International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Pratyay Mukherjee

Affiliation: Visa Research, USA US

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2021
PKC
BETA: Biometric-Enabled Threshold Authentication 📺
In the past decades, user authentication has been dominated by server-side password-based solutions that rely on ``what users know". This approach is susceptible to breaches and phishing attacks, and poses usability challenges. As a result, the industry is gradually moving to biometric-based client-side solutions that do not store any secret information on servers. This shift necessitates the safe storage of biometric templates and private keys, which are used to generate tokens, on user devices. We propose a new generic framework called Biometric Enabled Threshold Authentication (BETA) to protect sensitive client-side information like biometric templates and cryptographic keys. Towards this, we formally introduce the notion of Fuzzy Threshold Tokenizer (FTT) where an initiator can use a ``close'' biometric measurement to generate an authentication token if at least t (the threshold) devices participate. We require that the devices only talk to the initiator, and not to each other, to capture the way user devices are connected in the real world. We use the universal composability (UC) framework to model the security properties of FTT, including the unforgeability of tokens and the privacy of the biometric values (template and measurement), under a malicious adversary. We construct three protocols that meet our definition. Our first two protocols are general feasibility results that work for any distance function, any threshold t and tolerate the maximal (i.e. t-1) amount of corruption. They are based on any two round UC-secure multi-party computation protocol in the standard model (with a CRS) and threshold fully homomorphic encryption, respectively. We show how to effectively use these primitives to build protocols in a constrained communication model with just four rounds of communication. For the third protocol, we consider inner-product based distance metrics (cosine similarity, Euclidean distance, etc.) specifically, motivated by the recent interest in its use for face recognition. We use Paillier encryption, efficient NIZKs for specific languages, and a simple garbled circuit to build an efficient protocol for the common case of n=3 devices with one compromised.
2020
TCC
Reusable Two-Round MPC from DDH 📺
We present a reusable two-round multi-party computation (MPC) protocol from the Decisional Diffie Hellman assumption (DDH). In particular, we show how to upgrade any secure two-round MPC protocol to allow reusability of its first message across multiple computations, using Homomorphic Secret Sharing (HSS) and pseudorandom functions in NC1 — each of which can be instantiated from DDH. In our construction, if the underlying two-round MPC protocol is secure against semi-honest adversaries (in the plain model) then so is our reusable two-round MPC protocol. Similarly, if the underlying two-round MPC protocol is secure against malicious adversaries (in the common random/reference string model) then so is our reusable two-round MPC protocol. Previously, such reusable two-round MPC protocols were only known under assumptions on lattices. At a technical level, we show how to upgrade any two-round MPC protocol to a first message succinct two-round MPC protocol, where the first message of the protocol is generated independently of the computed circuit (though it is not reusable). This step uses homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) and low-depth pseudorandom functions. Next, we show a generic transformation that upgrades any first message succinct two-round MPC to allow for reusability of its first message.
2020
JOFC
Continuously Non-malleable Codes in the Split-State Model
Non-malleable codes (Dziembowski et al., ICS’10 and J. ACM’18) are a natural relaxation of error correcting/detecting codes with useful applications in cryptography. Informally, a code is non-malleable if an adversary trying to tamper with an encoding of a message can only leave it unchanged or modify it to the encoding of an unrelated value. This paper introduces continuous non-malleability, a generalization of standard non-malleability where the adversary is allowed to tamper continuously with the same encoding. This is in contrast to the standard definition of non-malleable codes, where the adversary can only tamper a single time. The only restriction is that after the first invalid codeword is ever generated, a special self-destruct mechanism is triggered and no further tampering is allowed; this restriction can easily be shown to be necessary. We focus on the split-state model, where an encoding consists of two parts and the tampering functions can be arbitrary as long as they act independently on each part. Our main contributions are outlined below. We show that continuous non-malleability in the split-state model is