## CryptoDB

### Divya Ravi

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2023

EUROCRYPT

Minimizing Setup in Broadcast-Optimal Two Round MPC
Abstract

In this paper we consider two-round secure computation protocols which use different communication channels in different rounds: namely, protocols where broadcast is available in neither round, both rounds, only the first round, or only the second round.
The prior works of Cohen, Garay and Zikas (Eurocrypt 2020) and Damgård, Magri, Ravi, Siniscalchi and Yakoubov (Crypto 2021) give tight characterizations of which security guarantees are achievable for various thresholds in each communication structure.
In this work, we introduce a new security notion, namely, selective identifiable abort, which guarantees that every honest party either obtains the output, or aborts identifying one corrupt party (where honest parties may potentially identify different corrupted parties). We investigate what broadcast patterns in two-round MPC allow achieving this guarantee across various settings (such as with or without PKI, with or without an honest majority).
Further, we determine what is possible in the honest majority setting without a PKI, closing a question left open by Damgård et al. We show that without a PKI, having an honest majority does not make it possible to achieve stronger security guarantees compared to the dishonest majority setting. However, if two-thirds of the parties are guaranteed to be honest, identifiable abort is additionally achievable using broadcast only in the second round.
We use fundamentally different techniques from the previous works to avoid relying on private communication in the first round when a PKI is not available, since assuming such private channels without the availability of public encryption keys is unrealistic.
We also show that, somewhat surprisingly, the availability of private channels in the first round does not enable stronger security guarantees unless the corruption threshold is one.

2023

JOFC

Beyond Honest Majority: The Round Complexity of Fair and Robust Multi-party Computation
Abstract

Two of the most sought-after properties of multi-party computation (MPC) protocols are fairness and guaranteed output delivery (GOD), the latter also referred to as robustness. Achieving both, however, brings in the necessary requirement of malicious-minority. In a generalized adversarial setting where the adversary is allowed to corrupt both actively and passively, the necessary bound for a n -party fair or robust protocol turns out to be $$t_a + t_p < n$$ t a + t p < n , where $$t_a,t_p$$ t a , t p denote the threshold for active and passive corruption with the latter subsuming the former. Subsuming the malicious-minority as a boundary special case, this setting, denoted as dynamic corruption, opens up a range of possible corruption scenarios for the adversary. While dynamic corruption includes the entire range of thresholds for $$(t_a,t_p)$$ ( t a , t p ) starting from $$(\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil - 1, \lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor )$$ ( ⌈ n 2 ⌉ - 1 , ⌊ n 2 ⌋ ) to $$(0,n-1)$$ ( 0 , n - 1 ) , the boundary corruption restricts the adversary only to the boundary cases of $$(\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil - 1, \lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor )$$ ( ⌈ n 2 ⌉ - 1 , ⌊ n 2 ⌋ ) and $$(0,n-1)$$ ( 0 , n - 1 ) . Notably, both corruption settings empower an adversary to control majority of the parties, yet ensuring the count on active corruption never goes beyond $$\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil - 1$$ ⌈ n 2 ⌉ - 1 . We target the round complexity of fair and robust MPC tolerating dynamic and boundary adversaries. As it turns out, $$\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil + 1$$ ⌈ n 2 ⌉ + 1 rounds are necessary and sufficient for fair as well as robust MPC tolerating dynamic corruption. The non-constant barrier raised by dynamic corruption can be sailed through for a boundary adversary. The round complexity of 3 and 4 is necessary and sufficient for fair and GOD protocols, respectively, with the latter having an exception of allowing 3-round protocols in the presence of a single active corruption. While all our lower bounds assume pairwise-private and broadcast channels and hold in the presence of correlated randomness setup (which subsumes both public (CRS) and private (PKI) setup), our upper bounds are broadcast-only and assume only public setup. The traditional and popular setting of malicious-minority, being restricted compared to both dynamic and boundary setting, requires 3 and 2 rounds in the presence of public and private setup, respectively, for both fair and GOD protocols.

