## CryptoDB

### Geoffroy Couteau

#### ORCID: 0000-0002-6645-0106

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2023

PKC

Improved Private Set Intersection for Sets with Small Entries
Abstract

We introduce new protocols for private set intersection (PSI), building upon recent constructions of pseudorandom correlation generators, such as vector-OLE and ring-OLE. Our new constructions improve over the state of the art on several aspects, and perform especially well
in the setting where the parties have databases with small entries. We obtain three main contributions:
1. We introduce a new semi-honest PSI protocol that combines subfield vector-OLE with hash-based PSI. Our protocol is the first PSI protocol to achieve communication complexity independent of the computational security parameter κ, and has communication lower than all previous known protocols for input sizes ℓ below 70 bits.
2. We enhance the security of our protocol to the malicious setting, using two different approaches. In particular, we show that applying the dual execution technique yields a malicious PSI whose communication remains independent of κ, and improves over all known PSI protocols
for small values of ℓ.
3. As most previous protocols, our above protocols are in the random oracle model. We introduce a third protocol which relies on subfield ring-OLE to achieve maliciously secure PSI in the standard model, under the ring-LPN assumption. Our protocol enjoys extremely low communication, reasonable computation, and standard model security. Furthermore, it is batchable: the message of a client can be reused to compute the intersection of their set with that of multiple servers, yielding further reduction in the overall amortized communication.

2023

PKC

Pseudorandom Correlation Functions from Variable-Density LPN, Revisited
Abstract

Pseudorandom correlation functions (PCF), introduced in the work of (Boyle et al., FOCS 2020), allow two parties to locally generate, from short correlated keys, a near-unbounded amount of pseudorandom samples from a target correlation. PCF is an extremely appealing primitive in secure computation, where they allow to confine all preprocessing phases of all future computations two parties could want to execute to a single short interaction with low communication and computation, followed solely by offline computations. Beyond introducing the notion, Boyle et al. gave a candidate construction, using a new variable-density} variant of the learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption. Then, to provide support for this new assumption, the authors showed that it provably resists a large class of linear attacks, which captures in particular all known attacks on LPN.
In this work, we revisit the analysis of the VDLPN assumption. We make two key contributions:
- First, we observe that the analysis of Boyle et al is purely asymptotic: they do not lead to any concrete and efficient PCF instantiation within the bounds that offer security guarantees. To improve this state of affairs, we combine a new variant of a VDLPN assumption with an entirely new, much tighter security analysis, which we further tighten using extensive computer simulations to optimize parameters. This way, we manage to obtain for the first time a set of provable usable parameters (under a simple combinatorial conjecture which is easy to verify experimentally), leading to a concretely efficient PCF resisting all linear tests.
- Second, we identify a flaw in the security analysis of Boyle et al., which invalidates their proof that VDLPN resists linear attacks. Using several new non-trivial arguments, we repair the proof and fully demonstrate that VDLPN resists linear attack; our new analysis is more involved than the original (flawed) analysis.
Our parameters set leads to PCFs with keys around 3MB allowing ~ 500 evaluations per second on one core of a standard laptop for 110 bits of security; these numbers can be improved to 360kB keys and ~ 3800 evaluations/s using a more aggressive all-prefix variant. All numbers are quite tight: only within a factor 3 of the best bounds one could heuristically hope for.

2023

EUROCRYPT

Oblivious Transfer with Constant Computational Overhead
Abstract

The computational overhead of a cryptographic task is the asymptotic ratio between the computational cost of securely realizing the task and that of realizing the task with no security at all. Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, and Sahai (STOC 2008) showed that secure two-party computation of Boolean circuits can be realized with constant computational overhead, independent of the desired level of security, assuming the existence of an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol and a local pseudorandom generator (PRG). However, this only applies to the case of semi-honest parties. A central open question in the area is the possibility of a similar result for malicious parties. This question is open even for the simpler task of securely realizing many instances of a constant-size function, such as OT of bits.
We settle the question in the affirmative for the case of OT, assuming: (1) a standard OT protocol, (2) a slightly stronger “correlation-robust” variant of a local PRG, and (3) a standard sparse variant of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption. An optimized version of our construction requires fewer than 100 bit operations per party per bit-OT. For 128-bit security, this improves over the best previous protocols by 1-2 orders of magnitude.
We achieve this by constructing a constant-overhead pseudorandom correlation generator (PCG) for the bit-OT correlation. Such a PCG generates N pseudorandom instances of bit-OT by locally expanding short, correlated seeds. As a result, we get an end-to-end protocol for generating N pseudorandom instances of bit-OT with o(N) communication, O(N) computation, and security that scales sub-exponentially with N.
Finally, we present applications of our main result to realizing other secure computation tasks with constant computational overhead. These include protocols for general circuits with a relaxed notion of security against malicious parties, protocols for realizing N instances of natural constant-size functions, and reducing the main open question to a potentially simpler question about fault-tolerant computation.

2023

EUROCRYPT

Sublinear-Communication Secure Multiparty Computation does not require FHE
Abstract

Secure computation enables mutually distrusting parties to jointly compute a function on their secret inputs, while revealing nothing beyond the function output. A long-running challenge is understanding the required communication complexity of such protocols---in particular, when communication can be *sublinear* in the circuit representation size of the desired function.
Significant advances have been made affirmatively answering this question within the {\em two-party} setting, based on a variety of structures and hardness assumptions.
In contrast, in the *multi-party* setting, only one general approach is known: using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE).
We present a framework for achieving secure sublinear-communication $(N+1)$-party computation, building from a particular form of Function Secret Sharing for only $N$ parties. In turn, we demonstrate implications to sublinear secure computation for various function classes in the 3-party and 5-party settings based on an assortment of assumptions not known to imply FHE.

