## CryptoDB

### Pratik Soni

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2024

EUROCRYPT

Foundations of Adaptor Signatures
Abstract

Adaptor signatures extend the functionality of regular signatures through the computation of pre-signatures on messages for statements of NP relations. Pre-signatures are publicly verifiable; they simultaneously hide and commit to a signature of an underlying signature scheme on that message. Anybody possessing a corresponding witness for the statement can adapt the pre-signature to obtain the ``regular'' signature. Adaptor signatures have found numerous applications for conditional payments in blockchain systems, like payment channels~(CCS'20, CCS'21), private coin mixing (CCS'22, SP'23), and oracle-based payments (NDSS'23).
In our work, we revisit the state of the security of adaptor signatures and their constructions. In particular, our two main contributions are:
- Security Gaps and Definitions: We review the widely-used security model of adaptor signatures due to Aumayr et al. (ASIACRYPT'21), and identify gaps in their definitions that render known protocols for private coin-mixing and oracle-based payments insecure. We give simple counterexamples of adaptor signatures that are secure w.r.t. their definitions, but result in insecure instantiations of these protocols. To fill these gaps, we identify a minimal set of modular definitions that align with these practical applications.
- Secure Constructions: Despite their popularity, all known constructions are (1) derived from identification schemes via the Fiat-Shamir transform in the random oracle model or (2) require modifications to the underlying signature verification algorithm, thus making the construction useless in the setting of cryptocurrencies. More concerningly, all known constructions were proven secure w.r.t. the insufficient definitions of Aumayr et al., leaving us with no provably secure adaptor signature scheme to use in applications.
Firstly, in this work, we salvage all current applications by proving security of the widely-used Schnorr adaptor signatures under our proposed definitions. We then provide several new constructions, including presenting the first adaptor signature schemes for Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL), Boneh-Boyen-Shacham (BBS+), and Waters signatures; all of which are proven secure in the standard model. Our new constructions rely on a new abstraction of digital signatures, called dichotomic signatures, which covers the essential properties we need to build adaptor signatures. Proving the security of all constructions (including identification-based schemes) relies on a novel non-black-box proof technique. Both our digital signature abstraction and the proof technique could be of independent interest to the community.

2024

CRYPTO

Game-Theoretically Fair Distributed Sampling
Abstract

Cleve's celebrated result (STOC'86) showed that a strongly fair multi-party coin-toss is impossible in the presence of majority-sized coalitions. Recently, however, a fascinating line of work studied a relaxed fairness notion called \emph{game-theoretic fairness}, which guarantees that no coalition should be incentivized to deviate from the prescribed protocol. A sequence of works has explored the feasibility of game-theoretic fairness for \emph{two-sided} coin-toss, and indeed demonstrated feasibility in the dishonest majority setting under standard cryptographic assumptions. In fact, the recent work of Wu, Asharov, and Shi (EUROCRYPT'22) completely characterized the regime where game-theoretic fairness is feasible. However, this line of work is largely restricted to two-sided coin-toss, and more precisely on a \emph{uniform} coin-toss (i.e., Bernoulli with parameter $1/2$). The only exceptions are the works on game-theoretically fair leader election, which can be viewed as a special case of uniform $n$-sided coin-toss where $n$ is the number of parties.
In this work, we \emph{initiate} the comprehensive study of game-theoretic fairness for multi-party \emph{sampling from general distributions}. In particular, for the case of $m$-sided \emph{uniform} coin-toss we give a nearly complete characterization of the regime in which game-theoretic fairness is feasible. Interestingly, contrary to standard fairness notions in cryptography, the composition of game-theoretically fair two-sided coin-toss protocols does not necessarily yield game-theoretically fair multi-sided coins. To circumvent this, we introduce new techniques compatible with game-theoretic fairness.
In particular, we give the following results:
- We give a protocol from standard cryptographic assumptions that achieves game-theoretic fairness for uniform $m$-sided coin-toss against half- or more-sized adversarial coalitions.
- To complement our protocol, we give a general impossibility result that establishes the optimality of our protocol for a broad range of parameters modulo an additive constant. Even in the worst-case, the gap between our protocol and our impossibility result is only a small constant multiplicative factor.
- We also present a game-theoretically fair protocol for \emph{any} efficiently sampleable $m$-outcome distribution in the dishonest majority setting. For instance, even for the case of $m=2$ (i.e., two-sided coin-toss), our result implies a game-theoretically fair protocol for an \emph{arbitrary} Bernoulli coin. In contrast, the work of Wu, Asharov, and Shi only focussed on a Bernoulli coin with parameter $1/2$.

2023

TCC

Non-Interactive Anonymous Router with Quasi-Linear Router Computation
Abstract

Anonymous routing is an important cryptographic primitive that allows users to communicate privately on the Internet, without revealing their message contents or their contacts. Until the very recent work of Shi and Wu (Eurocrypt’21), all classical anonymous routing schemes are interactive protocols, and their security rely on a threshold number of the routers being honest. The recent work of Shi and Wu suggested a new abstraction called Non-Interactive Anonymous Router (NIAR), and showed how to achieve anonymous routing non-interactively for the first time. In particular, a single untrusted router receives a token which allows it to obliviously apply a permutation to a set of encrypted messages from the senders. Shi and Wu’s construction suffers from two drawbacks: 1) the router takes time quadratic in the number of senders to obliviously route their messages; and 2) the scheme is proven secure only in the presence of static corruptions.
In this work, we show how to construct a non-interactive anonymous router scheme with sub-quadratic router computation, and achieving security in the presence of adaptive corruptions. To get this result, we assume the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions. Our final result is obtained through a sequence of stepping stones. First, we show how to achieve the desired efficiency, but with security under static corruption and in a selective, single-challenge setting. Then, we go through a sequence of upgrades which eventually get us the final result. We devise various new techniques along the way which lead to some additional results. In particular, our techniques for reasoning about a network of obfuscated programs may be of independent interest.

