We study how to construct secure digital signature schemes in the presence of kleptographic attacks. Our work utilizes an offline watchdog to clip the power of subversions via only one-time black-box testing of the implementation. Previous results essentially rely on an online watchdog which requires the collection of all communicating transcripts (or active re-randomization of messages).We first give a simple but generic construction, without random oracles, in the partial-subversion model in which key generation and signing algorithms can be subverted. Then, we give the first digital signature scheme in the complete-subversion model in which all cryptographic algorithms can be subverted. This construction is based on the full-domain hash. Along the way, we enhance the recent result of Russell et al.  (CRYPTO 2018) about correcting a subverted random oracle.

Homomorphic signatures (HS) allows the derivation of the signature of the message-function pair (m, g), where $$m = g(m_1, \ldots , m_K)$$, given the signatures of each of the input messages $$m_k$$ signed under the same key. Multi-key HS (M-HS) introduced by Fiore et al.  (ASIACRYPT’16) further enhances the utility by allowing evaluation of signatures under different keys. The unforgeability of existing M-HS notions assumes that all signers are honest. We consider a setting where an arbitrary number of signers can be corrupted, called unforgeability under corruption, which is typical for natural applications (e.g., verifiable multi-party computation) of M-HS. Surprisingly, there is a huge gap between M-HS (for arbitrary circuits) with and without unforgeability under corruption: While the latter can be constructed from standard lattice assumptions (ASIACRYPT’16), we show that the former likely relies on non-falsifiable assumptions. Specifically, we propose a generic construction of M-HS with unforgeability under corruption from zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (ZK-SNARK) (and other standard assumptions), and then show that such M-HS implies zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments (ZK-SNARG). Our results leave open the pressing question of what level of authenticity and utility can be achieved in the presence of corrupt signers under standard assumptions.

An identity-based online/offline encryption (IBOOE) scheme splits the encryption process into two phases. The first phase performs most of the heavy computations, such as modular exponentiation or pairing over points on elliptic curve. The knowledge of the plaintext or the receiver's identity is not required until the second phase, where the ciphertext is produced by only light computations, such as integer addition/multiplication or hashing. This division of computations makes encryption affordable by devices with limited computation power since the preparation works can be executed ``offline'' or possibly by some powerful devices. Since efficiency is the main concern, smaller ciphertext size and less burden in the computation requirements of all phases (i.e., both phases of encryption and the decryption phase) are desirable. In this paper, we proposed new schemes with improved efficiency over previous schemes by assuming random oracles. Our first construction is a very efficient scheme which is secure against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA), This scheme is slightly modified from an existing scheme. In particular, the setup and the user private key remain the same. We then proceed to propose the notion of ID-based Online/Offline KEM (IBOOKEM) that allows the key encapsulation process to be split into offline and online stages, in the same way as IBOOE does. We also present a generic transformation to get security against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) for IBOOE from any IBOOKEM scheme with one-wayness only. Our schemes (both CPA and CCA) are the most efficient one in the state-of-the-art, in terms of online computation and ciphertext size, which are the two main focuses of online/offline schemes. Our schemes are very suitable to be deployed on embedded devices such as smartcard or wireless sensor which have very limited computation powers and the communication bandwidth is very expensive.

While recent timed-release encryption (TRE) schemes are implicitly supported by a certificateless encryption (CLE) mechanism, the security models of CLE and TRE differ and there is no generic transformation from a CLE to a TRE. This paper gives a generalized model for CLE that fulfills the requirements of TRE. This model is secure against adversaries with adaptive trapdoor extraction capabilities, decryption capabilities for arbitrary public keys, and partial decryption capabilities. It also supports hierarchical identifiers. We propose a concrete scheme under our generalized model and prove it secure without random oracles, yielding the first strongly-secure security-mediated CLE and the first TRE in the standard model. In addition, our technique of partial decryption is different from the previous approach.

We exploit the relationships between signature schemes and key agreement protocols; and propose a high performance identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol based on strong pairing challenge-response signatures. The latter is the first of its kind in ID-based cryptography and is of interest in itself. Using the proof technique of signature unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attack, our protocol fully supports Session-Key Reveal queries and partially supports Session-State Reveal queries (which leaks ephemeral secret and keying material for session key derivation), without gap assumption or any unrealistic restriction. We show how to incorporate KGC forward secrecy so the past session keys are not compromised even the adversary gets the master secret key of the Key Generation Center (and the private keys of all users). Both proposals are efficient and have the strongest security among other unbroken identity-based two-party two-message protocols. Inspired by ring signatures and motivated by the need for a better anonymous roaming mechanism, we extend our basic protocol to support key agreement among spontaneous anonymous groups (SAG). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first ID-based SAG key agreement protocol with bilateral privacy.

