International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Hovav Shacham

Affiliation: UC San Diego

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2013
JOFC
Compact Proofs of Retrievability
Hovav Shacham Brent Waters
In a proof-of-retrievability system, a data storage center must prove to a verifier that he is actually storing all of a client’s data. The central challenge is to build systems that are both efficient and provably secure—that is, it should be possible to extract the client’s data from any prover that passes a verification check. In this paper, we give the first proof-of-retrievability schemes with full proofs of security against arbitrary adversaries in the strongest model, that of Juels and Kaliski.Our first scheme, built from BLS signatures and secure in the random oracle model, features a proof-of-retrievability protocol in which the client’s query and server’s response are both extremely short. This scheme allows public verifiability: anyone can act as a verifier, not just the file owner. Our second scheme, which builds on pseudorandom functions (PRFs) and is secure in the standard model, allows only private verification. It features a proof-of-retrievability protocol with an even shorter server’s response than our first scheme, but the client’s query is long. Both schemes rely on homomorphic properties to aggregate a proof into one small authenticator value.
2011
EUROCRYPT
2010
ASIACRYPT
2010
CHES
2009
ASIACRYPT
2009
CRYPTO
2009
CRYPTO
2008
ASIACRYPT
2008
EPRINT
Compact Proofs of Retrievability
Hovav Shacham Brent Waters
In a proof-of-retrievability system, a data storage center must prove to a verifier that he is actually storing all of a client's data. The central challenge is to build systems that are both efficient and provably secure -- that is, it should be possible to extract the client's data from any prover that passes a verification check. All previous provably secure solutions require that a prover send O(l) authenticator values (i.e., MACs or signatures) to verify a file, for a total of O(l^2) bits of communication, where l is the security parameter. The extra cost over the ideal O(l) communication can be prohibitive in systems where a verifier needs to check many files. We create the first compact and provably secure proof of retrievability systems. Our solutions allow for compact proofs with just one authenticator value -- in practice this can lead to proofs with as little as 40 bytes of communication. We present two solutions with similar structure. The first one is privately verifiable and builds elegantly on pseudorandom functions (PRFs); the second allows for publicly verifiable proofs and is built from the signature scheme of Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham in bilinear groups. Both solutions rely on homomorphic properties to aggregate a proof into one small authenticator value.
2008
EPRINT
Delegatable Anonymous Credentials
We construct an efficient delegatable anonymous credential system. Users can anonymously and unlinkably obtain credentials from any authority, delegate their credentials to other users, and prove possession of a credential $L$ levels away from the given authority. The size of the proof (and time to compute it) is $O(Lk)$, where $k$ is the security parameter. The only other construction of delegatable anonymous credentials (Chase and Lysyanskaya, Crypto 2006) relies on general non-interactive proofs for NP-complete languages of size $k \Omega(2^{L})$. We revise the entire approach to constructing anonymous credentials and identify \emph{randomizable} zero-knowledge proof of knowledge systems as the key building block. We formally define the notion of randomizable non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and give the first construction by showing how to appropriately rerandomize Groth and Sahai (Eurocrypt 2008) proofs. We show that such proof systems, in combination with an appropriate authentication scheme and a few other protocols, allow us to construct delegatable anonymous credentials. Finally, we instantiate these building blocks under appropriate assumptions about groups with bilinear maps.
2007
PKC
2007
EPRINT
A Cramer-Shoup Encryption Scheme from the Linear Assumption and from Progressively Weaker Linear Variants
Hovav Shacham
We describe a CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme, in the Cramer-Shoup paradigm, based on the Linear assumption of Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham. Through a comparison to the Kiltz tag-encryption scheme from TCC 2006, our scheme gives evidence that the Cramer-Shoup paradigm yields CCA encryption with shorter ciphertexts than the Canetti-Halevi-Katz paradigm. We present a generalization of the Linear assumption into a family of progressively weaker assumptions and show how to instantiate our Linear Cramer-Shoup encryption using the progressively weaker members of this family.
2007
EPRINT
The BBG HIBE Has Limited Delegation
Hovav Shacham
At Eurocrypt 2005, Boneh, Boyen, and Goh presented a hierarchical IBE for which they claimed a novel property, called limited delegation: it is possible to give an entity a private key that restricts it from generating descendant private keys beyond some depth d; in particular, with d equal to the entity's depth, such a key allows decryption only. In this paper, we argue that this claim is nonobvious and requires proof, provide a precise model for arguing about limited delegation, and prove that the Boneh-Boyen-Goh system does, in fact, have limited delegation. Whereas Boneh, Boyen, and Goh prove their system semantically secure under the BDHI assumption, our proof of limited delegation requires the stronger BDHE assumption.
