log n)$$poly(κ,logn), and (3) the key curator updates the public parameter upon the registration of a new party in time $${\text {poly}}(\mathrm {\kappa },\log n)$$poly(κ,logn). Properties (2) and (3) require the key curator to have random access to its data.Compactness requirements: (1) Public parameters are always at most $${\text {poly}}(\mathrm {\kappa },\log n)$$poly(κ,logn) bit, and (2) the total size of updates a user ever needs for decryption is also at most $${\text {poly}}(\mathrm {\kappa },\log n)$$poly(κ,logn) bits.We present feasibility results for constructions of RBE based on indistinguishably obfuscation. We further provide constructions of weakly efficient RBE, in which the registration step is done in $${\text {poly}}(\mathrm {\kappa },n)$$poly(κ,n), based on CDH, Factoring or LWE assumptions. Note that registration is done only once per identity, and the more frequent operation of generating updates for a user, which can happen more times, still runs in time $${\text {poly}}(\mathrm {\kappa },\log n)$$poly(κ,logn). We leave open the problem of obtaining standard RBE (with $${\text {poly}}(\mathrm {\kappa },\log n)$$poly(κ,logn) registration time) from standard assumptions.
2018
TCC
Two-Round MPC: Information-Theoretic and Black-Box
We continue the study of protocols for secure multiparty computation (MPC) that require only two rounds of interaction. The recent works of Garg and Srinivasan (Eurocrypt 2018) and Benhamouda and Lin (Eurocrypt 2018) essentially settle the question by showing that such protocols are implied by the minimal assumption that a two-round oblivious transfer (OT) protocol exists. However, these protocols inherently make a non-black-box use of the underlying OT protocol, which results in poor concrete efficiency. Moreover, no analogous result was known in the information-theoretic setting, or alternatively based on one-way functions, given an OT correlations setup or an honest majority.Motivated by these limitations, we study the possibility of obtaining information-theoretic and “black-box” implementations of two-round MPC protocols. We obtain the following results:Two-round MPC from OT correlations. Given an OT correlations setup, we get protocols that make a black-box use of a pseudorandom generator (PRG) and are secure against a malicious adversary corrupting an arbitrary number of parties. For a semi-honest adversary, we get similar information-theoretic protocols for branching programs.New NIOT constructions. Towards realizing OT correlations, we extend the DDH-based non-interactive OT (NIOT) protocol of Bellare and Micali (Crypto’89) to the malicious security model, and present new NIOT constructions from the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption (QRA) and the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption.Two-round black-box MPC with strong PKI setup. Combining the two previous results, we get two-round MPC protocols that make a black-box use of any DDH-hard or QRA-hard group. The protocols can offer security against a malicious adversary, and require a PKI setup that depends on the number of parties and the size of computation, but not on the inputs or the identities of the participating parties.Two-round honest-majority MPC from secure channels. Given secure point-to-point channels, we get protocols that make a black-box use of a pseudorandom generator (PRG), as well as information-theoretic protocols for branching programs. These protocols can tolerate a semi-honest adversary corrupting a strict minority of the parties, where in the information-theoretic case the complexity is exponential in the number of parties.
2018
TCC
A Simple Construction of iO for Turing Machines
Sanjam Garg Akshayaram Srinivasan
We give a simple construction of indistinguishability obfuscation for Turing machines where the time to obfuscate grows only with the description size of the machine and otherwise, independent of the running time and the space used. While this result is already known [Koppula, Lewko, and Waters, STOC 2015] from $$i\mathcal {O}$$ for circuits and injective pseudorandom generators, our construction and its analysis are conceptually much simpler. In particular, the main technical component in the proof of our construction is a simple combinatorial pebbling argument [Garg and Srinivasan, EUROCRYPT 2018]. Our construction makes use of indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits and $$\mathrm {somewhere\, statistically\, binding\, hash\, functions}$$ .
2017
EUROCRYPT
2017
EUROCRYPT
2017
CRYPTO
2017
CRYPTO
2017
CRYPTO
2017
CRYPTO
2017
ASIACRYPT
2017
TCC
2017
TCC
2016
EUROCRYPT
2016
CRYPTO
2016
CRYPTO
2016
TCC
2016
TCC
2016
TCC
2016
TCC
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
TCC
2015
CRYPTO
2015
PKC
2014
CRYPTO
2014
EUROCRYPT
2014
EUROCRYPT
2014
PKC
2014
TCC
2014
EPRINT
2014
EPRINT
2013
TCC
2013
CRYPTO
2013
CRYPTO
2013
EUROCRYPT
2012
TCC
2012
EUROCRYPT
2012
CRYPTO
2012
CRYPTO
2011
TCC
2011
CRYPTO
2011
CRYPTO
2008
CRYPTO

Program Committees

Crypto 2020
Eurocrypt 2019
PKC 2017
Asiacrypt 2016
PKC 2016
Crypto 2016
TCC 2015
Crypto 2015
PKC 2014
Asiacrypt 2014