Key Guessing Strategies for Linear Key-Schedule Algorithms in Rectangle Attacks 📺
When generating quartets for the rectangle attack on ciphers with linear key-schedule ciphers, we find the right quartets which may suggest key candidates have to satisfy some nonlinear relationships. However, some quartets generated always violate these relationships, so that they will never suggest any key candidates. Inspired by previous rectangle frameworks, we find that guessing certain key cells before generating quartets may reduce the number of those invalid quartets. However, guessing a lot of key cells at once may lose the benefit from the early abort technique, which may lead to a higher overall complexity. To get better tradeoff, we build a new rectangle attack framework on ciphers with linear key-schedule with the purpose of reducing the overall complexity or attacking more rounds. In the tradeoff model, there are many parameters affecting the overall complexity, especially for the choices of the number and positions of key guessing cells before generating quartets. To identify optimal parameters, we build a uniform automatic tool on SKINNY as an example, which includes the optimal rectangle distinguishers for key-recovery phase, the number and positions of key guessing cells before generating quartets, the size of key counters to build that affecting the exhaustive search step, etc. Based on the automatic tool, we identify a 32-round key-recovery attack on SKINNY-128-384 in the related-key setting, which extends the best previous attack by 2 rounds. For other versions with n-2n or n-3n, we also achieve one more round than before. In addition, using the previous rectangle distinguishers, we achieve better attacks on round-reduced ForkSkinny, Deoxys-BC-384 and GIFT-64. At last, we discuss the conversion of our rectangle framework from related-key setting into single-key setting and give new single-key rectangle attack on 10-round Serpent.
Mind the TWEAKEY Schedule: Cryptanalysis on SKINNYe-64-256
Designing symmetric ciphers for particular applications becomes a hot topic. At EUROCRYPT 2020, Naito, Sasaki and Sugawara invented the threshold implementation friendly cipher SKINNYe-64-256 to meet the requirement of the authenticated encryption PFB_Plus. Soon, Thomas Peyrin pointed out that SKINNYe-64-256 may lose the security expectation due the new tweakey schedule. Although the security issue of SKINNYe-64-256 is still unclear, Naito et al. decided to introduce SKINNYe-64-256 v2 as a response. In this paper, we give a formal cryptanalysis on the new tweakey schedule of SKINNYe-64-256 and discover unexpected differential cancellations in the tweakey schedule. For example, we find the number of cancellations can be up to 8 within 30 consecutive rounds, which is significantly larger than the expected 3 cancellations. This property is derived by the analysis of the updated functions (LFSRs) of the tweakey via linear algebra. Moreover, we take our new discoveries into rectangle, MITM and impossible differential attacks, and adapt the corresponding automatic tools with new constraints from our discoveries. Finally, we find a 41-round related-tweakey rectangle attack on SKINNYe-64-256 and leave a security margin of 3 rounds only. As STK accepts arbitrary tweakey size, but SKINNY and SKINNYe-64-256 v2 only support up to 4n tweakey size. We introduce a new design of tweakey schedule for SKINNY-64 to further extend the supported tweakey size. We give a formal proof that our new tweakey schedule inherits the security requirement of STK and SKINNY.
Automated Search Oriented to Key Recovery on Ciphers with Linear Key Schedule: Applications to Boomerangs in SKINNY and ForkSkinny 📺
Automatic modelling to search distinguishers with high probability covering as many rounds as possible, such as MILP, SAT/SMT, CP models, has become a very popular cryptanalysis topic today. In those models, the optimizing objective is usually the probability or the number of rounds of the distinguishers. If we want to recover the secret key for a round-reduced block cipher, there are usually two phases, i.e., finding an efficient distinguisher and performing key-recovery attack by extending several rounds before and after the distinguisher. The total number of attacked rounds is not only related to the chosen distinguisher, but also to the extended rounds before and after the distinguisher. In this paper, we try to combine the two phases in a uniform automatic model.Concretely, we apply this idea to automate the related-key rectangle attacks on SKINNY and ForkSkinny. We propose some new distinguishers with advantage to perform key-recovery attacks. Our key-recovery attacks on a few versions of round-reduced SKINNY and ForkSkinny cover 1 to 2 more rounds than the best previous attacks.