International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Ari Juels

Affiliation: RSA Laboratories

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2017
CRYPTO
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EUROCRYPT
2014
EUROCRYPT
2014
EPRINT
2013
JOFC
FlipIt: The Game of “Stealthy Takeover”
Recent targeted attacks have increased significantly in sophistication, undermining the fundamental assumptions on which most cryptographic primitives rely for security. For instance, attackers launching an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) can steal full cryptographic keys, violating the very secrecy of “secret” keys that cryptographers assume in designing secure protocols. In this article, we introduce a game-theoretic framework for modeling various computer security scenarios prevalent today, including targeted attacks. We are particularly interested in situations in which an attacker periodically compromises a system or critical resource completely, learns all its secret information and is not immediately detected by the system owner or defender. We propose a two-player game between an attacker and defender called FlipIt or The Game of “Stealthy Takeover.” In FlipIt, players compete to control a shared resource. Unlike most existing games, FlipIt allows players to move at any given time, taking control of the resource. The identity of the player controlling the resource, however, is not revealed until a player actually moves. To move, a player pays a certain move cost. The objective of each player is to control the resource a large fraction of time, while minimizing his total move cost. FlipIt provides a simple and elegant framework in which we can formally reason about the interaction between attackers and defenders in practical scenarios. In this article, we restrict ourselves to games in which one of the players (the defender) plays with a renewal strategy, one in which the intervals between consecutive moves are chosen independently and uniformly at random from a fixed probability distribution. We consider attacker strategies ranging in increasing sophistication from simple periodic strategies (with moves spaced at equal time intervals) to more complex adaptive strategies, in which moves are determined based on feedback received during the game. For different classes of strategies employed by the attacker, we determine strongly dominant strategies for both players (when they exist), strategies that achieve higher benefit than all other strategies in a particular class. When strongly dominant strategies do not exist, our goal is to characterize the residual game consisting of strategies that are not strongly dominated by other strategies. We also prove equivalence or strict inclusion of certain classes of strategies under different conditions. Our analysis of different FlipIt variants teaches cryptographers, system designers, and the community at large some valuable lessons: 1.Systems should be designed under the assumption of repeated total compromise, including theft of cryptographic keys. FlipIt provides guidance on how to implement a cost-effective defensive strategy.2.Aggressive play by one player can motivate the opponent to drop out of the game (essentially not to play at all). Therefore, moving fast is a good defensive strategy, but it can only be implemented if move costs are low. We believe that virtualization has a huge potential in this respect.3.Close monitoring of one’s resources is beneficial in detecting potential attacks faster, gaining insight into attacker’s strategies, and scheduling defensive moves more effectively. Interestingly, FlipIt finds applications in other security realms besides modeling of targeted attacks. Examples include cryptographic key rotation, password changing policies, refreshing virtual machines, and cloud auditing.
2010
EPRINT
How to Tell if Your Cloud Files Are Vulnerable to Drive Crashes
This paper presents a new challenge---verifying that a remote server is storing a file in a fault-tolerant manner, i.e., such that it can survive hard-drive failures. We describe an approach called the Remote Assessment of Fault Tolerance (RAFT). The key technique in a RAFT is to measure the time taken for a server to respond to a read request for a collection of file blocks. The larger the number of hard drives across which a file is distributed, the faster the read-request response. Erasure codes also play an important role in our solution. We describe a theoretical framework for RAFTs and show experimentally that RAFTs can work in practice.
2010
EPRINT
On the Impossibility of Cryptography Alone for Privacy-Preserving Cloud Computing
Marten van Dijk Ari Juels
Cloud computing denotes an architectural shift toward thin clients and conveniently centralized provision of computing resources. Clients’ lack of direct resource control in the cloud prompts concern about the potential for data privacy violations, particularly abuse or leakage of sensitive information by service providers. Cryptography is an oft-touted remedy. Among its most powerful primitives is fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), dubbed by some the field’s “Holy Grail,” and recently realized as a fully functional construct with seeming promise for cloud privacy. We argue that cryptography alone can’t enforce the privacy demanded by common cloud computing services, even with such powerful tools as FHE.We formally define a hierarchy of natural classes of private cloud applications, and show that no cryptographic protocol can implement those classes where data is shared among clients. We posit that users of cloud services will also need to rely on other forms of privacy enforcement, such as tamperproof hardware, distributed computing, and complex trust ecosystems.
