International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Thorsten Kleinjung

Affiliation: Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2017
EUROCRYPT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
ASIACRYPT
2014
CRYPTO
2014
EPRINT
2014
EPRINT
2014
EPRINT
2014
ASIACRYPT
2014
CHES
2012
CRYPTO
2012
ASIACRYPT
ECM at Work
Joppe W. Bos Thorsten Kleinjung
2010
EPRINT
Factorization of a 768-bit RSA modulus
This paper reports on the factorization of the 768-bit number RSA-768 by the number field sieve factoring method and discusses some implications for RSA.
2010
EPRINT
ECC2K-130 on Cell CPUs
This paper describes an implementation of Pollard's rho algorithm to compute the elliptic curve discrete logarithm for the Synergistic Processor Elements of the Cell Broadband Engine Architecture. Our implementation targets the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem defined in the Certicom ECC2K-130 challenge. We compare a bitsliced implementation to a non-bitsliced implementation and describe several optimization techniques for both approaches. In particular, we address the question whether normal-basis or polynomial-basis representation of field elements leads to better performance. Using our software, the ECC2K-130 challenge can be solved in one year using the Synergistic Processor Units of less than 2700 Sony Playstation~3 gaming consoles.
2010
EPRINT
Pushing the Limits of ECM
This paper describes our implementation of phase one of the elliptic curve method on the Cell processor and reports on actual record factors obtained. Our implementation uses a new and particularly efficient variable radix multiplication of independent interest.
2010
CRYPTO
2007
ASIACRYPT
2007
EPRINT
A kilobit special number field sieve factorization
We describe how we reached a new factoring milestone by completing the first special number field sieve factorization of a number having more than 1024 bits, namely the Mersenne number $2^{1039}-1$. Although this factorization is orders of magnitude `easier' than a factorization of a 1024-bit RSA modulus is believed to be, the methods we used to obtain our result shed new light on the feasibility of the latter computation.
2005
CHES