2023

EUROCRYPT

Short Signatures from Regular Syndrome Decoding in the Head
Abstract

We introduce a new candidate post-quantum digital signature scheme from the regular syndrome decoding (RSD) assumption, an established variant of the syndrome decoding assumption which asserts that it is hard to find w-regular solutions to systems of linear equations over F_2 (a vector is regular if it is a concatenation of w unit vectors). Our signature is obtained by introducing and compiling a new 5-round zero-knowledge proof system constructed using the MPC-in-the-head paradigm. At the heart of our result is an efficient MPC protocol in the preprocessing model that checks correctness of a regular syndrome decoding instance by using a share ring-conversion mechanism.
The analysis of our construction is non-trivial and forms a core technical contribution of our work. It requires careful combinatorial analysis and combines several new ideas, such as analyzing soundness in a relaxed setting where a cheating prover is allowed to use any witness *sufficiently close* to a regular vector. We complement our analysis with an in-depth overview of existing attacks against RSD.
Our signatures are competitive with the best-known code-based signatures, ranging from 12.52 KB (fast setting, with signing time of the order of a few milliseconds on a single core of a standard laptop) to about 9 KB (short setting, with estimated signing time of the order of 15ms).

2023

EUROCRYPT

Fine-Grained Non-Interactive Key-Exchange: Constructions and Lower Bounds
Abstract

In 1974, Merkle showed that an ideal hash function (modeled as a random oracle) can be used between two parties to agree on a key that remains \emph{mildly} secure against adversaries whose running time is quadratic in those of honest parties. Shortly after, Diffie and Hellman improved this idea to a full-fledged key exchange protocol that is conjectured to be secure against super-polynomial adversaries. Both of these protocols have a crucial aspect in common: they are \emph{non-interactive}, as parties send their single message in parallel, and then they use their secret randomness and the public messages to derive the common key. Constructing $K$-NIKE protocols on well-founded assumptions turned out to be much challenging for $K>2$. For $K=3$ one can do this based on pairing-based assumptions, and for $K>3$ even stronger assumptions such as indistinguishability obfuscations have been used.
In this work, we initiate a study of $K$-NIKE protocols in the \emph{fine-grained} setting, in which there is a \emph{polynomial} gap between the running time of the honest parties and that of the adversary. Our goal is to show the possibility, or impossibility, of basing such protocols on weaker assumptions than those of $K$-NIKE protocols for $K \geq 3$. Our contribution is threefold.
1. We show that random oracles can be used to obtain fine-grained $K$-NIKE protocols for \emph{every} constant $K$. In particular, we show how to generalize Merkle's two-party protocol to $K$ parties in such a way that the honest parties ask $n$ queries each, while the adversary needs $n^{K/(K-1)}$ queries to the random oracle to find the key.
2. We then improve the security by further using algebraic structure, while avoiding pairing. In particular, we show that there is a 4-party NIKE in Shoup's generic group model with a \emph{quadratic} gap between the number of queries by the honest parties vs. that of the adversary.
3. Finally, we show a limitation of using purely algebraic methods for obtaining $3$-NIKE. In particular, we show that any $n$-query $3$-NIKE protocol in Maurer's generic group model can be broken by a $O(n^2)$-query attacker. Maurer's GGM is more limited compared with Shoup's both for the parties and the adversary, as there are no explicit labels for the group elements. Despite being more limited, this model still captures the Diffie Hellman protocol. Prior to our work, it was open to break $3$-NIKE protocols in Maurer's model with \emph{any} polynomial number of queries.
Our work leaves open to understand the optimality of our $K$-NIKE protocol in the random oracle model, which we conjecture to be optimal, and also to close the gap between our positive result in Shoup's model and the negative result in Maurer's model.

2023

EUROCRYPT

Constrained Pseudorandom Functions from Homomorphic Secret Sharing
Abstract

We propose and analyze a simple strategy for constructing 1-key constrained pseudorandom functions (CPRFs) from homomorphic secret sharing. In the process, we obtain the following contributions: first, we identify desirable properties for the underlying HSS scheme for our strategy to work. Second, we show that (most of) recent existing HSS schemes satisfy these properties, leading to instantiations of CPRFs for various constraints and from various assumptions. Notably, we obtain the first (1-key selectively secure, private) CPRFs for inner-product and (1-key selectively secure) CPRFs for NC 1 from the DCR assumption, and more. Last, we revisit two applications of HSS equipped with these additional properties to secure computation: we obtain secure computation in the silent preprocessing model with one party being able to precompute its whole preprocessing material before even knowing the other party, and we construct one-sided statistically secure computation with sublinear communication for restricted forms of computation.

2023

CRYPTO

A Note on Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge from CDH
Abstract

We build non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) and ZAP arguments for all NP where soundness holds for infinitely-many security parameters, and against uniform adversaries, assuming the subexponential hardness of the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. We additionally prove the existence of NIZK arguments with these same properties assuming the polynomial hardness of both CDH and the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption. In both cases, the CDH assumption does not require a group equipped with a pairing.
Infinitely-often uniform security is a standard byproduct of commonly used non-black-box techniques that build on disjunction arguments on the (in)security of some primitive. In the course of proving our results, we develop a new variant of this non-black-box technique that yields improved guarantees: we obtain explicit constructions (previous works generally only obtained existential results) where security holds for a relatively dense set of security parameters (as opposed to an arbitrary infinite set of security parameters). We demonstrate that our techniques can have applications beyond our main results.

2023

CRYPTO

Correlated Pseudorandomness from the Hardness of Quasi-Abelian Decoding
Abstract

Secure computation often benefits from the use of correlated
randomness to achieve fast, non-cryptographic online protocols. A
recent paradigm put forth by Boyle et al. (CCS 2018, Crypto
2019) showed how pseudorandom correlation generators (PCG)
can be used to generate large amounts of useful forms of correlated
(pseudo)randomness, using minimal interactions followed solely by
local computation, yielding silent secure two-party
computation protocols (protocols where the preprocessing phase
requires almost no communication). Furthermore, programmable
PCGs can be used similarly to generate multiparty correlated
randomness to be used in silent secure N-party protocols. Previous
works constructed very efficient (non-programmable) PCGs for
correlations such as random oblivious transfer. However, the
situation is less satisfying for the case of random oblivious
linear evaluation (OLE), which generalize oblivious transfers
over large field, and are a core resource for secure computation of
arithmetic circuits. The state-of-the-art work of (Boyle et
al., Crypto 2020) constructed programmable PCGs for OLE, but
their work suffers from two important downsides: (1) it only
generates OLEs over large fields, and (2) it relies on a
relatively new ``splittable'' ring-LPN assumption, which lacks
strong security foundations.
In this work, we construct new programmable PCGs for the OLE
correlation, that overcome both limitations. To this end, we
introduce the Quasi-Abelian Syndrome Decoding problem
(QASD), a family of assumption which generalizes the
well-established Quasi-Cyclic Syndrome Decoding assumption. Building
upon QASD, we construct new programmable PCGs for OLEs over any
field Fq with q > 2. Furthermore, we provide strong security
foundations for QASD, showing that it resists all attacks from the
linear test framework (Couteau et al., Crypto 2021)
and admits a search-to-decision reduction. In particular, our
analysis also sheds light on the security of the ring-LPN assumption
used in Boyle et al., Crypto 2020). Using our new PCGs, we
obtain the first efficient N-party silent secure computation
protocols for computing general arithmetic circuit over Fq for
any q > 2.

