## CryptoDB

### Marshall Ball

#### Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2019
EUROCRYPT
We construct efficient non-malleable codes (NMC) that are (computationally) secure against tampering by functions computable in any fixed polynomial time. Our construction is in the plain (no-CRS) model and requires the assumptions that (1) $\mathbf {E}$E is hard for $\mathbf {NP}$NP circuits of some exponential $2^{\beta n}$2βn ($\beta >0$β>0) size (widely used in the derandomization literature), (2) sub-exponential trapdoor permutations exist, and (3) $\mathbf {P}$P-certificates with sub-exponential soundness exist.While it is impossible to construct NMC secure against arbitrary polynomial-time tampering (Dziembowski, Pietrzak, Wichs, ICS ’10), the existence of NMC secure against $O(n^c)$O(nc)-time tampering functions (for any fixedc), was shown (Cheraghchi and Guruswami, ITCS ’14) via a probabilistic construction. An explicit construction was given (Faust, Mukherjee, Venturi, Wichs, Eurocrypt ’14) assuming an untamperable CRS with length longer than the runtime of the tampering function. In this work, we show that under computational assumptions, we can bypass these limitations. Specifically, under the assumptions listed above, we obtain non-malleable codes in the plain model against $O(n^c)$O(nc)-time tampering functions (for any fixed c), with codeword length independent of the tampering time bound.Our new construction of NMC draws a connection with non-interactive non-malleable commitments. In fact, we show that in the NMC setting, it suffices to have a much weaker notion called quasi non-malleable commitments—these are non-interactive, non-malleable commitments in the plain model, in which the adversary runs in $O(n^c)$O(nc)-time, whereas the honest parties may run in longer (polynomial) time. We then construct a 4-tag quasi non-malleable commitment from any sub-exponential OWF and the assumption that $\mathbf {E}$E is hard for some exponential size $\mathbf {NP}$NP-circuits, and use tag amplification techniques to support an exponential number of tags.
2019
CRYPTO
We construct efficient, unconditional non-malleable codes that are secure against tampering functions computed by decision trees of depth $d= n^{1/4-o(1)}$ . In particular, each bit of the tampered codeword is set arbitrarily after adaptively reading up to d arbitrary locations within the original codeword. Prior to this work, no efficient unconditional non-malleable codes were known for decision trees beyond depth $O(\log ^2 n)$ .Our result also yields efficient, unconditional non-malleable codes that are $\exp (-n^{\varOmega (1)})$ -secure against constant-depth circuits of $\exp (n^{\varOmega (1)})$ -size. Prior work of Chattopadhyay and Li (STOC 2017) and Ball et al. (FOCS 2018) only provide protection against $\exp (O(\log ^2n))$ -size circuits with $\exp (-O(\log ^2n))$ -security.We achieve our result through simple non-malleable reductions of decision tree tampering to split-state tampering. As an intermediary, we give a simple and generic reduction of leakage-resilient split-state tampering to split-state tampering with improved parameters. Prior work of Aggarwal et al. (TCC 2015) only provides a reduction to split-state non-malleable codes with decoders that exhibit particular properties.
2018
EUROCRYPT
2018
EUROCRYPT
2018
CRYPTO
We give Proofs of Work (PoWs) whose hardness is based on well-studied worst-case assumptions from fine-grained complexity theory. This extends the work of (Ball et al., STOC ’17), that presents PoWs that are based on the Orthogonal Vectors, 3SUM, and All-Pairs Shortest Path problems. These, however, were presented as a ‘proof of concept’ of provably secure PoWs and did not fully meet the requirements of a conventional PoW: namely, it was not shown that multiple proofs could not be generated faster than generating each individually. We use the considerable algebraic structure of these PoWs to prove that this non-amortizability of multiple proofs does in fact hold and further show that the PoWs’ structure can be exploited in ways previous heuristic PoWs could not.This creates full PoWs that are provably hard from worst-case assumptions (previously, PoWs were either only based on heuristic assumptions or on much stronger cryptographic assumptions (Bitansky et al., ITCS ’16)) while still retaining significant structure to enable extra properties of our PoWs. Namely, we show that the PoWs of (Ball et al., STOC ’17) can be modified to have much faster verification time, can be proved in zero knowledge, and more.Finally, as our PoWs are based on evaluating low-degree polynomials originating from average-case fine-grained complexity, we prove an average-case direct sum theorem for the problem of evaluating these polynomials, which may be of independent interest. For our context, this implies the required non-amortizability of our PoWs.
2016
EUROCRYPT