International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Anna Lysyanskaya

Affiliation: Brown University

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2019
TCC
Fully Homomorphic NIZK and NIWI Proofs
In this work, we define and construct fully homomorphic non-interactive zero knowledge (FH-NIZK) and non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (FH-NIWI) proof systems.     We focus on the NP complete language L, where, for a boolean circuit C and a bit b, the pair $$(C,b)\in L$$ if there exists an input $$\mathbf {w}$$ such that $$C(\mathbf {w})=b$$. For this language, we call a non-interactive proof system fully homomorphic if, given instances $$(C_i,b_i)\in L$$ along with their proofs $$\varPi _i$$, for $$i\in \{1,\ldots ,k\}$$, and given any circuit $$D:\{0,1\}^k\rightarrow \{0,1\}$$, one can efficiently compute a proof $$\varPi $$ for $$(C^*,b)\in L$$, where $$C^*(\mathbf {w}^{(1)},\ldots ,\mathbf {w}^{(k)})=D(C_1(\mathbf {w}^{(1)}),\ldots ,C_k(\mathbf {w}^{(k)}))$$ and $$D(b_1,\ldots ,b_k)=b$$. The key security property is unlinkability: the resulting proof $$\varPi $$ is indistinguishable from a fresh proof of the same statement.     Our first result, under the Decision Linear Assumption (DLIN), is an FH-NIZK proof system for L in the common random string model. Our more surprising second result (under a new decisional assumption on groups with bilinear maps) is an FH-NIWI proof system that requires no setup.
2015
EPRINT
2014
CRYPTO
2014
CRYPTO
2014
EPRINT
2013
PKC
2013
TCC
2013
ASIACRYPT
2012
EUROCRYPT
2012
CRYPTO
2009
CRYPTO
2009
PKC
2009
EPRINT
Framework for Analyzing Optimistic Fair Exchange with Distributed Arbiters
Alptekin Küpçü Anna Lysyanskaya
Fair exchange is one of the most fundamental problems in secure distributed computation. Alice has something that Bob wants, and Bob has something that Alice wants. A fair exchange protocol would guarantee that, even if one of them maliciously deviates from the protocol, either both of them get the desired content, or neither of them do. It is known that no two-party protocol can guarantee fairness in general; therefore the presence of a trusted arbiter is necessary. In optimistic fair exchange, the arbiter only gets involved in case of faults. To reduce the trust put in an arbiter, it is natural to consider employing multiple arbiters. Avoine and Vaudenay (AV) [6] employ multiple autonomous arbiters in their optimistic fair exchange protocol which uses timeout mechanisms. They leave two open questions: (1) Can an optimistic fair exchange protocol without timeouts provide fairness when employing multiple autonomous arbiters? (2) Can any other optimistic fair exchange protocol with timeouts achieve better bounds on the number of honest arbiters required? In this paper, we answer both questions negatively. To answer these questions, we define a general class of optimistic fair exchange protocols with multiple arbiters, called “distributed arbiter fair exchange” (DAFE) protocols. Informally, in a DAFE protocol, if a participant fails to send a correctly formed message, the other party must contact some subset of the arbiters and get correctly formed responses from them. The arbiters do not talk to each other, but only to Alice and Bob. We prove that no DAFE protocol can exist. However, our impossibility results can be overcome in the timeout model (where all arbiters have access to loosely synchronized clocks) and also in case the arbiters can communicate (e.g., using secure multi-party computation with Omega(n^2) communication).
2008
TCC
2008
EPRINT
Delegatable Anonymous Credentials
We construct an efficient delegatable anonymous credential system. Users can anonymously and unlinkably obtain credentials from any authority, delegate their credentials to other users, and prove possession of a credential $L$ levels away from the given authority. The size of the proof (and time to compute it) is $O(Lk)$, where $k$ is the security parameter. The only other construction of delegatable anonymous credentials (Chase and Lysyanskaya, Crypto 2006) relies on general non-interactive proofs for NP-complete languages of size $k \Omega(2^{L})$. We revise the entire approach to constructing anonymous credentials and identify \emph{randomizable} zero-knowledge proof of knowledge systems as the key building block. We formally define the notion of randomizable non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and give the first construction by showing how to appropriately rerandomize Groth and Sahai (Eurocrypt 2008) proofs. We show that such proof systems, in combination with an appropriate authentication scheme and a few other protocols, allow us to construct delegatable anonymous credentials. Finally, we instantiate these building blocks under appropriate assumptions about groups with bilinear maps.
