## CryptoDB

### Nicolas Courtois

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2008

EPRINT

Algebraic Attacks on the Crypto-1 Stream Cipher in MiFare Classic and Oyster Cards
Abstract

MiFare Crypto 1 is a lightweight stream cipher used in London's Oyster card, Netherland's OV-Chipcard, US Boston's CharlieCard,
and in numerous wireless access control and ticketing systems worldwide. Recently, researchers have been able to recover this algorithm by reverse engineering.
We have examined MiFare from the point of view of the so called "algebraic attacks". We can recover the full 48-bit key of MiFare algorithm in 200 seconds on a PC, given 1 known IV (from one single encryption).
The security of this cipher is therefore close to zero. This is particularly shocking, given the fact that, according to the Dutch press, 1 billion of MiFare Classic chips are used worldwide,
including in many governmental security systems.

2007

EPRINT

Efficient Methods for Conversion and Solution of Sparse Systems of Low-Degree Multivariate Polynomials over GF(2) via SAT-Solvers
Abstract

The computational hardness of solving large systems of sparse and low-degree multivariate equations is a necessary condition for the security of most modern symmetric cryptographic schemes. Notably, most cryptosystems can be implemented with inexpensive hardware, and have a low gate counts, resulting in a sparse system of equations, which in turn renders such attacks feasible. On one hand, numerous recent papers on the XL algorithm and more sophisticated Groebner-bases techniques [5, 7, 13, 14] demonstrate that systems of equations are efficiently solvable when they are sufficiently overdetermined or have a hidden internal algebraic structure that implies the existence of some useful algebraic relations. On the other hand, most of this work, as well as most successful algebraic attacks, involve dense, not sparse systems, at least until linearization by XL or a similar algorithm. No polynomial-system-solving algorithm we are aware of, demonstrates that a significant benefit is obtained from the extreme sparsity of some systems of equations.
In this paper, we study methods for efficiently converting systems of low-degree sparse multivariate equations into a conjunctive normal form satisfiability (CNF-SAT) problem, for which excellent heuristic algorithms have been developed in recent years. A direct application of this method gives very efficient results: we show that sparse multivariate quadratic systems (especially if over-defined) can be solved much faster than by exhaustive search if beta < 1/100. In particular, our method requires no additional memory beyond that required to store the problem, and so often terminates with an answer for problems that cause Magma and Singular to crash. On the other hand, if Magma or Singular do not crash, then they tend to be faster than our method, but this case includes only the smallest sample problems.

2007

EPRINT

Algebraic and Slide Attacks on KeeLoq
Abstract

KeeLoq is a block cipher used in wireless devices that unlock doors in cars manufactured by Chrysler, Daewoo, Fiat, GM, Honda, Jaguar, Toyota, Volvo, Volkswagen, etc. It was designed in the 80's by Willem Smit from South Africa and in 1995 was sold to Microchip Technology Inc for more than 10 million USD. Though no attack on this cipher have been found thus far, the 64-bit key size makes it no longer secure. Hackers and car thieves exploit this, to recover the key by brute force with FPGA's.
From our point of view however, this cipher is interesting for other reasons. Compared to typical block ciphers that have a few carefully designed rounds, this cipher has 528 extremely simple rounds with extremely few intermediate variables (one per round). This seems a perfect target to study algebraic attacks on block ciphers. The cipher also has a periodic structure with period of 64 rounds, and an unusually small block size of 32 bits.
We present several slide-algebraic attacks on KeeLoq, the best of which allows one to recover the full key for the full cipher within 2^48 CPU clocks.
Until now algebraic attacks didn't give interesting results
on block ciphers and most researchers seriously doubted if any block cipher will EVER be broken by such attacks.
In this paper however, we show that, for the first time in history,
a full round real-life block cipher is broken by an algebraic attack.
Moreover, our attacks are easy to implement,
have been tested experimentally, and the full key
can be recovered in practice on a PC.