2023

TCC

On the Round Complexity of Fully Secure Solitary MPC with Honest Majority
Abstract

We study the problem of secure multiparty computation for functionalities where only one
party receives the output, to which we refer as solitary MPC. Recently, Halevi et al. (TCC 2019) studied fully secure (i.e., with guaranteed output delivery) solitary MPC and showed impossibility of such protocols for certain functionalities when there is no honest majority among the parties.
In this work, we study the round complexity of fully secure solitary MPC in the honest majority setting and with computational security. We note that a broadcast channel or public key infrastructure (PKI) setup is necessary for an n-party protocol against malicious adversaries
corrupting up to t parties where n/3 ≤ t < n/2. Therefore, we study the following settings and
ask the question: Can fully secure solitary MPC be achieved in fewer rounds than fully secure
standard MPC in which all parties receive the output?
• When there is a broadcast channel and no PKI:
– We start with a negative answer to the above question. In particular, we show that
the exact round complexity of fully secure solitary MPC is 3, which is the same as
fully secure standard MPC.
– We then study the minimal number of broadcast rounds needed to design round optimal fully secure solitary MPC. We show that both the first and second rounds of broadcast are necessary when $2 \lceil n/5 \rceil \leq t < n/2$, whereas pairwise-private channels suffice in the last round. Notably, this result also applies to fully secure standard MPC in which all parties receive the output.
• When there is a PKI and no broadcast channel, nevertheless, we show more positive results:
– We show an upper bound of 5 rounds for any honest majority. This is superior to the
super-constant lower bound for fully secure standard MPC in the exact same setting.
– We complement this by showing a lower bound of 4 rounds when $3\lceil n/7 \rceil \leq t < n/2$.
– For the special case of t = 1, n = 3, when the output receiving party does not have an input to the function, we show an upper bound of 2 rounds, which is optimal. When the output receiving party has an input to the function, we show a lower bound of 3, which matches an upper bound from prior work.
– For the special case of t = 2, n = 5, we show a lower bound of 3 rounds (an upper bound of 4 follows from prior work).
All our results also assume the existence of a common reference string (CRS) and pairwise private channels. Our upper bounds use a decentralized threshold fully homomorphic encryption (dTFHE) scheme (which can be built from the learning with errors (LWE) assumption) as the
main building block.

2023

TCC

Broadcast-Optimal Four-Round MPC in the Plain Model
Abstract

The prior works of Cohen, Garay and Zikas (Eurocrypt 2020), Damgård, Magri, Ravi, Siniscalchi and Yakoubov (Crypto 2021) and Damgård, Ravi, Siniscalchi and Yakoubov (Eurocrypt 2023) study 2-round Multi-Party Computation (where some form of set-up is required). Motivated by the fact that broadcast is an expensive resource, they focus on so-called broadcast optimal MPC, i.e., they give tight characterizations of which security guarantees are achievable, if broadcast is available in the first round, the second round, both rounds, or not at all.
This work considers the natural question of characterizing broadcast optimal MPC in the plain model where no set-up is assumed. We focus on 4-round protocols, since 4 is known to be the minimal number of rounds required to securely realize any functionality with black-box simulation. We give a complete characterization of which security guarantees, (namely selective abort, selective identifiable abort, unanimous abort and identifiable abort) are feasible or not, depending on the exact selection of rounds in which broadcast is available.

2023

TCC

Taming Adaptivity in YOSO Protocols: The Modular Way
Abstract

YOSO-style MPC protocols (Gentry et al., Crypto’21), is a promising framework where the overall computation is partitioned into small, short-lived pieces, delegated to subsets of one-time stateless parties. Such protocols enable gaining from the security benefits provided by using a large community of participants where “mass corruption” of a large fraction of participants is considered unlikely, while keeping the computational and communication costs manageable. However, fully realizing and analyzing YOSO-style protocols has proven to be challenging: While different components have been defined and realized in various works, there is a dearth of protocols that have reasonable efficiency and enjoy full end to end security against adaptive adversaries.
The YOSO model separates the protocol design, specifying the short-lived responsibilities, from the mechanisms assigning these responsibilities to machines participating in the computation. These protocol designs must then be translated to run directly on the machines, while preserving security guarantees. We provide a versatile and modular framework for analyzing the security of YOSO-style protocols, and show how to use it to compile any protocol design that is secure against static corruptions of t out of c parties, into protocols that withstand adaptive corruption of T out of N machines (where T/N is closely related to t/c, specifically when t/c < 0.5, we tolerate T/N ≤ 0.29) at overall communication cost that is comparable to that of the traditional protocol even when c << N.
Furthermore, we demonstrate how to minimize the use of costly non-committing encryption,
thereby keeping the computational and communication overhead manageable even in practical terms, while still providing end to end security analysis. Combined with existing approaches for transforming stateful protocols into stateless ones while preserving static security (e.g. Gentry et al. 21, Kolby et al. 22), we obtain end to end security.

