International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Jiaxin Pan

Affiliation: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2019
PKC
Tightly Secure Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption
Roman Langrehr Jiaxin Pan
We construct the first tightly secure hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme based on standard assumptions, which solves an open problem from Blazy, Kiltz, and Pan (CRYPTO 2014). At the core of our constructions is a novel randomization technique that enables us to randomize user secret keys for identities with flexible length.The security reductions of previous HIBEs lose at least a factor of $$ Q $$, which is the number of user secret key queries. Different to that, the security loss of our schemes is only dependent on the security parameter. Our schemes are adaptively secure based on the Matrix Diffie-Hellman assumption, which is a generalization of standard Diffie-Hellman assumptions such as $$k$$-Linear. We have two tightly secure constructions, one with constant ciphertext size, and the other with tighter security at the cost of linear ciphertext size. Among other things, our schemes imply the first tightly secure identity-based signature scheme by a variant of the Naor transformation.
2019
ASIACRYPT
Shorter QA-NIZK and SPS with Tighter Security
Quasi-adaptive non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (QA-NIZK) systems and structure-preserving signature (SPS) schemes are two powerful tools for constructing practical pairing-based cryptographic schemes. Their efficiency directly affects the efficiency of the derived advanced protocols.We construct more efficient QA-NIZK and SPS schemes with tight security reductions. Our QA-NIZK scheme is the first one that achieves both tight simulation soundness and constant proof size (in terms of number of group elements) at the same time, while the recent scheme from Abe et al. (ASIACRYPT 2018) achieved tight security with proof size linearly depending on the size of the language and the witness. Assuming the hardness of the Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) problem, our scheme contains only 14 elements in the proof and remains independent of the size of the language and the witness. Moreover, our scheme has tighter simulation soundness than the previous schemes.Technically, we refine and extend a partitioning technique from a recent SPS scheme (Gay et al., EUROCRYPT 2018). Furthermore, we improve the efficiency of the tightly secure SPS schemes by using a relaxation of NIZK proof system for OR languages, called designated-prover NIZK system. Under the SXDH assumption, our SPS scheme contains 11 group elements in the signature, which is shortest among the tight schemes and is the same as an early non-tight scheme (Abe et al., ASIACRYPT 2012). Compared to the shortest known non-tight scheme (Jutla and Roy, PKC 2017), our scheme achieves tight security at the cost of 5 additional elements.All the schemes in this paper are proven secure based on the Matrix Diffie-Hellman assumptions (Escala et al., CRYPTO 2013). These are a class of assumptions which include the well-known SXDH and DLIN assumptions and provide clean algebraic insights to our constructions. To the best of our knowledge, our schemes achieve the best efficiency among schemes with the same functionality and security properties. This naturally leads to improvement of the efficiency of cryptosystems based on simulation-sound QA-NIZK and SPS.
2018
EUROCRYPT
2018
ASIACRYPT
Identity-Based Encryption Tightly Secure Under Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks
We propose the first identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme that is (almost) tightly secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. Our scheme is efficient, in the sense that its ciphertext overhead is only seven group elements, three group elements more than that of the state-of-the-art passively (almost) tightly secure IBE scheme. Our scheme is secure in a multi-challenge setting, i.e., in face of an arbitrary number of challenge ciphertexts. The security of our scheme is based upon the standard symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumption in pairing-friendly groups, but we also consider (less efficient) generalizations under weaker assumptions.
2018
ASIACRYPT
Simple and More Efficient PRFs with Tight Security from LWE and Matrix-DDH
We construct efficient and tightly secure pseudorandom functions (PRFs) with only logarithmic security loss and short secret keys. This yields very simple and efficient variants of well-known constructions, including those of Naor-Reingold (FOCS 1997) and Lewko-Waters (ACM CCS 2009). Most importantly, in combination with the construction of Banerjee, Peikert and Rosen (EUROCRYPT 2012) we obtain the currently most efficient LWE-based PRF from a weak LWE-assumption with a much smaller modulus than the original construction. In comparison to the only previous construction with this property, which is due to Döttling and Schröder (CRYPTO 2015), we use a modulus of similar size, but only a single instance of the underlying PRF, instead of parallel instances, where is the security parameter. Like Döttling and Schröder, our security proof is only almost back-box, due to the fact that the number of queries made by the adversary and its advantage must be known a-priori.Technically, we introduce all-prefix universal hash functions (APUHFs), which are hash functions that are (almost-)universal, even if any prefix of the output is considered. We give simple and very efficient constructions of APUHFs, and show how they can be combined with the augmented cascade of Boneh et al. (ACM CCS 2010) to obtain our results. Along the way, we develop a new and more direct way to prove security of PRFs based on the augmented cascade.
2017
CRYPTO
2017
ASIACRYPT
2016
CRYPTO
2015
EPRINT
2015
PKC
2015
CRYPTO
2014
CRYPTO
2014
EPRINT

Program Committees

Asiacrypt 2019