Ring signature scheme is a cryptographic construct that enables a signer to sign on behalf of a group of $n$ different people such that the verifier can only ensure someone in the group signed, but not exactly whom. Ring signatures are utilized in many security applications. It is tricky to deploy multi-user cryptographic construct due to the complexity involved by certificates. Specifically, ring signatures working under traditional public key infrastructure requires the transfer and verification of $n$ certificates, making the scheme both space and time inefficient. On the other hand, the key-escrow problem of identity-based solution makes the authenticity of the ring signature in question. This paper studies ring signature in certificateless cryptography, one with neither certificate nor key-escrow. Designing a certificateless ring signature scheme is not entirely trivial. Many certificateless signatures require public key validity checking. In the context of ring signatures, this means both the signer and the verifier need to deal with the complexity in the verification of $n$ public keys. We propose the first certificateless ring signature scheme, without such public key validity checking.

The notion of concurrent signatures was recently introduced by Chen, Kudla and Paterson. In concurrent signature schemes, two entities can produce two signatures that are not binding, until an extra piece of information (namely the keystone) is released by one of the parties. Subsequently, it was noted that the concurrent signature scheme proposed in the seminal paper cannot provide perfect ambiguity. Then, the notion of perfect concurrent signatures was introduced. In this paper, we define the notion of identity-based (or ID-based) perfect concurrent signature schemes. We provide the first generic construction of (ID-based) perfect concurrent signature schemes from ring signature schemes. Using the proposed framework, we give two concrete ID-based perfect concurrent signature schemes based on two major paradigms of ID-based ring signature schemes. Security proofs are based on the random oracle model.

Since the formalization of ring signature by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman in 2001, there are lots of variations appeared in the literature. Almost all of the variations rely on the random oracle model for security proof. In this paper, we propose a ring signature scheme based on bilinear pairings, which is proven to be secure against chosen message attack without using the random oracle model. It is one of the first in the literature to achieve this security level.

Identity (or identifier) based encryption has shown to be a useful cryptographic schema enabling secure yet flexible role-based access control. In this paper, we propose a new notion named as {\em exclusion-intersection encryption}: the sender can specify the targeted groups that are legitimated and interested in reading the documents in the encryption algorithm; there exists a trusted key generation centre generating {\em intersection} private decryption keys on request. This special private key can only be used to decrypt the ciphertext which is of all the specified groups' interests, its holders are {\em excluded} from reading the documents targeted to any subset of the groups (e.g. the ciphertext of only a single group's interest). One of the applications of this new notion is to support an ad-hoc joint project of two groups which needs extra helpers that are not from either group. Another interesting application of the proposed scheme is an encrypted audit log that supports conjunctive field keyword searching, which is the first in the literature.

In threshold ring signature schemes, any group of $t$ entities spontaneously conscripting arbitrarily $n-t$ entities to generate a publicly verifiable $t$-out-of-$n$ signature on behalf of the whole group, yet the actual signers remain anonymous. The spontaneity of these schemes is desirable for ad-hoc groups such as mobile ad-hoc networks. In this paper, we present an identity based (ID-based) threshold ring signature scheme. The scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model and provides trusted authority compatibility. To the best of authors' knowledge, our scheme is the first ID-based threshold ring signature scheme which is also the most efficient (in terms of number of pairing operations required) ID-based ring signature scheme (when $t = 1$) and threshold ring signature scheme from pairings.

In many situations we want to enjoy confidentiality, authenticity and non-repudiation of message simultaneously. One approach to achieve this objective is to "sign-then-encrypt" the message, or we can employ special cryptographic scheme like signcryption. Two open problems about identity-based (ID-based) signcryption were proposed in \cite{CryptoePrint:2003:023}. The first one is to devise an efficient forward-secure signcryption scheme with public verifiability and public ciphertext authenticity, which is promptly closed by \cite{LNCS2971:ICISC2003:CYHC}. Another one which still remains open is to devise a hierarchical ID-based signcryption scheme that allows the user to receive signcrypted messages from sender who is under another sub-tree of the hierarchy. This paper aims at solving this problem by proposing two concrete constructions of hierarchical ID-based signcryption.

Deng and Zhao recently proposed a group signature scheme. We find that the scheme cannot satisfy all of the requirements of a secure group signature.