2022

PKC

On the Bottleneck Complexity of MPC with Correlated Randomness
📺
Abstract

At ICALP 2018, Boyle et al. introduced the notion of the \emph{bottleneck complexity} of a secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocol. This measures the maximum communication complexity of any one party in the protocol, aiming to improve load-balancing among the parties.
In this work, we study the bottleneck complexity of MPC in the preprocessing model, where parties are given correlated randomness ahead of time.
We present two constructions of \emph{bottleneck-efficient} MPC protocols, whose bottleneck complexity is independent of the number of parties:
1. A protocol for computing abelian programs, based only on one-way functions.
2. A protocol for selection functions, based on any linearly homomorphic encryption scheme.
Compared with previous bottleneck-efficient constructions, our protocols can be based on a wider range of assumptions, and avoid the use of fully homomorphic encryption.

2022

EUROCRYPT

Round-Optimal Multi-Party Computation with Identifiable Abort
📺
Abstract

Secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols that are resilient to a dishonest majority allow the adversary to get the output of the computation while, at the same time, forcing the honest parties to abort. Aumann and Lindell introduced the enhanced notion of security with identifiable abort, which still allows the adversary to trigger an abort but, at the same time, it enables the honest parties to agree on the identity of the party that led to the abort. More recently, in Eurocrypt 2016, Garg et al. showed that, assuming access to a simultaneous message exchange channel for all the parties, at least four rounds of communication are required to securely realize non-trivial functionalities in the plain model.
Following Garg et al., a sequence of works has matched this lower bound, but none of them achieved security with identifiable abort. In this work, we close this gap and show that four rounds of communication are also sufficient to securely realize any functionality with identifiable abort using standard and generic polynomial-time assumptions. To achieve this result we introduce the new notion of bounded-rewind secure MPC that guarantees security even against an adversary that performs a mild form of reset attacks. We show how to instantiate this primitive starting from any MPC protocol and by assuming trapdoor-permutations.
The notion of bounded-rewind secure MPC allows for easier parallel composition of MPC protocols with other (interactive) cryptographic primitives. Therefore, we believe that this primitive can be useful in other contexts in which it is crucial to combine multiple primitives with MPC protocols while keeping the round complexity of the final protocol low.

2022

TCC

Fully-Secure MPC with Minimal Trust
Abstract

The task of achieving full security (with guaranteed output delivery) in secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a long-studied problem with known impossibility results that rule out constructions in the dishonest majority setting. In this work, we investigate the question of constructing fully-secure MPC protocols in the dishonest majority setting with the help of an external trusted party (TP). It is well-known that the existence of such a trusted party is sufficient to bypass the impossibility results. As our goal is to study the minimal requirements needed from this trusted party, we restrict ourselves to the extreme setting where the size of the TP is independent of the size of the functionality to be computed (called "small" TP) and this TP is invoked only once during the protocol execution. We present several positive and negative results for fully-secure MPC in this setting.
- For a natural class of protocols, specifically, those with a universal output decoder, we show that the size of the TP must necessarily be exponential in the number of parties. This result holds irrespective of the computational assumptions used in the protocol. This class is broad enough to capture the prior results and indicates that the prior techniques necessitate the use of an exponential-sized TP. We additionally rule out the possibility of achieving information-theoretic full security (without the restriction of using a universal output decoder) using a "small" TP in the plain model (i.e., without any setup).
- In order to get around the above negative result, we consider protocols without a universal output decoder. The main positive result in our work is a construction of such a fully-secure MPC protocol assuming the existence of a succinct Functional Encryption scheme. We also give evidence that such an assumption is likely to be necessary for fully-secure MPC in certain restricted settings.
- We also explore the possibility of achieving full-security with a semi-honest TP that could collude with the other malicious parties in the protocol (which are in a dishonest majority). In this setting, we show that fairness is impossible to achieve even if we allow the size of the TP to grow with the circuit-size of the function to be computed.

