International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Ward Beullens

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2019
PKC
Obfuscating Simple Functionalities from Knowledge Assumptions
Ward Beullens Hoeteck Wee
This paper shows how to obfuscate several simple functionalities from a new Knowledge of OrthogonALity Assumption (KOALA) in cyclic groups which is shown to hold in the Generic Group Model. Specifically, we give simpler and stronger security proofs for obfuscation schemes for point functions, general-output point functions and pattern matching with wildcards. We also revisit the work of Bishop et al. (CRYPTO 2018) on obfuscating the pattern matching with wildcards functionality. We improve upon the construction and the analysis in several ways:attacks and stronger guarantees: We show that the construction achieves virtual black-box security for a simulator that runs in time roughly $$2^{n/2}$$, as well as distributional security for larger classes of distributions. We give attacks that show that our results are tight.weaker assumptions: We prove security under KOALA.better efficiency: We also provide a construction that outputs $$n+1$$ instead of 2n group elements. We obtain our results by first obfuscating a simpler “big subset functionality”, for which we establish full virtual black-box security; this yields a simpler and more modular analysis for pattern matching. Finally, we extend our distinguishing attacks to a large class of simple linear-in-the-exponent schemes.
2018
ASIACRYPT
Practical Attacks Against the Walnut Digital Signature Scheme
Ward Beullens Simon R. Blackburn
Recently, NIST started the process of standardizing quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. WalnutDSA, the subject of this paper, is one of the 20 proposed signature schemes that are being considered for standardization. Walnut relies on a one-way function called E-Multiplication, which has a rich algebraic structure. This paper shows that this structure can be exploited to launch several practical attacks against the Walnut cryptosystem. The attacks work very well in practice; it is possible to forge signatures and compute equivalent secret keys for the 128-bit and 256-bit security parameters submitted to NIST in less than a second and in less than a minute respectively.

Coauthors

Simon R. Blackburn (1)
Hoeteck Wee (1)