International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Let a Non-barking Watchdog Bite: Cliptographic Signatures with an Offline Watchdog

Sherman S. M. Chow
Alexander Russell
Qiang Tang
Moti Yung
Yongjun Zhao
Hong-Sheng Zhou
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-17253-4_8
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Conference: PKC 2019
Abstract: We study how to construct secure digital signature schemes in the presence of kleptographic attacks. Our work utilizes an offline watchdog to clip the power of subversions via only one-time black-box testing of the implementation. Previous results essentially rely on an online watchdog which requires the collection of all communicating transcripts (or active re-randomization of messages).We first give a simple but generic construction, without random oracles, in the partial-subversion model in which key generation and signing algorithms can be subverted. Then, we give the first digital signature scheme in the complete-subversion model in which all cryptographic algorithms can be subverted. This construction is based on the full-domain hash. Along the way, we enhance the recent result of Russell et al.  (CRYPTO 2018) about correcting a subverted random oracle.
  title={Let a Non-barking Watchdog Bite: Cliptographic Signatures with an Offline Watchdog},
  booktitle={Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2019},
  series={Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  author={Sherman S. M. Chow and Alexander Russell and Qiang Tang and Moti Yung and Yongjun Zhao and Hong-Sheng Zhou},