## CryptoDB

### Peihan Miao

#### Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2021
PKC
In multi-party threshold private set intersection (PSI), $n$ parties each with a private set wish to compute the intersection of their sets if the intersection is sufficiently large. Previously, Ghosh and Simkin (CRYPTO 2019) studied this problem for the two-party case and demonstrated interesting lower and upper bounds on the communication complexity. In this work, we investigate the communication complexity of the multi-party setting $(n\geq 2)$. We consider two functionalities for multi-party threshold PSI. In the first, parties learn the intersection if each of their sets and the intersection differ by at most $T$. In the second functionality, parties learn the intersection if the union of all their sets and the intersection differ by at most $T$. For both functionalities, we show that any protocol must have communication complexity $\Omega(nT)$. We build protocols with a matching upper bound of $O(nT)$ communication complexity for both functionalities assuming threshold FHE. We also construct a computationally more efficient protocol for the second functionality with communication complexity $\widetilde{O}(nT)$ under a weaker assumption of threshold additive homomorphic encryption. As a direct implication, we solve one of the open problems in the work of Ghosh and Simkin (CRYPTO 2019) by designing a two-party protocol with communication cost $\widetilde{O}(T)$ from assumptions weaker than FHE. As a consequence of our results, we achieve the first "regular" multi-party PSI protocol where the communication complexity only grows with the size of the set difference and does not depend on the size of the input sets.
2020
CRYPTO
Private intersection-sum with cardinality allows two parties, where each party holds a private set and one of the parties additionally holds a private integer value associated with each element in her set, to jointly compute the cardinality of the intersection of the two sets as well as the sum of the associated integer values for all the elements in the intersection, and nothing beyond that. We present a new construction for private intersection sum with cardinality that provides malicious security with abort and guarantees that both parties receive the output upon successful completion of the protocol. A central building block for our constructions is a primitive called shuffled distributed oblivious PRF (DOPRF), which is a PRF that offers oblivious evaluation using a secret key shared between two parties, and in addition to this allows obliviously permuting the PRF outputs of several parallel oblivious evaluations. We present the first construction for shuffled DOPRF with malicious security. We further present several new sigma proof protocols for relations across Pedersen commitments, ElGamal encryptions, and Camenisch-Shoup encryptions that we use in our main construction, for which we develop new batching techniques to reduce communication. We implement and evaluate the efficiency of our protocol and show that we can achieve communication cost that is only 4-5x greater than the most efficient semi-honest protocol. When measuring monetary cost of executing the protocol in the cloud, our protocol is 25x more expensive than the semi-honest protocol. Our construction also allows for different parameter regimes that enable trade-offs between communication and computation.
2020
CRYPTO
We present a new protocol for two-party private set intersection (PSI) with semi-honest security in the plain model and one-sided malicious security in the random oracle model. Our protocol achieves a better balance between computation and communication than existing PSI protocols. Specifically, our protocol is the fastest in networks with moderate bandwidth (e.g., 30 - 100 Mbps). Considering the monetary cost (proposed by Pinkas et al. in CRYPTO 2019) to run the protocol on a cloud computing service, our protocol also compares favorably. Underlying our PSI protocol is a new lightweight multi-point oblivious pesudorandom function (OPRF) protocol based on oblivious transfer (OT) extension. We believe this new protocol may be of independent interest.
2018
CRYPTO
We show new constructions of semi-honest and malicious two-round multiparty secure computation protocols using only (a fixed) $\mathsf {poly}(n,\lambda )$ poly(n,λ) invocations of a two-round oblivious transfer protocol (which use expensive public-key operations) and $\mathsf {poly}(\lambda , |C|)$ poly(λ,|C|) cheaper one-way function calls, where $\lambda$ λ is the security parameter, n is the number of parties, and C is the circuit being computed. All previously known two-round multiparty secure computation protocols required $\mathsf {poly}(\lambda ,|C|)$ poly(λ,|C|) expensive public-key operations.
2017
EUROCRYPT
2017
CRYPTO
2016
TCC