2007

EPRINT

CTC2 and Fast Algebraic Attacks on Block Ciphers Revisited
Abstract

The cipher CTC (Courtois Toy Cipher) has been designed to demonstrate that it is possible to break on a PC a block cipher with good diffusion and very small number of known (or chosen) plaintexts.
It has however never been designed to withstand all known attacks on block ciphers and Dunkelman and Keller have shown that a few bits of the key can be recovered by Linear Cryptanalysis (LC) - which cannot however compromise the security of a large key. This weakness can easily be avoided: in this paper we give a specification of CTC2, a tweaked version of CTC. The new cipher is MUCH more secure than CTC against LC and the key scheduling of CTC has been extended to use
any key size, independently from the block size. Otherwise, there is little difference between CTC and CTC2. We will show that up to 10 rounds of CTC2 can be broken by simple algebraic attacks.

2006

EPRINT

How Fast can be Algebraic Attacks on Block Ciphers ?
Abstract

In this paper we give a specification of a new block cipher
that can be called the Courtois Toy Cipher (CTC).
It is quite simple, and yet very much like any other known block cipher. If the parameters are large enough, it should evidently be
secure against all known attack methods.
However, we are not proposing a new method for encrypting sensitive data, but rather a research tool that should allow us (and other researchers) to experiment with algebraic attacks on block ciphers
and obtain interesting results using a PC with reasonable quantity of RAM. For this reason the S-box of this cipher has only 3-bits,
which is quite small.
Ciphers with very small S-boxes are believed quite secure,
for example the Serpent S-box has only 4 bits,
and in DES all the S-boxes have 4 output bits.
The AES S-box is not quite as small but can be described
(in many ways) by a very small systems of equations
with only a few monomials (and this fact can also be exploited in algebraic cryptanalysis).
We believe that results on algebraic cryptanalysis of this cipher
will have very deep implications for the security of ciphers in general.

2006

EPRINT

Algebraic Cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard
Abstract

In spite of growing importance of AES, the Data Encryption Standard is by no means obsolete. DES has never been broken from the practical point of view. The triple DES is believed very secure, is widely used, especially in the financial sector, and should remain so for many many years to come. In addition, some doubts have been risen whether its replacement AES is secure, given the extreme level of ``algebraic vulnerability'' of the AES S-boxes (their low I/O degree and exceptionally large number of quadratic I/O equations).
Is DES secure from the point of view of algebraic cryptanalysis, a new very fast-growing area of research? We do not really hope to break it, but just to advance the field of cryptanalysis. At a first glance, DES seems to be a very poor target - as there is (apparently) no strong algebraic structure of any kind in DES. However Courtois and Pieprzyk showed that ``small'' S-boxes always have a low I/O degree (cubic for DES as we show). In addition, due to their low gate count requirements, by introducing additional variables, we can always get an extremely sparse system of quadratic equations.
To assess the algebraic vulnerabilities is the easy part, that may appear unproductive. In this paper we demonstrate that in this way,
several interesting attacks on a real-life ``industrial'' block cipher can be found. One of our attacks is the fastest known algebraic attack on 6 rounds of DES. Yet, it requires only ONE SINGLE known plaintext (instead of a very large quantity) which is quite interesting in itself.
Though (on a PC) we recover the key for only six rounds, in a much weaker sense we can also attack 12 rounds of DES. These results are very interesting because DES is known to be a very robust cipher,
and our methods are very generic. They can be applied to DES with modified S-boxes and potentially other reduced-round block ciphers.

2005

EPRINT

Cryptanalysis of Sfinks
Abstract

Sfinks is an LFSR-based stream cipher submitted to ECRYPT call for stream ciphers by Braeken, Lano, Preneel et al. The designers of Sfinks do not to include any protection against algebraic attacks.
They rely on the so called "Algebraic Immunity", that relates to the complexity of a simple algebraic attack, and ignores other algebraic attacks. As a result, Sfinks is insecure.

