## CryptoDB

### Akinori Hosoyamada

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2023

ASIACRYPT

Quantum Speed-Up for Multidimensional (Zero Correlation) Linear Distinguishers
Abstract

This paper shows how to achieve a quantum speed-up for multidimensional (zero correlation) linear distinguishers.
A previous work by Kaplan et al. has already shown a quantum quadratic speed-up for one-dimensional linear distinguishers.
However, classical linear cryptanalysis often exploits multidimensional approximations to achieve more efficient attacks, and in fact it is highly non-trivial whether Kaplan et al.'s technique can be extended into the multidimensional case.
To remedy this, we investigate a new quantum technique to speed-up multidimensional linear distinguishers.
Firstly, we observe that there is a close relationship between the subroutine of Simon's algorithm and linear correlations via Fourier transform.
Specifically, a slightly modified version of Simon's subroutine, which we call Correlation Extraction Algorithm (CEA), can be used to speed-up multidimensional linear distinguishers.
CEA also leads to a speed-up for multidimensional zero correlation distinguishers, as well as some integral distinguishers through the correspondence of zero correlation and integral properties shown by Bogdanov et al.~and Sun et al.
Furthermore, we observe possibility of a more than quadratic speed-ups for some special types of integral distinguishers when multiple integral properties exist.
Especially, we show a single-query distinguisher on a 4-bit cell SPN cipher with the same integral property as 2.5-round AES.
Our attacks are the first to observe such a speed-up for classical cryptanalytic techniques without relying on hidden periods or shifts.
By replacing the Hadamard transform in CEA with the general quantum Fourier transform, our technique also speeds-up generalized linear distinguishers on an arbitrary finite abelian group.

2022

TOSC

Cryptanalysis of Rocca and Feasibility of Its Security Claim
Abstract

Rocca is an authenticated encryption with associated data scheme for beyond 5G/6G systems. It was proposed at FSE 2022/ToSC 2021(2), and the designers make a security claim of achieving 256-bit security against key-recovery and distinguishing attacks, and 128-bit security against forgery attacks (the security claim regarding distinguishing attacks was subsequently weakened in the full version in ePrint 2022/116). A notable aspect of the claim is the gap between the privacy and authenticity security. In particular, the security claim regarding key-recovery attacks allows an attacker to obtain multiple forgeries through the decryption oracle. In this paper, we first present a full key-recovery attack on Rocca. The data complexity of our attack is 2128 and the time complexity is about 2128, where the attack makes use of the encryption and decryption oracles, and the success probability is almost 1. The attack recovers the entire 256-bit key in a single-key and nonce-respecting setting, breaking the 256-bit security claim against key-recovery attacks. We then extend the attack to various security models and discuss several countermeasures to see the feasibility of the security claim. Finally, we consider a theoretical question of whether achieving the security claim of Rocca is possible in the provable security paradigm. We present both negative and positive results to the question.

2022

ASIACRYPT

A Modular Approach to the Incompressibility of Block-Cipher-Based AEADs
📺
Abstract

Incompressibility is one of the most fundamental security goals in white-box cryptography.
Given recent advances in the design of efficient and incompressible block ciphers such as SPACE, SPNbox and WhiteBlock,
we demonstrate the feasibility of reducing incompressible AEAD modes to incompressible block ciphers.
We first observe that several existing AEAD modes of operation, including CCM, GCM(-SIV), and OCB, would be all insecure against white-box adversaries even when used with an incompressble block cipher.
This motivates us to revisit and formalize incompressibility-based security definitions for AEAD schemes and for block ciphers, so that we become able to design modes and reduce their security to that of the underlying ciphers.
Our new security notion for AEAD, which we name whPRI, is an extension of the pseudo-random injection security in the black-box setting.
Similar security notions are also defined for other cryptosystems such as privacy-only encryption schemes.
We emphasize that whPRI ensures quite strong authenticity against white-box adversaries:
existential unforgeability beyond leakage.
This contrasts sharply with previous notions which have ensured either no authenticity or only universal unforgeability.
For the underlying ciphers we introduce a new notion of whPRP, which extends that of PRP in the black-box setting.
Interestingly, our incompressibility reductions follow from a variant of public indifferentiability.
In particular, we show that a practical whPRI-secure AEAD mode can be built from a whPRP-secure block cipher: We present a SIV-like composition of the sponge construction (utilizing a block cipher as its underlying primitive) with the counter mode and prove that such a construction is (in the variant sense) public indifferentiable from a random injection.
To instantiate such an AEAD scheme, we propose a 256-bit variant of SPACE, based on our conjecture that SPACE should be a whPRP-secure cipher.