2008
EPRINT
Usable Optimistic Fair Exchange
Alptekin Küpçü Anna Lysyanskaya
Fairly exchanging digital content is an everyday problem. It has been shown that fair exchange cannot be done without a trusted third party (called the Arbiter). Yet, even with a trusted party, it is still non-trivial to come up with an efficient solution, especially one that can be used in a p2p file sharing system with a high volume of data exchanged. We provide an efficient optimistic fair exchange mechanism for bartering digital files, where receiving a payment in return to a file (buying) is also considered fair. The exchange is optimistic, removing the need for the Arbiter’s involvement unless a dispute occurs. While the previous solutions employ costly cryptographic primitives for every file or block exchanged, our protocol employs them only once per peer, therefore achieving O(n) efficiency improvement when n blocks are exchanged between two peers. The rest of our protocol uses very efficient cryptography, making it perfectly suitable for a p2p file sharing system where tens of peers exchange thousands of blocks and they do not know beforehand which ones they will end up exchanging. Thus, for the first time, a provably secure (and privacy respecting when payments are made using e-cash) fair exchange protocol is being used in real bartering applications (e.g., BitTorrent) [14] without sacrificing performance.
2007
CRYPTO
2007
EPRINT
Non-Interactive Anonymous Credentials
In this paper, we introduce P-signatures. A P-signature scheme consists of a signature scheme, a commitment scheme, and (1) an interactive protocol for obtaining a signature on a committed value; (2) a non-interactive proof system for proving that the contents of a commitment has been signed; (3) a non-interactive proof system for proving that a pair of commitments are commitments to the same value. We give a definition of security for P-signatures and show how they can be realized under appropriate assumptions about groups with bilinear map. Namely, we make extensive use of the powerful suite of non-interactive proof techniques due to Groth and Sahai. Our P-signatures enable, for the first time, the design of a practical non-interactive anonymous credential system whose security does not rely on the random oracle model. In addition, they may serve as a useful building block for other privacy-preserving authentication mechanisms.
2006
CRYPTO
2006
CRYPTO
2006
PKC
2006
EPRINT
On Signatures of Knowledge
Melissa Chase Anna Lysyanskaya
In a traditional signature scheme, a signature $\sigma$ on a message $m$ is issued under a public key $\pk$, and can be interpreted as follows: "The owner of the public key $\pk$ and its corresponding secret key has signed message $m$." In this paper we consider schemes that allow one to issue signatures on behalf of any NP statement, that can be interpreted as follows: "A person in possession of a witness $w$ to the statement that $x \in L$ has signed message $m$." We refer to such schemes as \emph{signatures of knowledge}. We formally define the notion of a signature of knowledge. We begin by extending the traditional definition of digital signature schemes, captured by Canetti's ideal signing functionality, to the case of signatures of knowledge. We then give an alternative definition in terms of games that also seems to capture the necessary properties one may expect from a signature of knowledge. We then gain additional confidence in our two definitions by proving them equivalent. We construct signatures of knowledge under standard complexity assumptions in the common-random-string model. We then extend our definition to allow signatures of knowledge to be \emph{nested} i.e., a signature of knowledge (or another accepting input to a UC-realizable ideal functionality) can itself serve as a witness for another signature of knowledge. Thus, as a corollary, we obtain the first \emph{delegatable} anonymous credential system, i.e., a system in which one can use one's anonymous credentials as a secret key for issuing anonymous credentials to others.
