International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

Affiliation: Technische Universitaet Darmstadt

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2015
EPRINT
2013
CHES
2012
CHES
2011
CHES
2010
CHES
2010
EPRINT
Modular Design of Efficient Secure Function Evaluation Protocols
Two-party Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) allows mutually distrusting parties to (jointly) correctly compute a function on their private input data, without revealing the inputs. SFE, properly designed, guarantees to satisfy the most stringent security requirements, even for interactive computation. Two-party SFE can benefit almost any client-server interaction where privacy is required, such as privacy-preserving credit checking, medical classification, or face recognition. Today, SFE is a subject of immense amount of research in a variety of directions, and is not easy to navigate. In this paper, we systematize some of the vast research knowledge on \emph{practically} efficient SFE. It turns out that the most efficient SFE protocols are obtained by combining several basic techniques, such as garbled circuits and computation under homomorphic encryption. As an important practical contribution, we present a framework in which these techniques can be viewed as building blocks with well-defined interfaces. These components can be easily combined to establish a complete efficient solution. Further, our approach naturally lends itself to automated protocol generation (compilation). We believe, today, this approach is the best candidate for implementation and deployment.
2010
EPRINT
Garbled Circuits for Leakage-Resilience: Hardware Implementation and Evaluation of One-Time Programs
The power of side-channel leakage attacks on cryptographic implementations is evident. Today's practical defenses are typically attack-specific countermeasures against certain classes of side-channel attacks. The demand for a more general solution has given rise to the recent theoretical research that aims to build provably leakage-resilient cryptography. This direction is, however, very new and still largely lacks practitioners' evaluation with regard to both efficiency and practical security. A recent approach, One-Time Programs (OTPs), proposes using Yao's Garbled Circuit (GC) and very simple tamper-proof hardware to securely implement oblivious transfer, to guarantee leakage resilience. Our main contributions are (i) a generic architecture for using GC/OTP modularly, and (ii) hardware implementation and efficiency analysis of GC/OTP evaluation. We implemented two FPGA-based prototypes: a system-on-a-programmable-chip with access to hardware crypto accelerator (suitable for smartcards and future smartphones), and a stand-alone hardware implementation (suitable for ASIC design). We chose AES as a representative complex function for implementation and measurements. As a result of this work, we are able to understand, evaluate and improve the practicality of employing GC/OTP as a leakage-resistance approach. Last, but not least, we believe that our work contributes to bringing together the results of both theoretical and practical communities.
2010
EPRINT
A Certifying Compiler for Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge Based on $\Sigma$-Protocols
Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (ZK-PoK) are important building blocks for numerous cryptographic applications. Although ZK-PoK have very useful properties, their real world deployment is typically hindered by their significant complexity compared to other (non-interactive) crypto primitives. Moreover, their design and implementation is time-consuming and error-prone. We contribute to overcoming these challenges as follows: We present a comprehensive specification language and a certifying compiler for ZK-PoK protocols based on $\Sigma$-protocols and composition techniques known in literature. The compiler allows the fully automatic translation of an abstract description of a proof goal into an executable implementation. Moreover, the compiler overcomes various restrictions of previous approaches, e.g., it supports the important class of exponentiation homomorphisms with hidden-order co-domain, needed for privacy-preserving applications such as idemix. Finally, our compiler is certifying, in the sense that it automatically produces a formal proof of security (soundness) of the compiled protocol (currently covering special homomorphisms) using the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover.
2010
EPRINT
TASTY: Tool for Automating Secure Two-partY computations
Secure two-party computation allows two untrusting parties to jointly compute an arbitrary function on their respective private inputs while revealing no information beyond the outcome. Existing cryptographic compilers can automatically generate secure computation protocols from high-level specifications, but are often limited in their use and efficiency of generated protocols as they are based on either garbled circuits or (additively) homomorphic encryption only. In this paper we present TASTY, a novel tool for automating, i.e., describing, generating, executing, benchmarking, and comparing, efficient secure two-party computation protocols. TASTY is a new compiler that can generate protocols based on homomorphic encryption and efficient garbled circuits as well as combinations of both, which often yields the most efficient protocols available today. The user provides a high-level description of the computations to be performed on encrypted data in a domain-specific language. This is automatically transformed into a protocol. TASTY provides most recent techniques and optimizations for practical secure two-party computation with low online latency. Moreover, it allows to efficiently evaluate circuits generated by the well-known Fairplay compiler. We use TASTY to compare protocols for secure multiplication based on homomorphic encryption with those based on garbled circuits and highly efficient Karatsuba multiplication. Further, we show how TASTY improves the online latency for securely evaluating the AES functionality by an order of magnitude compared to previous software implementations. TASTY allows to automatically generate efficient secure protocols for many privacy-preserving applications where we consider the use cases for private set intersection and face recognition protocols.