2021

TOSC

Provably Quantum-Secure Tweakable Block Ciphers
📺
Abstract

Recent results on quantum cryptanalysis show that some symmetric key schemes can be broken in polynomial time even if they are proven to be secure in the classical setting. Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner showed that secure tweakable block ciphers can be constructed from secure block ciphers in the classical setting. However, Kaplan et al. showed that their scheme can be broken by polynomial time quantum superposition attacks, even if underlying block ciphers are quantum-secure. Since then, it remains open if there exists a mode of block ciphers to build quantum-secure tweakable block ciphers. This paper settles the problem in the reduction-based provable security paradigm. We show the first design of quantum-secure tweakable block ciphers based on quantum-secure block ciphers, and present a provable security bound. Our construction is simple, and when instantiated with a quantum-secure n-bit block cipher, it is secure against attacks that query arbitrary quantum superpositions of plaintexts and tweaks up to O(2n/6) quantum queries. Our security proofs use the compressed oracle technique introduced by Zhandry. More precisely, we use an alternative formalization of the technique introduced by Hosoyamada and Iwata.

2021

CRYPTO

On Tight Quantum Security of HMAC and NMAC in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
📺
Abstract

HMAC and NMAC are the most basic and important constructions to convert Merkle-Damg{\aa}rd hash functions into message authentication codes (MACs) or pseudorandom functions (PRFs).
In the quantum setting, at CRYPTO~2017, Song and Yun showed that HMAC and NMAC are quantum pseudorandom functions (qPRFs) under the standard assumption that the underlying compression function is a qPRF.
Their proof guarantees security up to $O(2^{n/5})$ or $O(2^{n/8})$ quantum queries when the output length of HMAC and NMAC is $n$ bits.
However, there is a gap between the provable security bound and a simple distinguishing attack that uses $O(2^{n/3})$ quantum queries.
This paper settles the problem of closing the gap.
We show that the tight bound of the number of
quantum queries to distinguish HMAC or NMAC from a random function
is $\Theta(2^{n/3})$ in the quantum random oracle model,
where compression functions are modeled as quantum random oracles.
To give the tight quantum bound,
based on an alternative formalization of Zhandry's compressed oracle technique,
we introduce a new proof technique focusing on the symmetry of quantum query records.

2021

CRYPTO

Quantum Collision Attacks on Reduced SHA-256 and SHA-512
📺
Abstract

In this paper, we study dedicated quantum collision attacks on SHA-256 and SHA-512 for the first time.
The attacks reach 38 and 39 steps, respectively, which significantly improve the classical attacks for 31 and 27 steps.
Both attacks adopt the framework of the previous work that converts many semi-free-start collisions into a 2-block collision, and are faster than the generic attack in the cost metric of time-space tradeoff.
We observe that the number of required semi-free-start collisions can be reduced in the quantum setting, which allows us to convert the previous classical 38 and 39 step semi-free-start collisions into a collision.
The idea behind our attacks is simple and will also be applicable to other cryptographic hash functions.