2006
EPRINT
How to Win the Clone Wars: \\ Efficient Periodic n-Times Anonymous Authentication
We create a credential system that lets a user anonymously authenticate at most $n$ times in a single time period. A user withdraws a dispenser of $n$ e-tokens. She shows an e-token to a verifier to authenticate herself; each e-token can be used only once, however, the dispenser automatically refreshes every time period. The only prior solution to this problem, due to Damg{\aa}rd et al.~[DDP05], uses protocols that are a factor of $k$ slower for the user and verifier, where $k$ is the security parameter. Damg{\aa}rd et al. also only support one authentication per time period, while we support $n$. Because our construction is based on e-cash, we can use existing techniques to identify a cheating user, trace all of her e-tokens, and revoke her dispensers. We also offer a new anonymity service: glitch protection for basically honest users who (occasionally) reuse e-tokens. The verifier can always recognize a reused e-token; however, we preserve the anonymity of users who do not reuse e-tokens too often.
2005
CRYPTO
2005
EUROCRYPT
2005
EUROCRYPT
2005
TCC
2005
EPRINT
Steganography with Imperfect Samplers
Anna Lysyanskaya Maria Meyerovich
The goal of steganography is to pass secret messages by disguising them as innocent-looking covertexts. Real world stegosystems are often broken because they make invalid assumptions about the system's ability to sample covertexts. We examine whether it is possible to weaken this assumption. By modeling the covertext distribution as a stateful Markov process, we create a sliding scale between real world and provably secure stegosystems. We also show that insufficient knowledge of past states can have catastrophic results.
2005
EPRINT
Compact E-Cash
Jan Camenisch Susan Hohenberger Anna Lysyanskaya
This paper presents efficient off-line anonymous e-cash schemes where a user can withdraw a wallet containing 2^l coins each of which she can spend unlinkably. Our first result is a scheme, secure under the strong RSA and the y-DDHI assumptions, where the complexity of the withdrawal and spend operations is O(l+k) and the user's wallet can be stored using O(l+k) bits, where k is a security parameter. The best previously known schemes require at least one of these complexities to be O(2^l k). In fact, compared to previous e-cash schemes, our whole wallet of 2^l coins has about the same size as one coin in these schemes. Our scheme also offers exculpability of users, that is, the bank can prove to third parties that a user has double-spent. We then extend our scheme to our second result, the first e-cash scheme that provides traceable coins without a trusted third party. That is, once a user has double spent one of the 2^l coins in her wallet, all her spendings of these coins can be traced. We present two alternate constructions. One construction shares the same complexities with our first result but requires a strong bilinear map assumption that is only conjectured to hold on MNT curves. The second construction works on more general types of elliptic curves, but the price for this is that the complexity of the spending and of the withdrawal protocols becomes O(lk) and O(lk + k^2) bits, respectively, and wallets take O(lk) bits of storage. All our schemes are secure in the random oracle model.
2004
CRYPTO
2004
EUROCRYPT
2004
TCC
2004
EPRINT
On the Composition of Authenticated Byzantine Agreement
Yehuda Lindell Anna Lysyanskaya Tal Rabin
A fundamental problem of distributed computing is that of simulating a secure broadcast channel, within the setting of a point-to-point network. This problem is known as Byzantine Agreement (or Generals) and has been the focus of much research. Lamport et al. showed that in order to achieve Byzantine Agreement in the standard model, more than 2/3 of the participating parties must be honest. They further showed that by augmenting the network with a public-key infrastructure for digital signatures, it is possible to obtain protocols that are secure for any number of corrupted parties. The problem in this augmented model is called "authenticated Byzantine Agreement". In this paper we consider the question of concurrent, parallel and sequential composition of authenticated Byzantine Agreement protocols. We present surprising impossibility results showing that: * If an authenticated Byzantine Agreement protocol remains secure under parallel or concurrent composition (even for just two executions), then more than 2/3 of the participating parties must be honest. * Deterministic authenticated Byzantine Agreement protocols that run for $r$ rounds and tolerate 1/3 or more corrupted parties, can remain secure for at most $2r-1$ sequential executions. In contrast, we present randomized protocols for authenticated Byzantine Agreement that remain secure under sequential composition, for {\em any}\/ polynomial number of executions. We exhibit two such protocols. In the first protocol, the number of corrupted parties may be any number less than 1/2 (i.e., an honest majority is required). In the second protocol, any number of parties may be corrupted; however, the overall number of parties must be limited to $O(\log k/\log\log k)$, where $k$ is the security parameter (and so all parties run in time that is polynomial in $k$). Finally, we show that when the model is further augmented so that unique and common session identifiers are assigned to each concurrent session, then any polynomial number of authenticated Byzantine agreement protocols can be concurrently executed, while tolerating any number of corrupted parties.