2022

EUROCRYPT

On Building Fine-Grained One-Way Functions from Strong Average-Case Hardness
📺
Abstract

Constructing one-way functions from average-case hardness is a long-standing open problem.
A positive result would exclude Pessiland (Impagliazzo '95) and establish a highly desirable win-win situation: either (symmetric) cryptography exists unconditionally, or all NP problems can be solved efficiently on the average. Motivated by the lack of progress on this seemingly very hard question, we initiate the investigation of weaker yet meaningful candidate win-win results of the following type: either there are *fine-grained* one-way functions (FGOWF), or nontrivial speedups can be obtained for all NP problems on the average. FGOWFs only require a fixed polynomial gap (as opposed to superpolynomial) between the running time of the function and the running time of an inverter. We obtain three main results:
Construction. We show that if there is an NP language having a very strong form of average-case hardness, which we call *block finding hardness*, then FGOWF exist. We provide heuristic support for this very strong average-case hardness notion by showing that it holds for a random language. Then, we study whether weaker (and more natural) forms of average-case hardness could already suffice to obtain FGOWF, and obtain two negative results:
Separation I. We provide a strong oracle separation for the implication (exponentially average-case hard languages exist => FGOWF exist).
Separation II. We provide a second strong negative result for an even weaker candidate win-win result. Namely, we rule out a black-box proof for the implication (exponentially average-case hard language *whose hardness amplifies optimally through parallel repetitions* exist => FGOWF exist). This separation forms the core technical contribution of our work.

2022

CRYPTO

Correlated Pseudorandomness from Expand-Accumulate Codes
📺
Abstract

A pseudorandom correlation generator (PCG) is a recent tool for securely generating useful sources of correlated randomness, such as random oblivious transfers (OT) and vector oblivious linear evaluations (VOLE), with low communication cost.
We introduce a simple new design for PCGs based on so-called expand-accumulate codes, which first apply a sparse random expander graph to replicate each message entry, and then accumulate the entries by computing the sum of each prefix. Our design offers the following advantages compared to state-of-the-art PCG constructions:
- Competitive concrete efficiency backed by provable security against relevant classes of attacks;
- An offline-online mode that combines near-optimal cache-friendliness with simple parallelization;
- Concretely efficient extensions to pseudorandom correlation functions, which enable incremental generation of new correlation instances on demand, and to new kinds of correlated randomness that include circuit-dependent correlations.
To further improve the concrete computational cost, we propose a method for speeding up a full-domain evaluation of a puncturable pseudorandom function (PPRF). This is independently motivated by other cryptographic applications of PPRFs.

2022

ASIACRYPT

Non-Interactive Secure Computation of Inner-Product from LPN and LWE
📺
Abstract

We put forth a new cryptographic primitive for securely computing inner-products in a scalable, non-interactive fashion: any party can broadcast a public (computationally hiding) encoding of its input, and store a secret state. Given their secret state and the other party's public encoding, any pair of parties can non-interactively compute additive shares of the inner-product between the encoded vectors.
We give constructions of this primitive from a common template, which can be instantiated under either the LPN (with non-negligible correctness error) or the LWE (with negligible correctness error) assumptions. Our construction uses a novel twist on the standard non-interactive key exchange based on the Alekhnovich cryptosystem, which upgrades it to a non-interactive inner product protocol almost for free. In addition to being non-interactive, our constructions have linear communication (with constants smaller than all known alternatives) and small computation: using LPN or LWE with quasi-cyclic codes, we estimate that encoding a length-2^20 vector over a 32-bit field takes less that 2s on a standard laptop; decoding amounts to a single cheap inner-product.
We show how to remove the non-negligible error in our LPN instantiation using a one-time, logarithmic-communication preprocessing. Eventually, we show to to upgrade its security to the malicious model using new sublinear-communication zero-knowledge proofs for low-noise LPN samples, which might be of independent interest.

2022

TCC

Anonymous Whistleblowing over Authenticated Channels
Abstract

The goal of anonymous whistleblowing is to publicly disclose a message while at the same time hiding the identity of the sender in a way that even if suspected of being the sender, this cannot be proven.
While many solutions to this problem have been proposed over the years, they all require some form of interaction with trusted or non-colluding parties. In this work, we ask whether this is fundamentally inherent. We put forth the notion of anonymous transfer as a primitive allowing to solve this problem without relying on any participating trusted parties.
We initiate the theoretical study of this question, and derive negative and positive results on the existence of such a protocol.
We refute the feasibility of asymptotically secure anonymous transfer, where the message will be received with overwhelming probability while at the same time the identity of the sender remains hidden with overwhelming probability.
On the other hand, resorting to fine-grained cryptography, we provide a heuristic instantiation (assuming ideal obfuscation) which guarantees that the message will be correctly received with overwhelming probability and the identity of the sender leaks with vanishing probability. Our results provide strong foundations for the study of the possibility of anonymous communications through authenticated channels, an intriguing goal which we believe to be of fundamental interest.