2009
ASIACRYPT
2008
ASIACRYPT
2008
CHES
2008
EPRINT
Universally Composable Security Analysis of TLS---Secure Sessions with Handshake and Record Layer Protocols
We present a security analysis of the complete TLS protocol in the Universal Composable security framework. This analysis evaluates the composition of key exchange functionalities realized by the TLS handshake with the message transmission of the TLS record layer to emulate secure communication sessions and is based on the adaption of the secure channel model from Canetti and Krawczyk to the setting where peer identities are not necessarily known prior the protocol invocation and may remain undisclosed. Our analysis shows that TLS, including the Diffie-Hellman and key transport suites in the uni-directional and bi-directional models of authentication, securely emulates secure communication sessions.
2008
EPRINT
A New Approach for Algebraically Homomorphic Encryption
Frederik Armknecht Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
The existence of an efficient and provably secure algebraically homomorphic scheme (AHS), i.e., one that supports both addition and multiplication operations, is a long stated open problem. All proposals so far are either insecure or not provable secure, inefficient, or allow only for one multiplication (and arbitrary additions). As only very limited progress has been made on the existing approaches in the recent years, the question arises whether new methods can lead to more satisfactory solutions. In this paper we show how to construct a provably secure AHS based on a coding theory problem. It allows for arbitrary many additions and for a fixed, but arbitrary number of multiplications and works over arbitrary finite fields. Besides, it possesses some useful properties: i) the plaintext space can be extended adaptively without the need for re-encryption, ii) it operates over arbitrary infinite fields as well, e.g., rational numbers, but the hardness of the underlying decoding problem in such cases is less studied, and iii) depending on the parameter choice, the scheme has inherent error-correcting up to a certain number of transmission errors in the ciphertext. However, since our scheme is symmetric and its ciphertext size grows exponentially with the expected total number of encryptions, its deployment is limited to specific client-server-applications with few number of multiplications. Nevertheless, we believe room for improvement due to the huge number of alternative coding schemes that can serve as the underlying hardness problem. For these reasons and because of the interesting properties of our scheme, we believe that using coding theory to design AHS is a promising approach and hope to encourage further investigations.
2008
EPRINT
Automatic Generation of Sound Zero-Knowledge Protocols
Efficient zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (ZK-PoK) are basic building blocks of many practical cryptographic applications such as identification schemes, group signatures, and secure multiparty computation. Currently, first applications that essentially rely on ZK-POKs are being deployed in the real world. The most prominent example is Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA), which was adopted by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) and implemented as one of the functionalities of the cryptographic chip Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Implementing systems using ZK-PoK turns out to be challenging, since ZK-PoK are, loosely speaking, significantly more complex than standard crypto primitives, such as encryption and signature schemes. As a result, implementation cycles of ZK-PoK are time-consuming and error-prone, in particular for developers with minor or no cryptographic skills. To overcome these challenges, we have designed and implemented a compiler with corresponding languages that given a high-level ZK-PoK protocol specification automatically generates a sound implementation of this. The output is given in form of $\Sigma$-protocols, which are the most efficient protocols for ZK-PoK currently known. Our compiler translates ZK-PoK protocol specifications, written in a high-level protocol description language, into Java code or \LaTeX\ documentation of the protocol. The compiler is based on a unified theoretical framework that encompasses a large number of existing ZK-PoK techniques. Within this framework we present a new efficient ZK-PoK protocol for exponentiation homomorphisms in hidden order groups. Our protocol overcomes several limitations of the existing proof techniques.
2008
EPRINT
Generalized Universal Circuits for Secure Evaluation of Private Functions with Application to Data Classification
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi Thomas Schneider
Secure Evaluation of Private Functions (PF-SFE) allows two parties to compute a private function which is known by one party only on private data of both. It is known that PF-SFE can be reduced to Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) of a Universal Circuit (UC). Previous UC constructions only simulated circuits with gates of $d=2$ inputs while gates with $d>2$ inputs were decomposed into many gates with $2$ inputs which is inefficient for large $d$ as the size of UC heavily depends on the number of gates. We present generalized UC constructions to efficiently simulate any circuit with gates of $d \ge 2$ inputs having efficient circuit representation. Our constructions are non-trivial generalizations of previously known UC constructions. As application we show how to securely evaluate private functions such as neural networks (NN) which are increasingly used in commercial applications. Our provably secure PF-SFE protocol needs only one round in the semi-honest model (or even no online communication at all using non-interactive oblivious transfer) and evaluates a generalized UC that entirely hides the structure of the private NN. This enables applications like privacy-preserving data classification based on private NNs without trusted third party while simultaneously protecting user's data and NN owner's intellectual property.
2007
EPRINT
Sufficient Conditions for Computational Intractability Regarding Generic Algorithms
The generic group model is a valuable methodology for analyzing the computational hardness of the number-theoretic problems used in cryptography. Although generic hardness proofs exhibit many similarities, still the computational intractability of every newly introduced problem needs to be proven from scratch, a task that can easily become complicated and cumbersome when done rigorously. In this paper we make the first steps towards overcoming this problem by identifying verifiable criteria which if met by a cryptographic problem guarantee its hardness with respect to generic algorithms. As useful means for formalization of definitions and proofs we relate the concepts of generic algorithms and straight-line programs that have only been used independently in cryptography so far. The class of problems we cover includes a significant number of the cryptographic problems currently known, and is general enough to also include many future problems. Moreover, we strengthen the conventional generic model by incorporating a broader class of possible oracles (operations) since the underlying algebraic groups may possibly be related through mappings such as isomorphisms, homomorphisms or multilinear maps. Our approach could serve as an appropriate basis for tool-aided hardness verification in the generic model.
