At CHES 2003, Piret and Quisquater published a very efficient DFA on AES which has served as a basis for many variants published afterwards. In this paper, we revisit P&Q's DFA on AES and we explain how this attack can be much more efficient than originally claimed. In particular, we show that only 2 (resp. 3) faulty ciphertexts allow an attacker to efficiently recover the key in the case of AES-192 (resp. AES-256). Our attack on AES-256 is the most efficient attack on this key length published so far.

Since their publication in 1996, Fault Attacks have been widely studied from both theoretical and practical points of view and most of cryptographic systems have been shown vulnerable to this kind of attacks. Until recently, most of the theoretical fault attacks and countermeasures used a fault model which assumes that the attacker is able to disturb the execution of a cryptographic algorithm only once. However, this approach seems too restrictive since the publication in 2007 of the successful experiment of an attack based on the injection of two faults, namely a second-order fault attack. Amongst the few papers dealing with second-order fault analysis, three countermeasures were published at WISTP'07 and FDTC'07 to protect the RSA cryptosystem using the CRT mode. In this paper, we analyse the security of these countermeasures with respect to the second-order fault model considered by their authors. We show that these countermeasures are not intrinsically resistant and we propose a new method allowing us to implement a CRT-RSA that resists to this kind of second-order fault attack.

Since the publication of Differential Power Analysis (DPA) in 1998, many countermeasures have been published to counteract this very efficient kind of attacks. All these countermeasures follow the same approach : they try to make sensitive operations uncorrelated with the input. Such a method is very costly in terms of both timing and memory space. In this paper, we suggest a new approach where block ciphers are designed to inherently thwart DPA attacks. The idea we develop in this paper is based on a theoretical analysis of DPA attacks and it essentially consists in embedding existing iterated block ciphers in a secure layer. We analyse the security of our proposal and we show that it induces very small overheads.

In this paper we describe two different DFA attacks on the AES. The first one uses a fault model that induces a fault on only one bit of an intermediate result, hence allowing us to obtain the key by using 50 faulty ciphertexts for an AES-128. The second attack uses a more realistic fault model: we assume that we may induce a fault on a whole byte. For an AES-128, this second attack provides the key by using less than 250 faulty ciphertexts. Moreover, this attack has been successfully put into practice on a smart card.

For speeding up elliptic curve scalar multiplication and making it secure against side-channel attacks such as timing or power analysis, various methods have been proposed using specifically chosen elliptic curves. We show that both goals can be achieved simultaneously even for conventional elliptic curves over $\mathbb{F}_p$. This result is shown via two facts. First, we recall the known fact that every elliptic curve over $\mathbb{F}_p$ admits a scalar multiplication via a (Montgomery ladder) Lucas chain. As such chains are known to be resistant against timing- and simple power/electromagnetic radiation analysis attacks, the security of our scalar multiplication against timing and simple power/electromagnetic radiation analysis follows. Second, we show how to parallelize the 19 multiplications within the resulting \lq\lq double" and \lq\lq add" formulas of the Lucas chain for the scalar multiplication. This parallelism together with the Lucas chain results in 10 parallel field multiplications per bit of the scalar. Finally, we also report on a concrete successful implementation of the above mentioned scalar multiplication algorithm on a very recently developed and commercially available coprocessor for smart cards.