2022

ASIACRYPT

Random Sources in Private Computation
📺
Abstract

We consider multi-party information-theoretic private computation. Such computation inherently requires the use of local randomness by the parties, and the question of minimizing the total number of random bits used for given private computations has received considerable attention in the literature.
In this work we are interested in another question: given a private computation, we ask how many of the players need to have access to a random source, and how many of them can be deterministic parties. We are further interested in the possible interplay between the number of random sources in the system and the total number of random bits necessary for the computation.
We give a number of results. We first show that, perhaps surprisingly, t players (rather than t+1) with access to a random source are sufficient for the information-theoretic t-private computation of any deterministic functionality over n players for any t<n/2; by a result of (Kushilevitz and Mansour, PODC'96), this is best possible. This means that, counter intuitively, while private computation is impossible without randomness, it is possible to have a private computation even when the adversary can control *all* parties who can toss coins (and therefore sees all random coins). For randomized functionalities we show that t+1 random sources are necessary (and sufficient).
We then turn to the question of the possible interplay between the number of random sources and the necessary number of random bits. Since for only very few settings in private computation meaningful bounds on the number of necessary random bits are known, we consider the AND function, for which some such bounds are known. We give a new protocol to 1-privately compute the n-player AND function, which uses a single random source and 6 random bits tossed by that source. This improves, upon the currently best known results (Kushilevitz et al., TCC 2019), at the same time the number of sources and the number of random bits ((Kushilevitz et al., TCC 2019) gives a 2-source, 8-bits protocol). This result gives maybe some evidence that for 1-privacy, using the minimum necessary number of sources one can also achieve the necessary minimum number of random bits. We believe however that our protocol is of independent interest for the study of randomness in private computation.

2022

TCC

Sublinear Secure Computation from New Assumptions
Abstract

Secure computation enables mutually distrusting parties to jointly compute a function on their secret inputs, while revealing nothing beyond the function output. A long-running challenge is understanding the required communication complexity of such protocols---in particular, when communication can be sublinear in the circuit representation size of the desired function. For certain functions, such as Private Information Retrieval (PIR), this question extends to even sublinearity in the input size.
We develop new techniques expanding the set of computational assumptions for sublinear communication in both settings:
1) Circuit size. We present sublinear-communication protocols for secure evaluation of general layered circuits, given any 2-round rate-1 batch oblivious transfer (OT) protocol with a particular ``decomposability'' property.
In particular, this condition can be shown to hold for the recent batch OT protocols of (Brakerski et al. Eurocrypt 2022), in turn yielding a new sublinear secure computation feasibility: from Quadratic Residuosity (QR) together with polynomial-noise-rate Learning Parity with Noise (LPN).
Our approach constitutes a departure from existing paths toward sublinear secure computation, all based on fully homomorphic encryption or homomorphic secret sharing.
2) Input size. We construct single-server PIR based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, with polylogarithmic communication in the database input size n. Previous constructions from CDH required communication Omega(n).
In hindsight, our construction comprises of a relatively simple combination of existing tools from the literature.

2021

EUROCRYPT

Efficient Range Proofs with Transparent Setup from Bounded Integer Commitments
📺
Abstract

We introduce a new approach for constructing range proofs. Our approach is modular, and leads to highly competitive range proofs under standard assumption, using less communication and (much) less computation than the state of the art methods, and without relying on a trusted setup. Our range proofs can be used as a drop-in replacement in a variety of protocols such as distributed ledgers, anonymous transaction systems, and many more, leading to significant reductions in communication and computation for these applications.
At the heart of our result is a new method to transform any commitment over a finite field into a commitment scheme which allows to commit to and efficiently prove relations about bounded integers. Combining these new commitments with a classical approach for range proofs based on square decomposition, we obtain several new instantiations of a paradigm which was previously limited to RSA-based range proofs (with high communication and computation, and trusted setup). More specifically, we get:
- Under the discrete logarithm assumption, we obtain the most compact and efficient range proof among all existing candidates (with or without trusted setup). Our proofs are 12% to 20% shorter than the state of the art Bulletproof (Bootle et al., CRYPTO'18) for standard choices of range size and security parameter, and are more efficient (both for the prover and the verifier) by more than an order of magnitude.
- Under the LWE assumption, we obtain range proofs that improve over the state of the art in a batch setting when at least a few dozen range proofs are required. The amortized communication of our range proofs improves by up to two orders of magnitudes over the state of the art when the number of required range proofs grows.
- Eventually, under standard class group assumptions, we obtain the first concretely efficient standard integer commitment scheme (without bounds on the size of the committed integer) which does not assume trusted setup.

2021

EUROCRYPT

Breaking the Circuit Size Barrier for Secure Computation under Quasi-Polynomial LPN
📺
Abstract

In this work we introduce a new (circuit-dependent) homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) scheme for all log/loglog-local circuits, with communication proportional only to the width of the circuit, and polynomial computation, assuming the super-polynomial hardness of learning parity with noise (LPN). At the heart of our new construction is a pseudorandom correlation generator (PCG), which allows two partie to locally stretch, from short seeds, pseudorandom instances of an arbitrary log / log log-local additive correlation.
Our main application, and the main motivation behind this work, is a generic two-party secure computation protocol for every layered (boolean or arithmetic) circuit of size s with total communication O(s/ log log s) and polynomial computation, assuming the super-polynomial hardness of the standard learning parity with noise assumption (a circuit is layered if its nodes can be partitioned in layers, such that any wire connects adjacent layers). This expands the set of assumptions under which the ‘circuit size barrier’ can be broken, for a large class of circuits. The strength of the underlying assumption is tied to the sublinearity factor: we achieve communication O(s/k(s)) under the s^2^k(s) -hardness of LPN, for any k(s) ≤ log log s /4.
Previously, the set of assumptions known to imply a PCG for correlations of degree ω(1) or generic secure computation protocols with sublinear communication was restricted to LWE, DDH, and a circularly secure variant of DCR.