2021

CRYPTO

Broadcast-Optimal Two Round MPC with an Honest Majority
📺
Abstract

This paper closes the question of the possibility of two-round MPC protocols achieving different security guarantees with and without the availability of broadcast in any given round. Cohen et al. (Eurocrypt 2020) study this question in the dishonest majority setting; we complete the picture by studying the honest majority setting.
In the honest majority setting, given broadcast in both rounds, it is known that the strongest guarantee — guaranteed output delivery — is achievable (Gordon et al. Crypto 2015). We show that, given broadcast in the first round only, guaranteed output delivery is still achievable. Given broadcast in the second round only, we give a new construction that achieves identifiable abort, and we show that fairness — and thus guaranteed output delivery — are not achievable in this setting. Finally, if only peer-to-peer channels are available, we show that the weakest guarantee — selective abort — is the only one achievable for corruption thresholds t > 1 and for t = 1 and n = 3. On the other hand, it is already known that selective abort can be achieved in these cases. In the remaining cases, i.e., t = 1 and n > 3, it is known (from the work of Ishai et al. at Crypto 2010, and Ishai et al. at Crypto 2015) that guaranteed output delivery (and thus all weaker guarantees) are possible.

2021

TCC

Information-Theoretically Secure MPC against Mixed Dynamic Adversaries
📺
Abstract

In this work we consider information-theoretically secure MPC against an \emph{mixed} adversary who can corrupt $t_p$ parties passively, $t_a$ parties actively, and can make $t_f$ parties fail-stop.
With perfect security, it is known that every function can be computed securely if and only if $3t_a + 2t_p + t_f < n$,
for statistical security the bound is $2t_a + 2t_p + t_f < n$.
These results say that for each given set of parameters $(t_a, t_p, t_f)$ respecting the inequality, there exists a protocol secure against
this particular choice of corruption thresholds.
In this work we consider a \emph{dynamic} adversary. Here, the goal is a \emph{single} protocol that is secure, no matter which set of corruption thresholds $(t_a, t_p, t_f)$ from a certain class is chosen by the adversary. A dynamic adversary can choose a corruption strategy after seeing the protocol and so is much stronger than a standard adversary.
Dynamically secure protocols have been considered before for computational security. Also the information theoretic case has been studied, but only considering non-threshold adversaries, leading to inefficient protocols.
We consider threshold dynamic adversaries and information theoretic security.
For statistical security we show that efficient dynamic secure function evaluation (SFE) is possible if and only if $2t_a + 2t_p + t_f < n$, but any dynamically secure protocol must use
$\Omega(n)$ rounds, even if only fairness is required. Further, general reactive MPC is possible if we assume in addition that $2t_a+2t_f \leq n$,
but fair reactive MPC only requires $2t_a + 2t_p + t_f < n$.
For perfect security we show that both dynamic SFE and verifiable secret sharing (VSS) are impossible if we only assume
$3t_a + 2t_p + t_f < n$ and remain impossible even if we also assume $t_f=0$. In fact even SFE with security with abort is impossible in this case. On the other hand, perfect dynamic SFE with guaranteed output delivery (G.O.D.) is possible when either $t_p = 0$ or $t_a = 0$ i.e. if instead we assume $3t_a+t_f < n$ or $2t_p +t_f < n$. Further, perfect dynamic VSS with G.O.D. is possible under the stronger conditions
$3t_a + 3/2t_f \leq n$ or $2t_p + 2t_f \leq n$. These conditions are also sufficient for perfect reactive MPC. On the other hand, because perfect fair VSS only requires $3t_a+2t_p+t_f< n$, perfect reactive MPC is possible whenever perfect SFE is.

