International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Akiko Inoue

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2022
TOSC
Cryptanalysis of Rocca and Feasibility of Its Security Claim
Rocca is an authenticated encryption with associated data scheme for beyond 5G/6G systems. It was proposed at FSE 2022/ToSC 2021(2), and the designers make a security claim of achieving 256-bit security against key-recovery and distinguishing attacks, and 128-bit security against forgery attacks (the security claim regarding distinguishing attacks was subsequently weakened in the full version in ePrint 2022/116). A notable aspect of the claim is the gap between the privacy and authenticity security. In particular, the security claim regarding key-recovery attacks allows an attacker to obtain multiple forgeries through the decryption oracle. In this paper, we first present a full key-recovery attack on Rocca. The data complexity of our attack is 2128 and the time complexity is about 2128, where the attack makes use of the encryption and decryption oracles, and the success probability is almost 1. The attack recovers the entire 256-bit key in a single-key and nonce-respecting setting, breaking the 256-bit security claim against key-recovery attacks. We then extend the attack to various security models and discuss several countermeasures to see the feasibility of the security claim. Finally, we consider a theoretical question of whether achieving the security claim of Rocca is possible in the provable security paradigm. We present both negative and positive results to the question.
2020
JOFC
Cryptanalysis of OCB2: Attacks on Authenticity and Confidentiality
We present practical attacks on OCB2. This mode of operation of a blockcipher was designed with the aim to provide particularly efficient and provably secure authenticated encryption services, and since its proposal about 15 years ago it belongs to the top performers in this realm. OCB2 was included in an ISO standard in 2009. An internal building block of OCB2 is the tweakable blockcipher obtained by operating a regular blockcipher in $${\text {XEX}}^*$$ XEX ∗  mode. The latter provides security only when evaluated in accordance with certain technical restrictions that, as we note, are not always respected by OCB2. This leads to devastating attacks against OCB2’s security promises: We develop a range of very practical attacks that, amongst others, demonstrate universal forgeries and full plaintext recovery. We complete our report with proposals for (provably) repairing OCB2. As a direct consequence of our findings, OCB2 is currently in a process of removal from ISO standards. Our attacks do not apply to OCB1 and OCB3, and our privacy attacks on OCB2 require an active adversary.
2020
TOSC
Highly Secure Nonce-based MACs from the Sum of Tweakable Block Ciphers 📺
Tweakable block ciphers (TBCs) have proven highly useful to boost the security guarantees of authentication schemes. In 2017, Cogliati et al. proposed two MACs combining TBC and universal hash functions: a nonce-based MAC called NaT and a deterministic MAC called HaT. While both constructions provide high security, their properties are complementary: NaT is almost fully secure when nonces are respected (i.e., n-bit security, where n is the block size of the TBC, and no security degradation in terms of the number of MAC queries when nonces are unique), while its security degrades gracefully to the birthday bound (n/2 bits) when nonces are misused. HaT has n-bit security and can be used naturally as a nonce-based MAC when a message contains a nonce. However, it does not have full security even if nonces are unique.This work proposes two highly secure and efficient MACs to fill the gap: NaT2 and eHaT. Both provide (almost) full security if nonces are unique and more than n/2-bit security when nonces can repeat. Based on NaT and HaT, we aim at achieving these properties in a modular approach. Our first proposal, Nonce-as-Tweak2 (NaT2), is the sum of two NaT instances. Our second proposal, enhanced Hash-as-Tweak (eHaT), extends HaT by adding the output of an additional nonce-depending call to the TBC and prepending nonce to the message. Despite the conceptual simplicity, the security proofs are involved. For NaT2 in particular, we rely on the recent proof framework for Double-block Hash-then-Sum by Kim et al. from Eurocrypt 2020.
2019
CRYPTO
Cryptanalysis of OCB2: Attacks on Authenticity and Confidentiality 📺
We present practical attacks on OCB2. This mode of operation of a blockcipher was designed with the aim to provide particularly efficient and provably-secure authenticated encryption services, and since its proposal about 15 years ago it belongs to the top performers in this realm. OCB2 was included in an ISO standard in 2009.An internal building block of OCB2 is the tweakable blockcipher obtained by operating a regular blockcipher in $$ \text {XEX} ^*$$ mode. The latter provides security only when evaluated in accordance with certain technical restrictions that, as we note, are not always respected by OCB2. This leads to devastating attacks against OCB2’s security promises: We develop a range of very practical attacks that, amongst others, demonstrate universal forgeries and full plaintext recovery. We complete our report with proposals for (provably) repairing OCB2. To our understanding, as a direct consequence of our findings, OCB2 is currently in a process of removal from ISO standards. Our attacks do not apply to OCB1 and OCB3, and our privacy attacks on OCB2 require an active adversary.