2021

CRYPTO

Low-Complexity Weak Pseudorandom Functions in AC0[MOD2]
📺
Abstract

A *weak pseudorandom function* (WPRF) is a keyed function $f_k:\{0,1\}^n\to\{0,1\}$ such that, for a random key $k$, a collection of samples $(x, f_k(x))$, for {\em uniformly random} inputs $x$, cannot be efficiently distinguished from totally random input-output pairs $(x,y)$. We study WPRFs in AC0[MOD2], the class of functions computable by AC0 circuits with parity gates, making the following contributions.
- *Between Lapland and Cryptomania.* We show that WPRFs in AC0[MOD2] imply a variant of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption. This gives an unconditional version of an earlier conditional result of Akavia et al. (ITCS 2014). We further show that WPRFs in a subclass of AC0[mod 2] that includes a recent WPRF candidate by Boyle et al. (FOCS 2020) imply, under a seemingly weak additional conjecture, public-key encryption.
- *WPRF by sparse polynomials.* We propose the first WPRF candidate that can be computed by sparse multivariate polynomials over $\F_2$. We prove that it has subexponential security against linear and algebraic attacks.
- *WPRF in AC0 ◦ MOD2.* We study the existence of WPRFs computed by AC0 circuits \emph{over} parity gates. We propose a modified version of a previous WPRF candidate of Akavia et al., and prove that it resists the algebraic attacks that were used by Bogdanov and Rosen (ECCC 2017) to break the original candidate in quasipolynomial time. We give evidence against the possibility of using {\em public} parity gates and relate this question to other conjectures.

2021

CRYPTO

Silver: Silent VOLE and Oblivious Transfer from Hardness of Decoding Structured LDPC Codes
📺
Abstract

We put forth new protocols for oblivious transfer extension and vector OLE, called \emph{Silver}, for SILent Vole and oblivious transfER. Silver offers extremely high performances: generating 10 million random OTs on one core of a standard laptop requires only 300ms of computation and 122KB of communication. This represents 37% less computation and ~1300x less communication than the standard IKNP protocol, as well as ~4x less computation and ~4x less communication than the recent protocol of Yang et al. (CCS 2020). Silver is \emph{silent}: after a one-time cheap interaction, two parties can store small seeds, from which they can later \emph{locally} generate a large number of OTs \emph{while remaining offline}. Neither IKNP nor Yang et al. enjoys this feature; compared to the best known silent OT extension protocol of Boyle et al. (CCS 2019), upon which we build up, Silver has 19x less computation, and the same communication. Due to its attractive efficiency features, Silver yields major efficiency improvements in numerous MPC protocols.
Our approach is a radical departure from the standard paradigm for building MPC protocols, in that we do \emph{not} attempt to base our constructions on a well-studied assumption. Rather, we follow an approach closer in spirit to the standard paradigm in the design of symmetric primitives: we identify a set of fundamental structural properties that allow us to withstand all known attacks, and put forth a candidate design, guided by our analysis. We also rely on extensive experimentations to analyze our candidate and experimentally validate their properties. In essence, our approach boils down to constructing new families of linear codes with (plausibly) high minimum distance and extremely low encoding time. While further analysis is of course warranted to confidently assess the security of Silver, we hope and believe that initiating this approach to the design of MPC primitives will pave the way to new secure primitives with extremely attractive efficiency features.

2021

ASIACRYPT

Efficient NIZKs for Algebraic Sets
📺
Abstract

Significantly extending the framework of (Couteau and Hartmann, Crypto 2020), we propose a general methodology to construct NIZKs for showing that an encrypted vector $\vec{\chi}$ belongs to an algebraic set, i.e., is in the zero locus of an ideal $\mathscr{I}$ of a polynomial ring. In the case where $\mathscr{I}$ is principal, i.e., generated by a single polynomial $F$, we first construct a matrix that is a ``quasideterminantal representation'' of $F$ and then a NIZK argument to show that $F (\vec{\chi}) = 0$. This leads to compact NIZKs for general computational structures, such as polynomial-size algebraic branching programs. We extend the framework to the case where $\IDEAL$ is non-principal, obtaining efficient NIZKs for R1CS, arithmetic constraint satisfaction systems, and thus for $\mathsf{NP}$. As an independent result, we explicitly describe the corresponding language of ciphertexts as an algebraic language, with smaller parameters than in previous constructions that were based on the disjunction of algebraic languages. This results in an efficient GL-SPHF for algebraic branching programs.

2021

TCC

On Derandomizing Yao’s Weak-to-Strong OWF Construction
📺
Abstract

The celebrated result of Yao (Yao, FOCS'82) shows that concatenating n · p(n) copies of a weak one-way function f which can be inverted with probability 1 - 1/p(n) suffices to construct a strong one-way function g, showing that weak and strong one-way functions are black-box equivalent. This direct product theorem for hardness amplification of one-way functions has been very influential. However, the construction of Yao has severe efficiency limitations; in particular, it is not security-preserving (the input to g needs to be much larger than the input to f). Understanding whether this is inherent is an intriguing and long-standing open question.
In this work, we explore necessary features of constructions which achieve short input length by proving the following: for any direct product construction of strong OWF g from a weak OWF f, which can be inverted with probability 1-1/p(n), the input size of g must grow as Omega(p(n)). By direct product construction, we refer to any construction with the following structure: the construction g executes some arbitrary pre-processing function (independent of f) on its input, obtaining a vector (y_1 ,··· ,y_l ), and outputs f(y_1),··· ,f(y_l). Note that Yao's construction is obtained by setting the pre-processing to be the identity. Our result generalizes to functions g with post-processing, as long as the post-processing function is not too lossy. Thus, in essence, any weak-to-strong hardness amplification must either (1) be very far from security-preserving, (2) use adaptivity, or (3) must be very far from a direct-product structure (in the sense of having a very lossy post-processing of the outputs of f).
On a technical level, we use ideas from lower bounds for secret-sharing to prove the impossibility of derandomizing Yao in a black-box way. Our results are in line with Goldreich, Impagliazzo, Levin, Venkatesan, and Zuckerman (FOCS 1990) who derandomize Yao's construction for regular weak one-way functions by evaluating the OWF along a random walk on an expander graph---the construction is adaptive, since it alternates steps on the expander graph with evaluations of the weak one-way function.