2006
CHES
Challenges for Trusted Computing
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
2006
EPRINT
Linkable Democratic Group Signatures
Mark Manulis Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi Jörg Schwenk
In a variety of group-oriented applications cryptographic primitives like group signatures or ring signatures are valuable methods to achieve anonymity of group members. However, in their classical form, these schemes cannot be deployed for applications that simultaneously require (i) to avoid centralized management authority like group manager and (ii) the signer to be anonymous only against non-members while group members have rights to trace and identify the signer. The idea of recently introduced {\it democratic group signatures} is to provide these properties. Based on this idea we introduce a group-oriented signature scheme that allows the group members to trace the identity of any other group member who issued a signature while non-members are only able to link the signatures issued by the same signer without tracing. For this purpose the signature scheme assigns to every group member a unique pseudonym that can be used by any non-member verifier to communicate with the anonymous signer from the group. We present several group-oriented application scenarios where this kind of linkability is essential. We propose a concrete linkable democratic group signature scheme for two-parties, prove its security in the random oracle model, and describe how to modularly extend it to the multi-party case.
2005
CHES
2005
EPRINT
Browser Model for Security Analysis of Browser-Based Protocols
Thomas Groß Birgit Pfitzmann Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Currently, many industrial initiatives focus on web-based applications. In this context an important requirement is that the user should only rely on a standard web browser. Hence the underlying security services also rely solely on a browser for interaction with the user. Browser-based identity federation is a prominent example of such a protocol. Unfortunately, very little is still known about the security of browser-based protocols, and they seem at least as error-prone as standard security protocols. In particular, standard web browsers have limited cryptographic capabilities and thus new protocols are used. Furthermore, these protocols require certain care by the user in person, which must be modeled. In addition, browsers, unlike normal protocol principals, cannot be assumed to do nothing but execute the given security protocol. In this paper, we lay the theoretical basis for the rigorous analysis and security proofs of browser-based security protocols. We formally model web browsers, secure browser channels, and the security-relevant browsing behavior of a user as automata. As a first rigorous security proof of a browser-based protocol we prove the security of password-based user authentication in our model. This is not only the most common stand-alone type of browser authentication, but also a fundamental building block for more complex protocols like identity federation.
2002
EPRINT
Assumptions Related to Discrete Logarithms: Why Subtleties Make a Real Difference
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi Michael Steiner
The security of many cryptographic constructions relies on assumptions related to Discrete Logarithms (DL), e.g., the Diffie-Hellman, Square Exponent, Inverse Exponent or Representation Problem assumptions. In the concrete formalizations of these assumptions one has some degrees of freedom offered by parameters such as computational model, problem type (computational, decisional) or success probability of adversary. However, these parameters and their impact are often not properly considered or are simply overlooked in the existing literature. In this paper we identify parameters relevant to cryptographic applications and describe a formal framework for defining DL-related assumptions. This enables us to precisely and systematically classify these assumptions. In particular, we identify a parameter, termed granularity, which describes the underlying probability space in an assumption. Varying granularity we discover the following surprising result: We prove that two DL-related assumptions can be reduced to each other for medium granularity but we also show that they are provably not reducible with generic algorithms for high granularity. Further we show that reductions for medium granularity can achieve much better concrete security than equivalent high-granularity reductions.
2001
EUROCRYPT
2001
FSE
2000
ASIACRYPT
2000
EPRINT
Anonymous Fingerprinting with Direct Non-Repudiation
Birgit Pfitzmann Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Fingerprinting schemes support copyright protection by enabling the merchant of a data item to identify the original buyer of a redistributed copy. In asymmetric schemes, the merchant can also convince an arbiter of this fact. Anonymous fingerprinting schemes enable buyers to purchase digital items anonymously; however, identification is possible if they redistribute the data item. Recently, a concrete and reasonably efficient construction based on digital coins was proposed. A disadvantage is that the accused buyer has to participate in any trial protocol to deny charges. Trials with direct non-repudiation, i.e., the merchant alone holds enough evidence to convince an arbiter, are more useful in real life. This is similar to the difference between ``normal'' and ``undeniable'' signatures. In this paper, we present an equally efficient anonymous fingerprinting scheme with direct non-repudiation. The main technique we use, delayed verifiable encryption, is related to coin tracing in escrowed cash systems. However, there are technical differences, mainly to provide an unforgeable link to license conditions.
1999
EUROCRYPT

Program Committees

PKC 2016
Asiacrypt 2015
CHES 2014
CHES 2013
CHES 2011
PKC 2009
CHES 2008
Eurocrypt 2008
CHES 2007
CHES 2005