2021

JOFC

On the Exact Round Complexity of Secure Three-Party Computation
Abstract

We settle the exact round complexity of three-party computation (3PC) in honest-majority setting, for a range of security notions such as selective abort, unanimous abort, fairness and guaranteed output delivery. It is a folklore that the implication holds from the guaranteed output delivery to fairness to unanimous abort to selective abort. We focus on computational security and consider two network settings—pairwise-private channels without and with a broadcast channel. In the minimal setting of pairwise-private channels, 3PC with selective abort is known to be feasible in just two rounds, while guaranteed output delivery is infeasible to achieve irrespective of the number of rounds. Settling the quest for exact round complexity of 3PC in this setting, we show that three rounds are necessary and sufficient for unanimous abort and fairness. Extending our study to the setting with an additional broadcast channel, we show that while unanimous abort is achievable in just two rounds, three rounds are necessary and sufficient for fairness and guaranteed output delivery. Our lower bound results extend for any number of parties in honest majority setting and imply tightness of several known constructions. While our lower bounds extend to the common reference string (CRS) model, all our upper bounds are in the plain model. The fundamental concept of garbled circuits underlies all our upper bounds. Concretely, our constructions involve transmitting and evaluating only constant number of garbled circuits. Assumption-wise, our constructions rely on injective (one-to-one) one-way functions.

2020

ASIACRYPT

On the Exact Round Complexity of Best-of-both-Worlds Multi-party Computation
📺
Abstract

The two traditional streams of multiparty computation (MPC) protocols consist of-- (a) protocols achieving guaranteed output delivery (\god) or fairness (\fair) in the honest-majority setting and (b) protocols achieving unanimous or selective abort (\uab, \sab) in the dishonest-majority setting. The favorable presence of honest majority amongst the participants is necessary to achieve the stronger notions of \god~or \fair. While the constructions of each type are abound in the literature, one class of protocols does not seem to withstand the threat model of the other. For instance, the honest-majority protocols do not guarantee privacy of the inputs of the honest parties in the face of dishonest majority and likewise the dishonest-majority protocols cannot achieve $\god$ and $\fair$, tolerating even a single corruption, let alone dishonest minority. The promise of the unconventional yet much sought-after species of MPC, termed as `Best-of-Both-Worlds' (BoBW), is to offer the best possible security depending on the actual corruption scenario.
This work nearly settles the exact round complexity of two classes of BoBW protocols differing on the security achieved in the honest-majority setting, namely $\god$ and $\fair$ respectively, under the assumption of no setup (plain model), public setup (CRS) and private setup (CRS + PKI or simply PKI). The former class necessarily requires the number of parties to be strictly more than the sum of the bounds of corruptions in the honest-majority and dishonest-majority setting, for a feasible solution to exist. Demoting the goal to the second-best attainable security in the honest-majority setting, the latter class needs no such restriction.
Assuming a network with pair-wise private channels and a broadcast channel, we show that 5 and 3 rounds are necessary and sufficient for the class of BoBW MPC with $\fair$ under the assumption of `no setup' and `public and private setup' respectively. For the class of BoBW MPC with $\god$, we show necessity and sufficiency of 3 rounds for the public setup case and 2 rounds for the private setup case. In the no setup setting, we show the sufficiency of 5 rounds, while the known lower bound is 4. All our upper bounds are based on polynomial-time assumptions and assume black-box simulation. With distinct feasibility conditions, the classes differ in terms of the round requirement. The bounds are in some cases different and on a positive note at most one more, compared to the maximum of the needs of the honest-majority and dishonest-majority setting. Our results remain unaffected when security with abort and fairness are upgraded to their identifiable counterparts.