2006
EUROCRYPT
2006
EPRINT
Sequential Aggregate Signatures and Multisignatures without Random Oracles
We present the first aggregate signature, the first multisignature, and the first verifiably encrypted signature provably secure without random oracles. Our constructions derive from a novel application of a recent signature scheme due to Waters. Signatures in our aggregate signature scheme are sequentially constructed, but knowledge of the order in which messages were signed is not necessary for verification. The aggregate signatures obtained are shorter than Lysyanskaya et~al. sequential aggregates and can be verified more efficiently than Boneh et~al. aggregates. We also consider applications to secure routing and proxy signatures.
2006
EPRINT
Efficient Ring Signatures without Random Oracles
Hovav Shacham Brent Waters
We describe the first efficient ring signature scheme secure, without random oracles, based on standard assumptions. Our ring signatures are based in bilinear groups. For $l$ members of a ring our signatures consist of $2l+2$ group elements and require $2l+3$ pairings to verify. We prove our scheme secure in the strongest security model proposed by Bender, Katz, and Morselli: namely, we show our scheme to be anonymous against full key exposure and unforgeable with respect to insider corruption. A shortcoming of our approach is that all the users' keys must be defined in the same group.
2006
EPRINT
Forward-Secure Signatures with Untrusted Update
In most forward-secure signature constructions, a program that updates a user's private signing key must have full access to the private key. Unfortunately, these schemes are incompatible with several security architectures including Gnu Privacy Guard (GPG) and S/MIME, where the private key is encrypted under a user password as a ``second factor'' of security, in case the private key storage is corrupted, but the password is not. We introduce the concept of forward-secure signatures with untrusted update, where the key update can be performed on an encrypted version of the key. Forward secure signatures with untrusted update allow us to add forward security to signatures, while still keeping passwords as a second factor of security. We provide a construction that has performance characteristics comparable with the best existing forward-secure signatures. In addition, we describe how to modify the Bellare-Miner forward secure signature scheme to achieve untrusted update.
2004
CRYPTO
2004
EUROCRYPT
2004
EPRINT
Short Group Signatures
Dan Boneh Xavier Boyen Hovav Shacham
We construct a short group signature scheme. Signatures in our scheme are approximately the size of a standard RSA signature with the same security. Security of our group signature is based on the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption and a new assumption in bilinear groups called the Decision Linear assumption. We prove security of our system, in the random oracle model, using a variant of the security definition for group signatures recently given by Bellare, Micciancio, and Warinschi.
2004
JOFC
2003
EUROCRYPT
2003
EPRINT
Sequential Aggregate Signatures from Trapdoor Permutations
An aggregate signature scheme (recently proposed by Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham) is a method for combining $n$ signatures from $n$ different signers on $n$ different messages into one signature of unit length. We propose \emph{sequential aggregate signatures}, in which the set of signers is ordered. The aggregate signature is computed by having each signer, in turn, add his signature to it. We show how to realize this in such a way that the size of the aggregate signature is independent of $n$. This makes sequential aggregate signatures a natural primitive for certificate chains, whose length can be reduced by aggregating all signatures in a chain. We give a construction based on families of certified trapdoor permutations, and show how to instantiate our scheme based on RSA.
2002
EPRINT
Aggregate and Verifiably Encrypted Signatures from Bilinear Maps
An aggregate signature scheme is a digital signature that supports aggregation: Given $n$ signatures on $n$ distinct messages from $n$ distinct users, it is possible to aggregate all these signatures into a single short signature. This single signature (and the $n$ original messages) will convince the verifier that the $n$ users did indeed sign the $n$ original messages (i.e., user $i$ signed message $M_i$ for $i=1,\ldots,n$). In this paper we introduce the concept of an aggregate signature scheme, present security models for such signatures, and give several applications for aggregate signatures. We construct an efficient aggregate signature from a recent short signature scheme based on bilinear maps due to Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham. Aggregate signatures are useful for reducing the size of certificate chains (by aggregating all signatures in the chain) and for reducing message size in secure routing protocols such as SBGP. We also show that aggregate signatures give rise to verifiably encrypted signatures. Such signatures enable the verifier to test that a given ciphertext $C$ is the encryption of a signature on a given message $M$. Verifiably encrypted signatures are used in contract-signing protocols. Finally, we show that similar ideas can be used to extend the short signature scheme to give simple ring signatures.
2001
ASIACRYPT

Program Committees

Crypto 2018
Crypto 2017
Eurocrypt 2014
Crypto 2013
Eurocrypt 2011
PKC 2010
PKC 2009
Crypto 2008
Eurocrypt 2008
PKC 2007
Crypto 2006
Asiacrypt 2006
Asiacrypt 2005