CryptoDB
Edoardo Persichetti
Publications and invited talks
Year
Venue
Title
2025
TCHES
LESS is Even More: Optimizing Digital Signatures from Code Equivalence
Abstract
LESS is a signature scheme based on the code equivalence problem that has advanced to the second round of the NIST PQC standardization process. While promising, the scheme suffers from relatively large signatures and moderate to slow signing and verification times. Chou, Santini, and Persichetti recently introduced a variant of LESS relying on canonical forms to significantly reduce signature sizes. However, the overall performance impact of this approach remained largely unclear. In this work, we provide the first implementation of the new LESS variant and show that, in its original form, it performs poorly due to the overhead of computing canonical forms in a naïve way. We then introduce a series of algorithmic and implementation-level optimizations that reduce this overhead to about 10%, showing that the signature size reduction comes at minor cost. In addition, we present further improvements to the signature scheme as a whole, as well as a re-parameterization. The resulting scheme achieves speedups of 2.5x to 10x over the Round 1 NIST submission, while maintaining the reduced signature sizes.
2024
ASIACRYPT
On the Semidirect Discrete Logarithm Problem in Finite Groups
Abstract
We present an efficient quantum algorithm for solving the semidirect discrete logarithm problem ($\SDLP$) in \emph{any} finite group. The believed hardness of the semidirect discrete logarithm problem underlies more than a decade of works constructing candidate post-quantum cryptographic algorithms from non-abelian groups. We use a series of reduction results to show that it suffices to consider $\SDLP$ in finite simple groups. We then apply the celebrated Classification of Finite Simple Groups to consider each family. The infinite families of finite simple groups admit, in a fairly general setting, linear algebraic attacks providing a reduction to the classical discrete logarithm problem. For the sporadic simple groups, we show that their inherent properties render them unsuitable for cryptographically hard $\SDLP$ instances, which we illustrate via a Baby-Step Giant-Step style attack against $\SDLP$ in the Monster Group.
Our quantum $\SDLP$ algorithm is fully constructive, up to the computation of maximal normal subgroups, for all but three remaining cases that appear to be gaps in the literature on constructive recognition of groups; for these cases $\SDLP$ is no harder than finding a linear representation. We conclude that $\SDLP$ is not a suitable post-quantum hardness assumption for any choice of finite group.
2023
ASIACRYPT
A New Formulation of the Linear Equivalence Problem and Shorter LESS Signatures
Abstract
The Linear Equivalence Problem (LEP) asks to find a linear isometry between a given pair of linear codes; in the Hamming weight this is known as a monomial map.
LEP has been used in cryptography to design the family of LESS signatures, which includes also some advanced schemes, such as ring and identity-based signatures.
All of these schemes are obtained applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation to a Sigma protocol, in which the prover's responses contain a description of how the monomial map acts on all code coordinates; such a description constitutes the vast majority of the signature size.
In this paper, we propose a new formulation of LEP, which we refer to as Information-Set (IS)-LEP.
Exploiting IS-LEP, it is enough for the prover to provide the description of the monomial action only on an information set, instead of all the coordinates.
Thanks to this new formulation, we are able to drastically reduce signature sizes for all LESS signature schemes, without any relevant computational overhead.
We prove that IS-LEP and LEP are completely equivalent (indeed, the same problem), which means that improvement comes with no additional security assumption, either.
2019
TCC
Tighter Proofs of CCA Security in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
Abstract
We revisit the construction of IND-CCA secure key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) from public-key encryption schemes (PKE). We give new, tighter security reductions for several constructions. Our main result is an improved reduction for the security of the
$$U^{\not \bot }$$
-transform of Hofheinz, Hövelmanns, and Kiltz (TCC’17) which turns OW-CPA secure deterministic PKEs into IND-CCA secure KEMs. This result is enabled by a new one-way to hiding (O2H) lemma which gives a tighter bound than previous O2H lemmas in certain settings and might be of independent interest. We extend this result also to the case of PKEs with non-zero decryption failure probability and non-deterministic PKEs. However, we assume that the derandomized PKE is injective with overwhelming probability.In addition, we analyze the impact of different variations of the
$$U^{\not \bot }$$
-transform discussed in the literature on the security of the final scheme. We consider the difference between explicit (
$$U^{\bot }$$
) and implicit (
$$U^{\not \bot }$$
) rejection, proving that security of the former implies security of the latter. We show that the opposite direction holds if the scheme with explicit rejection also uses key confirmation. Finally, we prove that (at least from a theoretic point of view) security is independent of whether the session keys are derived from message and ciphertext (
$$U^{\not \bot }$$
) or just from the message (
$$U^{\not \bot }_m$$
).
2012
PKC
Service
- PKC 2023 Program committee
- Asiacrypt 2023 Program committee
Coauthors
- Christopher Battarbee (1)
- Luke Beckwith (1)
- Nina Bindel (1)
- Giacomo Borin (1)
- Julian Brough (1)
- Ryann Cartor (1)
- Pierre-Louis Cayrel (1)
- Andre Esser (1)
- Mike Hamburg (1)
- Tobias Hemmert (1)
- Nadia Heninger (1)
- Gerhard Hoffmann (1)
- Kathrin Hövelmanns (1)
- Andreas Hülsing (1)
- David Jao (1)
- Delaram Kahrobaei (1)
- Laura Maddison (1)
- Edoardo Persichetti (5)
- Angela Robinson (1)
- Paolo Santini (2)
- Daniel Smith-Tone (1)
- Rainer Steinwandt (1)
- Floyd Zweydinger (1)