2021

TCC

Statistical ZAPs from Group-Based Assumptions
📺
Abstract

We put forth a template for constructing statistical ZAPs for NP. Our template compiles NIZKs for NP in the hidden bit model (which exist unconditionally) into statistical ZAPs using a new notion of interactive hidden-bit generator (IHBG), which adapts the notion of hidden-bit generator to the plain model by building upon the recent notion of statistically-hiding extractable commitments. We provide a construction of IHBG from the explicit hardness of the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption (where explicit refers to requiring an explicit upper bound on the advantage of any polynomial-time adversary against the assumption) and the existence of statistical ZAPs for a specific simple language, building upon the recent construction of dual-mode hidden-bit generator from (Libert et al., EUROCRYPT 2020). We provide two instantiations of the underlying simple ZAP:
1. Using the recent statistical ZAP for the Diffie-Hellman language of (Couteau and Hartmann, CRYPTO 2020), we obtain statistical ZAPs for NP assuming (the explicit hardness of) DDH in $G_1$ and kernel-DH in $G_2$ (a search assumption which is weaker than DDH), where $(G_1,G_2)$ are groups equipped with an asymmetric pairing. This improves over the recent work of (Lombardi et al., EUROCRYPT 2020) which achieved a relaxed variant of statistical ZAP for NP, under a stronger assumption.
2. Using the recent work of (Couteau et al., EUROCRYPT 2020), we obtain statistical ZAPs for NP assuming the explicit hardness of DDH, together with the assumption that no efficient adversary can break the key-dependent message one-wayness of ElGamal with respect to efficient functions over groups of size $2^\secpar$ with probability better than $\poly(\secpar)/2^{(c + o(1)) \cdot \secpar}$, denoted $2^{-c\secpar}$-\OWKDM, for a constant c = 1/2, in pairing-free groups.
Note that the latter is a search discrete-log-style falsifiable assumption, incomparable to DDH (in particular, it is not known to imply public-key encryption).

2020

EUROCRYPT

Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge in Pairing-Free Groups from Weaker Assumptions
📺
Abstract

We provide new constructions of non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments (NIZKs) for NP from discrete-logarithm-style assumptions over cyclic groups, without relying on pairings. A previous construction from (Canetti et al., Eurocrypt'18) achieves such NIZKs under the assumption that no efficient adversary can break the key-dependent message (KDM) security of (additive) ElGamal with respect to all (even inefficient) functions over groups of size $2^\lambda$, with probability better than $\poly(\lambda)/2^{\lambda}$. This is an extremely strong, non-falsifiable assumption. In particular, even mild (polynomial) improvements over the current best known attacks on the discrete logarithm problem would already contradict this assumption. (Canetti et al. STOC'19) describe how to improve the assumption to rely only on KDM security with respect to all efficient functions, therefore obtaining an assumption that is (in spirit) falsifiable.
Our first construction improves this state of affairs. We provide a construction of NIZKs for NP under the CDH assumption together with the assumption that no efficient adversary can break the key-dependent message one-wayness of ElGamal with respect to efficient functions over groups of size $2^\lambda$, with probability better than $\poly(\lambda)/2^{c\lambda}$ (denoted $2^{-c\lambda}$-OWKDM), for a constant $c = 3/4$. Unlike the previous assumption, our assumption leaves an exponential gap between the best known attack and the required security guarantee.
We also analyse whether we could build NIZKs when CDH does not hold. As a second contribution, we construct an infinitely often NIZK argument system for NP (where soundness and zero-knowledge are only guaranteed to hold for infinitely many security parameters), under the $2^{-c\lambda}$-OWKDM security of ElGamal with $c = 28/29+o(1)$, together with the existence of low-depth pseudorandom generators.

2020

PKC

The Usefulness of Sparsifiable Inputs: How to Avoid Subexponential iO
📺
Abstract

We consider the problem of removing subexponential reductions to indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) in the context of obfuscating probabilistic programs. Specifically, we show how to apply complexity absorption (Zhandry Crypto 2016) to the recent notion of probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation (piO, Canetti et al. TCC 2015). As a result, we obtain a variant of piO which allows to obfuscate a large class of probabilistic programs, from polynomially secure indistinguishability obfuscation and extremely lossy functions. Particularly, our piO variant is able to obfuscate circuits with specific input domains regardless of the performed computation. We then revisit several (direct or indirect) applications of piO, and obtain – a fully homomorphic encryption scheme (without circular security assumptions), – a multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme with threshold decryption, – an encryption scheme secure under arbitrary key-dependent messages, – a spooky encryption scheme for all circuits, – a function secret sharing scheme with additive reconstruction for all circuits, all from polynomially secure iO, extremely lossy functions, and, depending on the scheme, also other (but polynomial and comparatively mild) assumptions. All of these assumptions are implied by polynomially secure iO and the (non-polynomial, but very well-investigated) exponential DDH assumption. Previously, all the above applications required to assume the subexponential security of iO (and more standard assumptions).

2020

CRYPTO

Shorter Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments and ZAPs for Algebraic Languages
📺
Abstract

We put forth a new framework for building pairing-based non-interactive
zero-knowledge (NIZK) arguments for a wide class of algebraic languages,
which are an extension of linear languages, containing disjunctions of linear
languages and more. Our approach differs from the Groth-Sahai methodology, in
that we rely on pairings to compile a Sigma-protocol into a NIZK. Our framework enjoys
a number of interesting features:
- conceptual simplicity, parameters derive from the Sigma-protocol;
- proofs as short as resulting from the Fiat-Shamir heuristic applied to the underlying
Sigma-protocol;
- fully adaptive soundness and perfect zero-knowledge in the common random
string model with a single random group element as CRS;
- yields simple and efficient two-round, public coin, publicly-verifiable perfect witness-
indistinguishable (WI) arguments(ZAPs) in the plain model. To our knowledge, this is the first
construction of two-rounds statistical witness-indistinguishable arguments from pairing
assumptions.
Our proof system relies on a new (static, falsifiable) assumption over pairing
groups which generalizes the standard kernel Diffie-Hellman assumption in a
natural way and holds in the generic group model (GGM) and in the algebraic
group model (AGM).
Replacing Groth-Sahai \NIZKs with our new proof system allows to improve several important cryptographic primitives. In particular, we obtain the shortest tightly-secure structure-preserving signature scheme (which are a core component in anonymous credentials), the shortest tightly-secure quasi-adaptive \NIZK with unbounded simulation soundness (which in turns implies the shortest tightly-mCCA-secure cryptosystem), and shorter ring signatures.

