International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Patrick Felke

Affiliation: Ruhr-University Bochum

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2021
PKC
Analysis of Multivariate Encryption Schemes: Application to Dob 📺
In this paper, we study the effect of two modifications to multivariate public key encryption schemes: internal perturbation (ip), and Q_+. Focusing on the Dob encryption scheme, a construction utilising these modifications, we accurately predict the number of degree fall polynomials produced in a Gröbner basis attack, up to and including degree five. The predictions remain accurate even when fixing variables. Based on this new theory we design a novel attack on the Dob encryption scheme, which breaks Dob using the parameters suggested by its designers. While our work primarily focuses on the Dob encryption scheme, we also believe that the presented techniques will be of particular interest to the analysis of other big-field schemes.
2005
EPRINT
An infinite class of quadratic APN functions which are not equivalent to power mappings
We exhibit an infinite class of almost perfect nonlinear quadratic polynomials from $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ to $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ ($n\geq 12$, $n$ divisible by 3 but not by 9). We prove that these functions are EA-inequivalent to any power function. In the forthcoming version of the present paper we will proof that these functions are CCZ-inequivalent to any Gold function and to any Kasami function, in particular for $n=12$, they are therefore CCZ-inequivalent to power functions.
2004
CHES
2004
EPRINT
On the Affine Transformations of HFE-Cryptosystems and Systems with Branches
Patrick Felke
We show how to recover the affine parts of the secret key for a certain class of HFE-Cryptosystems. Further we will show that any system build on branches can be decomposed in its single branches in polynomial time on average. The first part generalizes the result from \cite{geisel} to a bigger class of systems and is achieved by a different approach. Dispite the fact that systems with branches are not used anymore (see \cite{patarin1, goubin}), our second result is a still of interest as it applies to a very general class of HFE-cryptosystems and thus is a contribution to the list of algebraic properties, which cannot be hidden by composition with the secret affine transformations. We derived both algorithms by considering the cryptosystem as objects from the theory of nonassociative algebras and applying classical techniques from this theory. This general framework might be useful for future investigations of HFE-Cryptosysstems or to generalize other attacks known so far.
2003
PKC
2002
EPRINT
On the Security of HFE, HFEv- and Quartz
Quartz is a signature scheme based on an HFEv- trapdoor function published at Eurocrypt 1996. In this paper we study "inversion" attacks for Quartz, i.e. attacks that solve the system of multivariate equations used in Quartz. We do not cover some special attacks that forge signatures without inversion. We are interested in methods to invert the HFEv- trapdoor function or at least to distinguish it from a random system of the same size. There are 4 types of attacks known on HFE: Shamir-Kipnis, Shamir-Kipnis-Courtois, Courtois, and attacks related to Gr\"{o}bner bases such as the F5/2 attack by Jean Charles Faug\`{e}re. No attack has been published so far on HFEv- and it was believed to be more secure than HFE. In this paper we show that even modified HFE systems can be successfully attacked. It seems that the complexity of the attack increases by at least a factor of $q^{tot}$ with $tot$ being the total number of perturbations in HFE. From this and all the other known attacks we will estimate what is the complexity of the best "inversion" attack for Quartz.