2020

EUROCRYPT

Finding Hash Collisions with Quantum Computers by Using Differential Trails with Smaller Probability than Birthday Bound
📺
Abstract

In this paper we spot light on dedicated quantum collision attacks on concrete hash functions, which has not received much attention so far.
In the classical setting, the generic complexity to find collisions of an $n$-bit hash function is $O(2^{n/2})$, thus classical collision attacks based on differential cryptanalysis such as rebound attacks build differential trails with probability higher than $2^{-n/2}$.
By the same analogy, generic quantum algorithms such as the BHT algorithm find collisions with complexity $O(2^{n/3})$.
With quantum algorithms, a pair of messages satisfying a differential trail with probability $p$ can be generated with complexity $p^{-1/2}$.
Hence, in the quantum setting, some differential trails with probability up to $2^{-2n/3}$ that cannot be exploited in the classical setting may be exploited to mount a collision attack in the quantum setting.
In particular, the number of attacked rounds may increase.
In this paper, we attack two international hash function standards: AES-MMO and Whirlpool.
For AES-MMO, we present a $7$-round differential trail with probability $2^{-80}$ and use it to find collisions with a quantum version of the rebound attack,
while only $6$ rounds can be attacked in the classical setting.
For Whirlpool, we mount a collision attack based on a $6$-round differential trail from a classical rebound distinguisher with a complexity higher than the birthday bound. This improves the best classical attack on 5 rounds by 1.
We also show that those trails are optimal in our approach.
Our results have two important implications.
First, there seems to exist a common belief that classically secure hash functions will remain secure against quantum adversaries. Indeed, several second-round candidates in the NIST post-quantum competition use existing hash functions, say SHA-3, as quantum secure ones. Our results disprove this common belief.
Second, our observation suggests that differential trail search should not stop with probability $2^{-n/2}$ but should consider up to $2^{-2n/3}$.
Hence it deserves to revisit the previous differential trail search activities.

2020

ASIACRYPT

Finding Collisions in a Quantum World: Quantum Black-Box Separation of Collision-Resistance and One-Wayness
📺 ★
Abstract

Since the celebrated work of Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC 1989), a number of black-box impossibility results have been established. However, these works only ruled out classical black-box reductions among cryptographic primitives.
Therefore it may be possible to overcome these impossibility results by using quantum reductions.
To exclude such a possibility, we have to extend these impossibility results to the quantum setting.
In this paper, we study black-box impossibility in the quantum setting.
We first formalize a quantum counterpart of fully-black-box reduction following the formalization by Reingold, Trevisan and Vadhan (TCC 2004).
Then we prove that there is no quantum fully-black-box reduction from collision-resistant hash functions to one-way permutations (or even trapdoor permutations).
We take both of classical and quantum implementations of primitives into account.
This is an extension to the quantum setting of the work of Simon (Eurocrypt 1998) who showed a similar result in the classical setting.

2020

TOSC

Improved Attacks on sLiSCP Permutation and Tight Bound of Limited Birthday Distinguishers
📺
Abstract

Limited birthday distinguishers (LBDs) are widely used tools for the cryptanalysis of cryptographic permutations. In this paper we propose LBDs on several variants of the sLiSCP permutation family that are building blocks of two round 2 candidates of the NIST lightweight standardization process: Spix and SpoC. We improve the number of steps with respect to the previously known best results, that used rebound attack. We improve the techniques used for solving the middle part, called inbound, and we relax the external conditions in order to extend the previous attacks. The lower bound of the complexity of LBDs has been proved only against functions. In this paper, we prove for the first time the bound against permutations, which shows that the known upper bounds are tight.

