CryptoDB
Uniform Black-Box Separations via Non-Malleable Extractors
| Authors: |
|
|---|---|
| Download: | |
| Conference: | CRYPTO 2025 |
| Abstract: | We construct $t$-non-malleable extractors---which allow an attacker to tamper with a source $t$ times---for high min-entropy sources samplable by poly-time hierarchy circuits and for tampering classes corresponding to poly-time hierarchy functions from derandomization-type assumptions. We then show an application of this new object to ruling out constructions of succinct, non-interactive, arguments (SNARGs) secure against \emph{uniform} adversaries from \emph{uniform} falsifiable assumptions via a class of black-box reductions that has not been previously considered in the literature. This class of black-box reductions allows the reduction to arbitrarily set the \emph{coins}, as well as the input, of the uniform adversary it interacts with. The class of reductions we consider is restricted in allowing only non-adaptive queries to the adversary. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{crypto-2025-35748,
title={Uniform Black-Box Separations via Non-Malleable Extractors},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
author={Marshall Ball and Dana Dachman-Soled},
year=2025
}