## CryptoDB

### Nina Bindel

#### Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2020
TCHES
This paper presents a set of efficient and parameterized hardware accelerators that target post-quantum lattice-based cryptographic schemes, including a versatile cSHAKE core, a binary-search CDT-based Gaussian sampler, and a pipelined NTT-based polynomial multiplier, among others. Unlike much of prior work, the accelerators are fully open-sourced, are designed to be constant-time, and can be parameterized at compile-time to support different parameters without the need for re-writing the hardware implementation. These flexible, publicly-available accelerators are leveraged to demonstrate the first hardware-software co-design using RISC-V of the post-quantum lattice-based signature scheme qTESLA with provably secure parameters. In particular, this work demonstrates that the NIST’s Round 2 level 1 and level 3 qTESLA variants achieve over a 40-100x speedup for key generation, about a 10x speedup for signing, and about a 16x speedup for verification, compared to the baseline RISC-V software-only implementation. For instance, this corresponds to execution in 7.7, 34.4, and 7.8 milliseconds for key generation, signing, and verification, respectively, for qTESLA’s level 1 parameter set on an Artix-7 FPGA, demonstrating the feasibility of the scheme for embedded applications.
2019
TCC
We revisit the construction of IND-CCA secure key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) from public-key encryption schemes (PKE). We give new, tighter security reductions for several constructions. Our main result is an improved reduction for the security of the $U^{\not \bot }$ -transform of Hofheinz, Hövelmanns, and Kiltz (TCC’17) which turns OW-CPA secure deterministic PKEs into IND-CCA secure KEMs. This result is enabled by a new one-way to hiding (O2H) lemma which gives a tighter bound than previous O2H lemmas in certain settings and might be of independent interest. We extend this result also to the case of PKEs with non-zero decryption failure probability and non-deterministic PKEs. However, we assume that the derandomized PKE is injective with overwhelming probability.In addition, we analyze the impact of different variations of the $U^{\not \bot }$ -transform discussed in the literature on the security of the final scheme. We consider the difference between explicit ( $U^{\bot }$ ) and implicit ( $U^{\not \bot }$ ) rejection, proving that security of the former implies security of the latter. We show that the opposite direction holds if the scheme with explicit rejection also uses key confirmation. Finally, we prove that (at least from a theoretic point of view) security is independent of whether the session keys are derived from message and ciphertext ( $U^{\not \bot }$ ) or just from the message ( $U^{\not \bot }_m$ ).