impossible without relying on computational assumptions. We construct a computationally secure split-state code satisfying continuous non-malleability in the common reference string (CRS) model. Our scheme can be instantiated assuming the existence of collision-resistant hash functions and (doubly enhanced) trapdoor permutations, but we also give concrete instantiations based on standard number-theoretic assumptions. We revisit the application of non-malleable codes to protecting arbitrary cryptographic primitives against related-key attacks. Previous applications of non-malleable codes in this setting required perfect erasures and the adversary to be restricted in memory. We show that continuously non-malleable codes allow to avoid these restrictions.
2019
CRYPTO
Continuous Space-Bounded Non-malleable Codes from Stronger Proofs-of-Space 📺
Non-malleable codes are encoding schemes that provide protections against various classes of tampering attacks. Recently Faust et al. (CRYPTO 2017) initiated the study of space-bounded non-malleable codes that provide such protections against tampering within small-space devices. They put forward a construction based on any non-interactive proof-of-space(NIPoS). However, the scheme only protects against an a priori bounded number of tampering attacks.We construct non-malleable codes that are resilient to an unbounded polynomial number of space-bounded tamperings. Towards that we introduce a stronger variant of $$\text {NIPoS}$$ called proof-extractable$$\text {NIPoS}$$ ($$\text {PExt-NIPoS}$$), and propose two approaches of constructing such a primitive. Using a new proof strategy we show that the generic encoding scheme of Faust et al. achieves unbounded tamper-resilience when instantiated with a $$\text {PExt-NIPoS}$$. We show two methods to construct $$\text {PExt-NIPoS}$$:1.The first method uses a special family of “memory-hard” graphs, called challenge-hard graphs (CHG), a notion we introduce here. We instantiate such family of graphs based on an extension of stack of localized expanders (first used by Ren and Devadas in the context of proof-of-space). In addition, we show that the graph construction used as a building block for the proof-of-space by Dziembowski et al. (CRYPTO 2015) satisfies challenge-hardness as well. These two CHG-instantiations lead to continuous space-bounded NMC with different features in the random oracle model.2.Our second instantiation relies on a new measurable property, called uniqueness of $$\text {NIPoS}$$. We show that standard extractability can be upgraded to proof-extractability if the $$\text {NIPoS}$$ also has uniqueness. We propose a simple heuristic construction of $$\text {NIPoS}$$, that achieves (partial) uniqueness, based on a candidate memory-hard function in the standard model and a publicly verifiable computation with small-space verification. Instantiating the encoding scheme of Faust et al. with this $$\text {NIPoS}$$, we obtain a continuous space-bounded NMC that supports the “most practical” parameters, complementing the provably secure but “relatively impractical” CHG-based constructions. Additionally, we revisit the construction of Faust et al. and observe that due to the lack of uniqueness of their $$\text {NIPoS}$$, the resulting encoding schemes yield “highly impractical” parameters in the continuous setting. We conclude the paper with a comparative study of all our non-malleable code constructions with an estimation of concrete parameters.
2019
ASIACRYPT
Approximate Trapdoors for Lattices and Smaller Hash-and-Sign Signatures
Yilei Chen Nicholas Genise Pratyay Mukherjee
We study a relaxed notion of lattice trapdoor called approximate trapdoor, which is defined to be able to invert Ajtai’s one-way function approximately instead of exactly. The primary motivation of our study is to improve the efficiency of the cryptosystems built from lattice trapdoors, including the hash-and-sign signatures.Our main contribution is to construct an approximate trapdoor by modifying the gadget trapdoor proposed by Micciancio and Peikert [Eurocrypt 2012]. In particular, we show how to use the approximate gadget trapdoor to sample short preimages from a distribution that is simulatable without knowing the trapdoor. The analysis of the distribution uses a theorem (implicitly used in past works) regarding linear transformations of discrete Gaussians on lattices.Our approximate gadget trapdoor can be used together with the existing optimization techniques to improve the concrete performance of the hash-and-sign signature in the random oracle model under (Ring-)LWE and (Ring-)SIS assumptions. Our implementation shows that the sizes of the public-key & signature can be reduced by half from those in schemes built from exact trapdoors.
2017
CRYPTO
2017
JOFC
2016
EUROCRYPT
2016
EUROCRYPT
2016
TCC
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
PKC
2014
EUROCRYPT
2014
TCC
2014
EPRINT
2014
EPRINT
2013
ASIACRYPT

Program Committees

PKC 2019
TCC 2019
TCC 2017
Asiacrypt 2017