International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Mind the TWEAKEY Schedule: Cryptanalysis on SKINNYe-64-256

Lingyue Qin , Tsinghua University
Xiaoyang Dong , Tsinghua University
Anyu Wang , Tsinghua University
Jialiang Hua , Tsinghua University
Xiaoyun Wang , Tsinghua University
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Presentation: Slides
Conference: ASIACRYPT 2022
Abstract: Designing symmetric ciphers for particular applications becomes a hot topic. At EUROCRYPT 2020, Naito, Sasaki and Sugawara invented the threshold implementation friendly cipher SKINNYe-64-256 to meet the requirement of the authenticated encryption PFB_Plus. Soon, Thomas Peyrin pointed out that SKINNYe-64-256 may lose the security expectation due the new tweakey schedule. Although the security issue of SKINNYe-64-256 is still unclear, Naito et al. decided to introduce SKINNYe-64-256 v2 as a response. In this paper, we give a formal cryptanalysis on the new tweakey schedule of SKINNYe-64-256 and discover unexpected differential cancellations in the tweakey schedule. For example, we find the number of cancellations can be up to 8 within 30 consecutive rounds, which is significantly larger than the expected 3 cancellations. This property is derived by the analysis of the updated functions (LFSRs) of the tweakey via linear algebra. Moreover, we take our new discoveries into rectangle, MITM and impossible differential attacks, and adapt the corresponding automatic tools with new constraints from our discoveries. Finally, we find a 41-round related-tweakey rectangle attack on SKINNYe-64-256 and leave a security margin of 3 rounds only. As STK accepts arbitrary tweakey size, but SKINNY and SKINNYe-64-256 v2 only support up to 4n tweakey size. We introduce a new design of tweakey schedule for SKINNY-64 to further extend the supported tweakey size. We give a formal proof that our new tweakey schedule inherits the security requirement of STK and SKINNY.
Video from ASIACRYPT 2022
  title={Mind the TWEAKEY Schedule: Cryptanalysis on SKINNYe-64-256},
  author={Lingyue Qin and Xiaoyang Dong and Anyu Wang and Jialiang Hua and Xiaoyun Wang},