2004
EPRINT
ID-Based Encryption for Complex Hierarchies with Applications to Forward Security and Broadcast Encryption
A forward-secure encryption scheme protects secret keys from exposure by evolving the keys with time. Forward security has several unique requirements in Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) scheme: (1) users join dynamically; (2) encryption is joining-time-oblivious; (3) users evolve secret keys autonomously. We present a scalable forward-secure HIBE scheme satisfying the above properties. Note that a naive combination of Gentry-Silverberg HIBE scheme with the forward-secure Public-Key Encryption scheme by Canetti, Halevi and Katz would not meet the requirements. We also show how our fs-HIBE scheme can be used to construct a forward-secure public-key Broadcast Encryption scheme, which protects the secrecy of prior transmissions in the Broadcast Encryption setting. We further generalize fs-HIBE into a collusion-resistant Multiple Hierarchical ID-Based Encryption scheme, which can be used for secure communications with entities having multiple roles in Role-Based Access Control. The security of our schemes is based on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
2003
EPRINT
Sequential Aggregate Signatures from Trapdoor Permutations
An aggregate signature scheme (recently proposed by Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham) is a method for combining $n$ signatures from $n$ different signers on $n$ different messages into one signature of unit length. We propose \emph{sequential aggregate signatures}, in which the set of signers is ordered. The aggregate signature is computed by having each signer, in turn, add his signature to it. We show how to realize this in such a way that the size of the aggregate signature is independent of $n$. This makes sequential aggregate signatures a natural primitive for certificate chains, whose length can be reduced by aggregating all signatures in a chain. We give a construction based on families of certified trapdoor permutations, and show how to instantiate our scheme based on RSA.
2003
EPRINT
Forward-Secure Hierarchical ID-Based Cryptography
Danfeng Yao Anna Lysyanskaya
We present a forward-secure hierarchical identity-based encryption (FHIBE) scheme, which is based on the hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme by Gentry and Silverberg. Canetti, Halevi and Katz presented a forward-secure public key encryption scheme based on HIBE scheme. They give the formal definition of Binary Encryption Tree (BET), which is a relaxed version of HIBE and is essential to their forward-secure encryption.We unify their idea with HIBE scheme, and present a forward-secure hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme. In the FHIBE scheme, secret keys of each entity on the hierarchy are updated at regular intervals throughout the lifetime of the system; furthermore, exposure of an entity's secret key corresponding to a given interval does not enable an adversary to break the ancestors of the entity for any prior time period. Entities can join in the hierarchy at any time and at any position, and are able to update their secret keys on their own once they are initialized by their parent entities. These features are important in the distributed settings. The forward-secure hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme can be generalized into a collusion resistant multiple hierarchical identity-based encryption (MHIBE) scheme, where a message can be encrypted under multiple identities of a user.
2002
CRYPTO
2002
CRYPTO
2002
EPRINT
Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing and Proactive Cryptosystems
Verifiable secret sharing is an important primitive in distributed cryptography. With the growing interest in the deployment of threshold cryptosystems in practice, the traditional assumption of a synchronous network has to be reconsidered and generalized to an asynchronous model. This paper proposes the first \emph{practical} verifiable secret sharing protocol for asynchronous networks. The protocol creates a discrete logarithm-based sharing and uses only a quadratic number of messages in the number of participating servers. It yields the first asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol in the standard model whose efficiency makes it suitable for use in practice. Proactive cryptosystems are another important application of verifiable secret sharing. The second part of this paper introduces proactive cryptosystems in asynchronous networks and presents an efficient protocol for refreshing the shares of a secret key for discrete logarithm-based sharings.