2008
EPRINT
Unidirectional Key Distribution Across Time and Space with Applications to RFID Security
We explore the problem of secret-key distribution in _unidirectional_ channels, those in which a sender transmits information blindly to a receiver. We consider two approaches: (1) Key sharing across _space_, i.e., across simultaneously emitted values that may follow different data paths and (2) Key sharing across _time_, i.e., in temporally staggered emissions. Our constructions are of general interest, treating, for instance, the basic problem of constructing highly compact secret shares. Our main motivating problem, however, is that of practical key management in RFID (Radio-Frequency IDentification) systems. We describe the application of our techniques to RFID-enabled supply chains and a prototype privacy-enhancing system.
2008
EPRINT
Proofs of Retrievability: Theory and Implementation
A proof of retrievability (POR) is a compact proof by a file system (prover) to a client (verifier) that a target file F is intact, in the sense that the client can fully recover it. As PORs incur lower communication costs than transmission of F itself, they are an attractive building block for high-assurance remote storage systems. In this paper, we propose a theoretical framework for the design of PORs. This framework leads to improvements in the previously proposed POR constructions of Juels-Kaliski and Shacham-Waters, and also sheds light on the conceptual limitations of previous theoretical models for PORs. We propose a new variant on the Juels-Kaliski protocol with significantly improved efficiency and describe a prototype implementation. We demonstrate practical encoding even for files F whose size exceeds that of client main memory.
2008
EPRINT
HAIL: A High-Availability and Integrity Layer for Cloud Storage
We introduce HAIL (High-Availability and Integrity Layer), a distributed cryptographic system that permits a set of servers to prove to a client that a stored file is intact and retrievable. Proofs in HAIL are efficiently computable by servers and highly compact---typically tens or hundreds of bytes, irrespective of file size. HAIL cryptographically verifies and reactively reallocates file shares. It is robust against an active, mobile adversary, i.e., one that may progressively corrupt the full set of servers. We propose a strong, formal adversarial model for HAIL, and rigorous analysis and parameter choices. We also report on a prototype implementation. HAIL strengthens, formally unifies, and streamlines distinct approaches from the cryptographic and distributed-systems communities. HAIL also includes an optional new tool for proactive protection of stored files. HAIL is primarily designed to protect static stored objects, such as backup files or archives.
2007
ASIACRYPT
2007
EPRINT
PORs: Proofs of Retrievability for Large Files
In this paper, we define and explore the notion of a _proof of retrievability_ (POR). A POR enables an archive or back-up service (prover) to demonstrate to a user (verifier) that it has ``possession'' of a file F, that is, that the archive retains data sufficient for the user to retrieve F in its entirety. A POR may be viewed as a kind of cryptographic proof of knowledge (POK), but one specially designed to handle a _large_ file (or bitstring) F. We explore POR protocols here in which the communication costs, number of memory accesses for the prover, and storage requirements of the user (verifier) are small parameters essentially independent of the length of $F$. In addition, in a POR, unlike a POK, neither the prover nor the verifier need actually have knowledge of F. PORs give rise to a new and unusual security definition. We view PORs as an important tool for the management of semi-trusted online archives. Existing cryptographic tools help users ensure the privacy and integrity of their files once they are retrieved. It is also natural, however, for users to want to verify that archives do not delete or modify files while they are stored. The goal of a POR is to accomplish these checks {\em without users having to download the files themselves}. A POR can also provide quality-of-service guarantees, i.e., show that a file is retrievable within a certain time bound.
2006
CHES
2006
EPRINT
Defining Strong Privacy for RFID
Ari Juels Stephen A. Weis
In this work, we consider privacy in Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) systems. Our contribution is threefold: (1) We propose a simple, formal definition of strong privacy useful for basic analysis of RFID systems, as well as a different (weaker) definition applicable to multi-verifier systems; (2) We apply our definition to reveal vulnerabilities in several proposed privacy-enhancing RFID protocols; and (3) We formally analyze and suggest improvements to ``Hash-Locks,'' one of the first privacy-enhancing RFID protocols in the literature.