2023

TCC

Distributed-Prover Interactive Proofs
Abstract

Interactive proof systems enable a verifier with limited resources to decide an intractable language (or compute a hard function) by communicating with a powerful but untrusted prover. Such systems guarantee soundness: the prover can only convince the verifier of true statements. This is a central notion in computer science with far-reaching implications. One key drawback of the classical model is that the data on which the prover operates must be held by a single machine.
In this work, we initiate the study of distributed-prover interactive proofs (dpIPs):
an untrusted cluster of machines, acting as a distributed prover, interacts with a single verifier. The machines in the cluster jointly store and operate on a massive data-set that no single machine can store. The goal is for the machines in the cluster to convince the verifier of the validity of some statement about its data-set. We formalize the communication and space constraints via the massively parallel computation (MPC) model, a widely accepted analytical framework capturing the computational power of massive data-centers.
Our main result is a compiler that generically augments any verification algorithm in the MPC model with a soundness guarantee. Concretely, for any language $L$ for which there is an MPC algorithm verifying whether $x{\in} L$, we design a new MPC protocol capable of convincing a verifier of the validity of $x\in L$ and where if $x\not\in L$, the verifier will reject almost surely reject, no matter what. The new protocol requires only slightly more rounds, i.e., a $\mathsf{poly}(\log N)$ blowup, and a slightly bigger memory per machine, i.e., $\mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$ blowup, where $N$ is the total size of the dataset and $\lambda$ is a security parameter independent of $N$.
En route, we introduce distributed-prover interactive oracle proofs (dpIOPs), a natural adaptation of the (by now classical) IOP model to the distributed prover setting. We design a dpIOP for algorithms in the MPC model and then tranlate them to ``plain model'' dpIPs via an adaptation of existing polynomial commitment schemes into the distributed prover setting.

2021

CRYPTO

Time- and Space-Efficient Arguments from Groups of Unknown Order
📺
Abstract

We construct public-coin time- and space-efficient zero-knowledge arguments for NP. For every time T and space S non-deterministic RAM computation, the prover runs in time T * polylog(T) and space S * polylog(T), and the verifier runs in time n * polylog(T), where n is the input length. Our protocol relies on hidden order groups, which can be instantiated with a trusted setup from the hardness of factoring (products of safe primes), or without a trusted setup using class groups. The argument-system can heuristically be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir transform.
Our proof builds on DARK (Bunz et al., Eurocrypt 2020), a recent succinct and efficiently verifiable polynomial commitment scheme. We show how to implement a variant of DARK in a time- and space-efficient way. Along the way we:
1. Identify a significant gap in the proof of security of Dark.
2. Give a non-trivial modification of the DARK scheme that overcomes the aforementioned gap. The modified version also relies on significantly weaker cryptographic assumptions than those in the original DARK scheme. Our proof utilizes ideas from the theory of integer lattices in a novel way.
3. Generalize Pietrzak's (ITCS 2019) proof of exponentiation (PoE) protocol to work with general groups of unknown order (without relying on any cryptographic assumption).
In proving these results, we develop general-purpose techniques for working with (hidden order) groups, which may be of independent interest.

2020

TCC

Public-Coin Zero-Knowledge Arguments with (almost) Minimal Time and Space Overheads
📺
Abstract

Zero-knowledge protocols enable the truth of a mathematical statement to be certified by a verifier without revealing any other information. Such protocols are a cornerstone of modern cryptography and recently are becoming more and more practical. However, a major bottleneck in deployment is the efficiency of the prover and, in particular, the space-efficiency of the protocol.
For every $\mathsf{NP}$ relation that can be verified in time $T$ and space $S$, we construct a public-coin zero-knowledge argument in which the prover runs in time $T \cdot \mathrm{polylog}(T)$ and space $S \cdot \mathrm{polylog}(T)$. Our proofs have length $\mathrm{polylog}(T)$ and the verifier runs in time $T \cdot \mathrm{polylog}(T)$ (and space $\mathrm{polylog}(T)$). Our scheme is in the random oracle model and relies on the hardness of discrete log in prime-order groups.
Our main technical contribution is a new space efficient \emph{polynomial commitment scheme} for multi-linear polynomials. Recall that in such a scheme, a sender commits to a given multi-linear polynomial $P:\mathbb{F}^n \to \mathbb{F}$ so that later on it can prove to a receiver statements of the form ``$P(x)=y$''. In our scheme, which builds on commitments schemes of Bootle et al. (Eurocrypt 2016) and B{\"u}nz et al. (S\&P 2018), we assume that the sender is given multi-pass streaming access to the evaluations of $P$ on the Boolean hypercube and we show how to implement both the sender and receiver in roughly time $2^n$ and space $n$ and with communication complexity roughly $n$.

#### Program Committees

- Crypto 2024
- Asiacrypt 2022

#### Coauthors

- Alexander R. Block (2)
- Sourav Das (1)
- Rex Fernando (2)
- Paul Gerhart (1)
- Justin Holmgren (2)
- Ilan Komargodski (1)
- Alon Rosen (2)
- Ron D. Rothblum (2)
- Dominique Schröder (1)
- Elaine Shi (2)
- Pratik Soni (8)
- Stefano Tessaro (2)
- Sri AravindaKrishnan Thyagarajan (1)
- Sri Aravinda Krishnan Thyagarajan (1)
- Nikhil Vanjani (1)
- Brent Waters (1)
- Ke Wu (1)