2001
ASIACRYPT
2001
ASIACRYPT
2001
CRYPTO
2001
EUROCRYPT
2001
EPRINT
An Efficient System for Non-transferable Anonymous Credentials with Optional Anonymity Revocation
Jan Camenisch Anna Lysyanskaya
A credential system is a system in which users can obtain credentials from organizations and demonstrate possession of these credentials. Such a system is anonymous when transactions carried out by the same user cannot be linked. An anonymous credential system is of significant practical relevance because it is the best means of providing privacy for users. In this paper we propose a practical anonymous credential system that is based on the strong RSA assumption and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption modulo a safe prime product and is considerably superior to existing ones: (1) We give the first practical solution that allows a user to unlinkably demonstrate possession of a credential as many times as necessary without involving the issuing organization. (2) To prevent misuse of anonymity, our scheme is the first to offer optional anonymity revocation for particular transactions. (3) Our scheme offers separability: all organizations can choose their cryptographic keys independently of each other. Moreover, we suggest more effective means of preventing users from sharing their credentials, by introducing {\em all-or-nothing} sharing: a user who allows a friend to use one of her credentials once, gives him the ability to use all of her credentials, i.e., taking over her identity. This is implemented by a new primitive, called {\em circular encryption}, which is of independent interest, and can be realized from any semantically secure cryptosystem in the random oracle model.
2001
EPRINT
Efficient Revocation of Anonymous Group Membership
Jan Camenisch Anna Lysyanskaya
An accumulator scheme, introduced be Benaloh and de Mare and further studied by Bari{\'c} and Pfitzmann, is an algorithm that allows to hash a large set of inputs into one short value, called the \textit{accumulator}, such that there is a short witness that a given input was incorporated into the accumulator. We put forward the notion of \textit{dynamic accumulators}, i.e., a method that allows to dynamically add and delete inputs from the accumulator, such that the cost of an add or delete is independent on the number of accumulated values. We achieve this under the strong RSA assumption. For this construction, we also show an efficient zero-knowledge protocol for proving that a committed value is in the accumulator. In turn, our construction of dynamic accumulator enables efficient membership revocation in the anonymous setting. This method applies to membership revocation in group signature schemes, such as the one due to Ateniese et al., and efficient revocation of credentials in anonymous credential systems, such as the one due to Camenisch and Lysyanskaya. Using our method, allowing revocation does not alter the complexity of any operations of the underlying schemes. In particular, the cost of a group signature verification or credential showing increases by only a small constant factor, less than 2. All previously known methods (such as the ones due to Bresson and Stern and Ateniese and Tsudik incurred an increase in these costs that was linear in the number of members.
2000
EUROCRYPT
2000
EPRINT
Threshold Cryptography Secure Against the Adaptive Adversary, Concurrently
Anna Lysyanskaya
A threshold cryptosystem or signature scheme is a system with $n$ participants where an honest majority can successfully decrypt a message or issue a signature, but where the security and functionality properties of the system are retained even as the adversary corrupts up to $t$ players. We present the novel technique of a committed proof, which is a new general tool that enables security of threshold cryptosystems in the presence of the adaptive adversary. We also put forward a new measure of security for threshold schemes secure in the adaptive adversary model: security under concurrent composition. Using committed proofs, we construct concurrently and adaptively secure threshold protocols for a variety of cryptographic applications. In particular, based on the recent scheme by Cramer-Shoup, we construct adaptively secure threshold cryptosystems secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under the DDH intractability assumption.

Program Committees

Crypto 2020
TCC 2018
Crypto 2018
Eurocrypt 2017
PKC 2015
Asiacrypt 2013
Eurocrypt 2011
TCC 2011
Asiacrypt 2010
Eurocrypt 2009
Crypto 2009
Eurocrypt 2008
Asiacrypt 2007
Eurocrypt 2007
PKC 2007
TCC 2005
PKC 2005
Eurocrypt 2004
Crypto 2003