2019

ASIACRYPT

Beyond Honest Majority: The Round Complexity of Fair and Robust Multi-party Computation
Abstract

Two of the most sought-after properties of Multi-party Computation (MPC) protocols are fairness and guaranteed output delivery (GOD), the latter also referred to as robustness. Achieving both, however, brings in the necessary requirement of malicious-minority. In a generalised adversarial setting where the adversary is allowed to corrupt both actively and passively, the necessary bound for a n-party fair or robust protocol turns out to be $$t_a + t_p < n$$, where $$t_a,t_p$$ denote the threshold for active and passive corruption with the latter subsuming the former. Subsuming the malicious-minority as a boundary special case, this setting, denoted as dynamic corruption, opens up a range of possible corruption scenarios for the adversary. While dynamic corruption includes the entire range of thresholds for $$(t_a,t_p)$$ starting from $$(\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil - 1, \lfloor n/2 \rfloor )$$ to $$(0,n-1)$$, the boundary corruption restricts the adversary only to the boundary cases of $$(\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil - 1, \lfloor n/2 \rfloor )$$ and $$(0,n-1)$$. Notably, both corruption settings empower an adversary to control majority of the parties, yet ensuring the count on active corruption never goes beyond $$\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil - 1$$. We target the round complexity of fair and robust MPC tolerating dynamic and boundary adversaries. As it turns out, $$\lceil n/2 \rceil + 1$$ rounds are necessary and sufficient for fair as well as robust MPC tolerating dynamic corruption. The non-constant barrier raised by dynamic corruption can be sailed through for a boundary adversary. The round complexity of 3 and 4 is necessary and sufficient for fair and GOD protocols respectively, with the latter having an exception of allowing 3 round protocols in the presence of a single active corruption. While all our lower bounds assume pair-wise private and broadcast channels and are resilient to the presence of both public (CRS) and private (PKI) setup, our upper bounds are broadcast-only and assume only public setup. The traditional and popular setting of malicious-minority, being restricted compared to both dynamic and boundary setting, requires 3 and 2 rounds in the presence of public and private setup respectively for both fair as well as GOD protocols.

2018

CRYPTO

On the Exact Round Complexity of Secure Three-Party Computation
📺
Abstract

We settle the exact round complexity of three-party computation (3PC) in honest-majority setting, for a range of security notions such as selective abort, unanimous abort, fairness and guaranteed output delivery. Selective abort security, the weakest in the lot, allows the corrupt parties to selectively deprive some of the honest parties of the output. In the mildly stronger version of unanimous abort, either all or none of the honest parties receive the output. Fairness implies that the corrupted parties receive their output only if all honest parties receive output and lastly, the strongest notion of guaranteed output delivery implies that the corrupted parties cannot prevent honest parties from receiving their output. It is a folklore that the implication holds from the guaranteed output delivery to fairness to unanimous abort to selective abort. We focus on two network settings– pairwise-private channels without and with a broadcast channel.In the minimal setting of pairwise-private channels, 3PC with selective abort is known to be feasible in just two rounds, while guaranteed output delivery is infeasible to achieve irrespective of the number of rounds. Settling the quest for exact round complexity of 3PC in this setting, we show that three rounds are necessary and sufficient for unanimous abort and fairness. Extending our study to the setting with an additional broadcast channel, we show that while unanimous abort is achievable in just two rounds, three rounds are necessary and sufficient for fairness and guaranteed output delivery. Our lower bound results extend for any number of parties in honest majority setting and imply tightness of several known constructions.The fundamental concept of garbled circuits underlies all our upper bounds. Concretely, our constructions involve transmitting and evaluating only constant number of garbled circuits. Assumption-wise, our constructions rely on injective (one-to-one) one-way functions.

#### Program Committees

- Eurocrypt 2023

#### Coauthors

- Saikrishna Badrinarayanan (1)
- Ran Canetti (1)
- Michele Ciampi (2)
- Ivan Damgård (4)
- Daniel Escudero (1)
- Yuval Ishai (1)
- Sebastian Kolby (1)
- Bernardo Magri (1)
- Peihan Miao (1)
- Pratyay Mukherjee (1)
- Claudio Orlandi (1)
- Arpita Patra (6)
- Sikhar Patranabis (1)
- Divya Ravi (14)
- Peter Scholl (1)
- Swati Singla (1)
- Luisa Siniscalchi (4)
- Eduardo Soria-Vazquez (1)
- Akshayaram Srinivasan (1)
- Hendrik Waldner (1)
- Yu Xia (1)
- Sophia Yakoubov (4)