2005
CRYPTO
2005
EPRINT
Security and Privacy Issues in E-passports
Within the next year, travelers from dozens of nations may be carrying a new form of passport in response to a mandate by the United States government. The e-passport, as it is sometimes called, represents a bold initiative in the deployment of two new technologies: Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) and biometrics. Important in their own right, e-passports are also the harbinger of a wave of next-generation ID cards: several national governments plan to deploy identity cards integrating RFID and biometrics for domestic use. We explore the privacy and security implications of this impending worldwide experiment in next-generation authentication technology. We describe privacy and security issues that apply to e-passports, then analyze these issues in the context of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standard for e-passports.
2004
EUROCRYPT
2002
ASIACRYPT
2002
PKC
2002
EPRINT
Making Mix Nets Robust For Electronic Voting By Randomized Partial Checking
We propose a new technique for making mix nets robust, called randomized partial checking (RPC). The basic idea is that rather than providing a proof of completely correct operation, each server provides strong evidence of its correct operation by revealing a pseudo-randomly selected subset of its input/output relations. Randomized partial checking is exceptionally efficient compared to previous proposals for providing robustness; the evidence provided at each layer is shorter than the output of that layer, and producing the evidence is easier than doing the mixing. It works with mix nets based on any encryption scheme (i.e., on public-key alone, and on hybrid schemes using public-key/symmetric-key combinations). It also works both with Chaumian mix nets where the messages are successively encrypted with each servers' key, and with mix nets based on a single public key with randomized re-encryption at each layer. Randomized partial checking is particularly well suited for voting systems, as it ensures voter privacy and provides assurance of correct operation. Voter privacy is ensured (either probabilistically or cryptographically) with appropriate design and parameter selection. Unlike previous work, our work provides voter privacy as a global property of the mix net rather than as a property ensured by a single honest server. RPC-based mix nets also provide very high assurance of a correct election result, since a corrupt server is very likely to be caught if it attempts to tamper with even a couple of ballots.
2002
EPRINT
A Fuzzy Vault Scheme
Ari Juels Madhu Sudan
We describe a simple and novel cryptographic construction that we refer to as a {\em fuzzy vault}. A player Alice may place a secret value $\kappa$ in a fuzzy vault and ``lock'' it using a set $A$ of elements from some public universe $U$. If Bob tries to ``unlock'' the vault using a set $B$ of similar length, he obtains $\kappa$ only if $B$ is close to $A$, i.e., only if $A$ and $B$ overlap substantially. In constrast to previous constructions of this flavor, ours possesses the useful feature of {\em order invariance}, meaning that the ordering of $A$ and $B$ is immaterial to the functioning of the vault. As we show, our scheme enjoys provable security against a computationally unbounded attacker.
2002
EPRINT
Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections
We introduce a model for electronic election schemes that involves a more powerful adversary than in previous work. In particular, we allow the adversary to demand of coerced voters that they vote in a particular manner, abstain from voting, or even disclose their secret keys. We define a scheme to be _coercion-resistant_ if it is infeasible for the adversary to determine whether a coerced voter complies with the demands. A first contribution of this paper is to describe and characterize a new and strengthened adversary for coercion in elections. (In doing so, we additionally present what we believe to be the first formal security definitions for electronic elections of _any_ type.) A second contribution is to demonstrate a protocol that is secure against this adversary. While it is clear that a strengthening of attack models is of theoretical relevance, it is important to note that our results lie close to practicality. This is true both in that we model real-life threats (such as vote-buying and vote-cancelling), and in that our proposed protocol combines a fair degree of efficiency with an unusual lack of structural complexity. Furthermore, while previous schemes have required use of an untappable channel, ours only carries the much more practical requirement of an anonymous channel.
2000
ASIACRYPT
2000
ASIACRYPT
1997
CRYPTO

Program Committees

Crypto 2012
Eurocrypt 2010
Crypto 2008
Asiacrypt 2002