2020

CRYPTO

Efficient Pseudorandom Correlation Generators from Ring-LPN
📺
Abstract

Secure multiparty computation can often utilize a trusted source of correlated randomness to achieve better efficiency. A recent line of work, initiated by Boyle et al. (CCS 2018, Crypto 2019), showed how useful forms of correlated randomness can be generated using a cheap, one-time interaction, followed by only ``silent'' local computation. This is achieved via a \emph{pseudorandom correlation generator} (PCG), a deterministic function that stretches short correlated seeds into long instances of a target correlation. Previous works constructed concretely efficient PCGs for simple but useful correlations, including random oblivious transfer and vector-OLE, together with efficient protocols to distribute the PCG seed generation. Most of these constructions were based on variants of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption. PCGs for other useful correlations had poor asymptotic and concrete efficiency.
In this work, we design a new class of efficient PCGs based on different flavors of the {\em ring-LPN} assumption. Our new PCGs can generate OLE correlations, authenticated multiplication triples, matrix product correlations, and other types of useful correlations over large fields. These PCGs are more efficient by orders of magnitude than the previous constructions and can be used to improve the preprocessing phase of many existing MPC protocols.

2020

TCC

On Pseudorandom Encodings
📺
Abstract

We initiate a study of \emph{pseudorandom encodings}: efficiently computable and decodable encoding functions that map messages from a given distribution to a random-looking distribution.
For instance, every distribution that can be perfectly compressed admits such a pseudorandom encoding.
Pseudorandom encodings are motivated by a variety of cryptographic applications, including password-authenticated key exchange, ``honey encryption'' and steganography.
The main question we ask is whether \emph{every} efficiently samplable distribution admits a pseudorandom encoding.
Under different cryptographic assumptions, we obtain positive and negative answers for different flavors of pseudorandom encodings, and relate this question to problems in other areas of cryptography. In particular, by establishing a two-way relation between pseudorandom encoding schemes and efficient invertible sampling algorithms, we reveal a connection between adaptively secure multi-party computation and questions in the domain of steganography.

2019

PKC

Non-interactive Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials
Abstract

Anonymous credential ($$\mathsf {AC}$$) schemes are protocols which allow for authentication of authorized users without compromising their privacy. Of particular interest are non-interactive anonymous credential ($$\mathsf {NIAC}$$) schemes, where the authentication process only requires the user to send a single message that still conceals its identity. Unfortunately, all known $$\mathsf {NIAC}$$ schemes in the standard model require pairing based cryptography, which limits them to a restricted set of specific assumptions and requires expensive pairing computations. The notion of keyed-verification anonymous credential ($$\mathsf {KVAC}$$) was introduced in (Chase et al., CCS’14) as an alternative to standard anonymous credential schemes allowing for more efficient instantiations; yet, making existing $$\mathsf {KVAC}$$ non-interactive either requires pairing-based cryptography, or the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.In this work, we construct the first non-interactive keyed-verification anonymous credential ($$\mathsf {NIKVAC}$$) system in the standard model, without pairings. Our scheme is efficient, attribute-based, supports multi-show unlinkability, and anonymity revocation. We achieve this by building upon a combination of algebraic $$\mathsf {MAC}$$ with the recent designated-verifier non-interactive zero-knowledge ($$\mathsf {DVNIZK}$$) proof of knowledge of (Couteau and Chaidos, Eurocrypt’18). Toward our goal of building $$\mathsf {NIKVAC}$$, we revisit the security analysis of a $$\mathsf {MAC}$$ scheme introduced in (Chase et al., CCS’14), strengthening its guarantees, and we introduce the notion of oblivious non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system, where the prover can generate non-interactive proofs for statements that he cannot check by himself, having only a part of the corresponding witness, and where the proof can be checked efficiently given the missing part of the witness. We provide an efficient construction of an oblivious $$\mathsf {DVNIZK}$$, building upon the specific properties of the $$\mathsf {DVNIZK}$$ proof system of (Couteau and Chaidos, Eurocrypt’18).

2019

EUROCRYPT

A Note on the Communication Complexity of Multiparty Computation in the Correlated Randomness Model
📺
Abstract

Secure multiparty computation (
$$\mathsf {MPC}$$
MPC) addresses the challenge of evaluating functions on secret inputs without compromising their privacy. A central question in multiparty computation is to understand the amount of communication needed to securely evaluate a circuit of size s. In this work, we revisit this fundamental question in the setting of information-theoretically secure
$$\mathsf {MPC}$$
MPC in the correlated randomness model, where a trusted dealer distributes correlated random coins, independent of the inputs, to all parties before the start of the protocol. This setting is of strong theoretical interest, and has led to the most practically efficient
$$\mathsf {MPC}$$
MPC protocols known to date.While it is known that protocols with optimal communication (proportional to input plus output size) can be obtained from the LWE assumption, and that protocols with sublinear communication o(s) can be obtained from the DDH assumption, the question of constructing protocols with o(s) communication remains wide open for the important case of information-theoretic
$$\mathsf {MPC}$$
MPC in the correlated randomness model; all known protocols in this model require O(s) communication in the online phase.In this work, we exhibit the first generic multiparty computation protocol in the correlated randomness model with communication sublinear in the circuit size, for a large class of circuits. More precisely, we show the following: any size-slayered circuit (whose nodes can be partitioned into layers so that any edge connects adjacent layers) can be evaluated with
$$O(s/\log \log s)$$
O(s/loglogs) communication. Our results holds for both boolean and arithmetic circuits, in the honest-but-curious setting, and do not assume honest majority. For boolean circuits, we extend our results to handle malicious corruption.