2019

ASIACRYPT

4-Round Luby-Rackoff Construction is a qPRP
Abstract

The Luby-Rackoff construction, or the Feistel construction, is one of the most important approaches to construct secure block ciphers from secure pseudorandom functions. The 3- and 4-round Luby-Rackoff constructions are proven to be secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPAs) and chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCAs), respectively, in the classical setting. However, Kuwakado and Morii showed that a quantum superposed chosen-plaintext attack (qCPA) can distinguish the 3-round Luby-Rackoff construction from a random permutation in polynomial time. In addition, Ito et al. recently showed a quantum superposed chosen-ciphertext attack (qCCA) that distinguishes the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction. Since Kuwakado and Morii showed the result, a problem of much interest has been how many rounds are sufficient to achieve provable security against quantum query attacks. This paper answers to this fundamental question by showing that 4-rounds suffice against qCPAs. Concretely, we prove that the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction is secure up to $$O(2^{n/12})$$ quantum queries. We also give a query upper bound for the problem of distinguishing the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction from a random permutation by showing a distinguishing qCPA with $$O(2^{n/6})$$ quantum queries. Our result is the first to demonstrate the security of a typical block-cipher construction against quantum query attacks, without any algebraic assumptions. To give security proofs, we use an alternative formalization of Zhandry’s compressed oracle technique.

2019

ASIACRYPT

Quantum Attacks Without Superposition Queries: The Offline Simon’s Algorithm
Abstract

In symmetric cryptanalysis, the model of superposition queries has led to surprising results, with many constructions being broken in polynomial time thanks to Simon’s period-finding algorithm. But the practical implications of these attacks remain blurry. In contrast, the results obtained so far for a quantum adversary making classical queries only are less impressive.In this paper, we introduce a new quantum algorithm which uses Simon’s subroutines in a novel way. We manage to leverage the algebraic structure of cryptosystems in the context of a quantum attacker limited to classical queries and offline quantum computations. We obtain improved quantum-time/classical-data tradeoffs with respect to the current literature, while using only as much hardware requirements (quantum and classical) as a standard exhaustive search with Grover’s algorithm. In particular, we are able to break the Even-Mansour construction in quantum time $$\tilde{O}(2^{n/3})$$, with $$O(2^{n/3})$$ classical queries and $$O(n^2)$$ qubits only. In addition, we improve some previous superposition attacks by reducing the data complexity from exponential to polynomial, with the same time complexity.Our approach can be seen in two complementary ways: reusing superposition queries during the iteration of a search using Grover’s algorithm, or alternatively, removing the memory requirement in some quantum attacks based on a collision search, thanks to their algebraic structure.We provide a list of cryptographic applications, including the Even-Mansour construction, the FX construction, some Sponge authenticated modes of encryption, and many more.

2018

ASIACRYPT

Building Quantum-One-Way Functions from Block Ciphers: Davies-Meyer and Merkle-Damgård Constructions
Abstract

We present hash functions that are almost optimally one-way in the quantum setting. Our hash functions are based on the Merkle-Damgård construction iterating a Davies-Meyer compression function, which is built from a block cipher. The quantum setting that we use is a natural extention of the classical ideal cipher model. Recent work has revealed that symmetric-key schemes using a block cipher or a public permutation, such as CBC-MAC or the Even-Mansour cipher, can get completely broken with quantum superposition attacks, in polynomial time of the block size. Since many of the popular schemes are built from a block cipher or a permutation, the recent findings motivate us to study such schemes that are provably secure in the quantum setting. Unfortunately, no such schemes are known, unless one relies on certain algebraic assumptions. In this paper we present hash constructions that are provably one-way in the quantum setting without algebraic assumptions, solely based on the assumption that the underlying block cipher is ideal. To do this, we reduce one-wayness to a problem of finding a fixed point and then bound its success probability with a distinguishing advantage. We develop a generic tool that helps us prove indistinguishability of two quantum oracle distributions.

#### Program Committees

- FSE 2023
- Asiacrypt 2021

#### Coauthors

- Xavier Bonnetain (1)
- Akinori Hosoyamada (13)
- Akiko Inoue (1)
- Takanori Isobe (1)
- Ryoma Ito (1)
- Tetsu Iwata (4)
- Kazuhiko Mimematsu (1)
- María Naya-Plasencia (2)
- Yu Sasaki (5)
- André Schrottenloher (1)
- Ferdinand Sibleyras (1)
- Yosuke Todo (2)
- Keita Xagawa (1)
- Takashi Yamakawa (1)
- Kan Yasuda (2)