2019

EUROCRYPT

Designated-Verifier Pseudorandom Generators, and Their Applications
📺
Abstract

We provide a generic construction of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) schemes. Our construction is a refinement of Dwork and Naor’s (FOCS 2000) implementation of the hidden bits model using verifiable pseudorandom generators (VPRGs). Our refinement simplifies their construction and relaxes the necessary assumptions considerably.As a result of this conceptual improvement, we obtain interesting new instantiations:A designated-verifier NIZK (with unbounded soundness) based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. If a pairing is available, this NIZK becomes publicly verifiable. This constitutes the first fully secure CDH-based designated-verifier NIZKs (and more generally, the first fully secure designated-verifier NIZK from a non-generic assumption which does not already imply publicly-verifiable NIZKs), and it answers an open problem recently raised by Kim and Wu (CRYPTO 2018).A NIZK based on the learning with errors (LWE) assumption, and assuming a non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) proof system for bounded distance decoding (BDD). This simplifies and improves upon a recent NIZK from LWE that assumes a NIZK for BDD (Rothblum et al., PKC 2019).

2019

CRYPTO

Efficient Pseudorandom Correlation Generators: Silent OT Extension and More
📺
Abstract

Secure multiparty computation (MPC) often relies on correlated randomness for better efficiency and simplicity. This is particularly useful for MPC with no honest majority, where input-independent correlated randomness enables a lightweight “non-cryptographic” online phase once the inputs are known. However, since the amount of randomness typically scales with the circuit size of the function being computed, securely generating correlated randomness forms an efficiency bottleneck, involving a large amount of communication and storage.A natural tool for addressing the above limitations is a pseudorandom correlation generator (PCG). A PCG allows two or more parties to securely generate long sources of useful correlated randomness via a local expansion of correlated short seeds and no interaction. PCGs enable MPC with silent preprocessing, where a small amount of interaction used for securely sampling the seeds is followed by silent local generation of correlated pseudorandomness.A concretely efficient PCG for Vector-OLE correlations was recently obtained by Boyle et al. (CCS 2018) based on variants of the learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption over large fields. In this work, we initiate a systematic study of PCGs and present concretely efficient constructions for several types of useful MPC correlations. We obtain the following main contributions:PCG foundations. We give a general security definition for PCGs. Our definition suffices for any MPC protocol satisfying a stronger security requirement that is met by existing protocols. We prove that a stronger security requirement is indeed necessary, and justify our PCG definition by ruling out a stronger and more natural definition.Silent OT extension. We present the first concretely efficient PCG for oblivious transfer correlations. Its security is based on a variant of the binary LPN assumption and any correlation-robust hash function. We expect it to provide a faster alternative to the IKNP OT extension protocol (Crypto 2003) when communication is the bottleneck. We present several applications, including protocols for non-interactive zero-knowledge with bounded-reusable preprocessing from binary LPN, and concretely efficient related-key oblivious pseudorandom functions.PCGs for simple 2-party correlations. We obtain PCGs for several other types of useful 2-party correlations, including (authenticated) one-time truth-tables and Beaver triples. While the latter PCGs are slower than our PCG for OT, they are still practically feasible. These PCGs are based on a host of assumptions and techniques, including specialized homomorphic secret sharing schemes and pseudorandom generators tailored to their structure.Multiparty correlations. We obtain PCGs for multiparty correlations that can be used to make the (input-dependent) online communication of MPC protocols scale linearly with the number of parties, instead of quadratically.

2018

ASIACRYPT

On the Concrete Security of Goldreich’s Pseudorandom Generator
Abstract

Local pseudorandom generators allow to expand a short random string into a long pseudo-random string, such that each output bit depends on a constant number d of input bits. Due to its extreme efficiency features, this intriguing primitive enjoys a wide variety of applications in cryptography and complexity. In the polynomial regime, where the seed is of size n and the output of size
$$n^{\textsf {s}}$$
for
$$\textsf {s}> 1$$
, the only known solution, commonly known as Goldreich’s PRG, proceeds by applying a simple d-ary predicate to public random size-d subsets of the bits of the seed.While the security of Goldreich’s PRG has been thoroughly investigated, with a variety of results deriving provable security guarantees against class of attacks in some parameter regimes and necessary criteria to be satisfied by the underlying predicate, little is known about its concrete security and efficiency. Motivated by its numerous theoretical applications and the hope of getting practical instantiations for some of them, we initiate a study of the concrete security of Goldreich’s PRG, and evaluate its resistance to cryptanalytic attacks. Along the way, we develop a new guess-and-determine-style attack, and identify new criteria which refine existing criteria and capture the security guarantees of candidate local PRGs in a more fine-grained way.

#### Program Committees

- Crypto 2023
- PKC 2022
- TCC 2022
- Eurocrypt 2021
- Eurocrypt 2020
- TCC 2019

#### Coauthors

- Arash Afshar (1)
- Thomas Agrikola (3)
- Fabrice Benhamouda (1)
- Maxime Bombar (1)
- Elette Boyle (7)
- Chris Brzuska (2)
- Dung Bui (1)
- Eliana Carozza (1)
- Pyrros Chaidos (1)
- Alain Couvreur (1)
- Clément Ducros (2)
- Aurélien Dupin (1)
- Niv Gilboa (5)
- Michael Hartmann (1)
- Dennis Hofheinz (2)
- Yuval Ishai (6)
- Abhishek Jain (1)
- Stanislaw Jarecki (1)
- Zhengzhong Jin (1)
- Antoine Joux (1)
- Pihla Karanko (1)
- Shuichi Katsumata (2)
- Michael Klooß (1)
- Lisa Kohl (5)
- Huang Lin (1)
- Helger Lipmaa (1)
- Mohammad Mahmoody (1)
- Sven Maier (1)
- Pierrick Méaux (1)
- Pierre Meyer (4)
- Arne Tobias Ødegaard (1)
- Roberto Parisella (1)
- Alain Passelègue (1)
- Thomas Peters (2)
- David Pointcheval (3)
- Willy Quach (1)
- Srinivasan Raghuraman (1)
- Michael Reichle (2)
- Nicolas Resch (2)
- Mahshid Riahinia (1)
- Peter Rindal (1)
- Felix Rohrbach (1)
- Adi Rosén (1)
- Mélissa Rossi (1)
- Yann Rotella (1)
- Elahe Sadeghi (2)
- Amit Sahai (1)
- Peter Scholl (5)
- Bogdan Ursu (2)
- Hoeteck Wee (1)
- Maryam Zarezadeh (1)