2005

EPRINT

The Best Differential Characteristics and Subtleties of the Biham-Shamir Attacks on DES
Abstract

In about every book about cryptography, we learn that the plaintext complexity of differential cryptanalysis on DES is 2^47, as reported by Biham and Shamir. Yet few people realise that in a typical setting this estimation is not exact and too optimistic.
In this note we show that the two "best" differentials for DES used by Biham and Shamir are NOT the best differentials that exist in DES.
For approximations over many rounds such as used in the Biham-Shamir attack from the best characteristic is in fact a third, different differential already given by Knudsen.
A more detailed analysis shows that on average the best differential attack on DES remains the Biham-Shamir attack, because it can exploit two differentials at the same time and their propagation probabilities are related.
However for a typical fixed DES key, the attack requires on average
about 2^48.34 chosen plaintexts and not 2^47 as initially claimed.
In addition, if the key is changing frequently during the attack,
then in fact Biham and Shamir initial figure of 2^47 is correct.
We were surprised to find out that (with differential cryptanalysis) it is easier to break DES with a changing key, than for one fixed key.

2005

EPRINT

On Exact Algebraic [Non-]Immunity of S-boxes Based on Power Functions
Abstract

In this paper we are interested in algebraic immunity of several well known highly-nonlinear vectorial Boolean functions (or S-boxes), designed for block and stream ciphers.
Unfortunately, ciphers that use such S-boxes may still be vulnerable to so called "algebraic attacks" proposed recently by
Courtois, Pieprzyk, Meier, Armknecht, et al. These attacks are not always feasible in practice but are in general very powerful.
They become possible, if we regard the S-boxes, no longer as highly-nonlinear functions of their inputs, but rather exhibit (and exploit) much simpler algebraic equations, that involve both input and the output bits. Instead of complex and "explicit" Boolean FUNCTIONS
we have then simple and "implicit" algebraic RELATIONS that can be combined to fully describe the secret key of the system.
In this paper we look at the number and the type of relations that do exist for several well known components. We wish to correct or/and complete several inexact results on this topic that were presented at FSE 2004.
We also wish to bring a theoretical contribution. One of the main problems in the area of algebraic attacks is to prove that
some systems of equations (derived from some more fundamental equations), are still linearly independent.
We give a complete proof that the number of linearly independent equations for the Rijndael S-box (derived from the basic equation XY=1) is indeed as reported by Courtois and Pieprzyk.
It seems that nobody has so far proven this fundamental statement.

2005

EPRINT

An Algebraic Masking Method to Protect AES Against Power Attacks
Abstract

The central question in constructing a secure and efficient masking method for AES is to address the interaction between additive masking
and the inverse S-box of Rijndael. All recently proposed methods to protect AES against power attacks try to avoid this problem and
work by decomposing the inverse in terms of simpler operations
that are more easily protected against DPA by generic methods.
In this paper, for the first time, we look at the problem in the face, and show that this interaction is not as intricate as it seems. In fact, any operation, even complex, can be directly protected against DPA of any given order, if it can be embedded in a group that has a compact representation.
We show that a secure computation of a whole masked inverse can be done directly in this way, using the group of homographic transformations over the projective space (but not exactly, with some non-trivial technicalities).
This is used to propose a general high-level algebraic method to protect AES against power attacks of any given order.

2005

EPRINT

Feistel Schemes and Bi-Linear Cryptanalysis
Abstract

In this paper we introduce the method of bi-linear cryptanalysis(BLC), designed specifically to attack Feistel ciphers. It allows to construct periodic biased characteristics that combine for an arbitrary number of rounds. In particular, we present a practical attack on DES based on a 1-round invariant, the fastest known based on such invariant, and about as fast as the best Matsui's attack.
For ciphers similar to DES, based on small S-boxes, we claim that BLC is very closely related to LC, and we do not expect to find a bi-linear attack much faster than by LC. Nevertheless we have found bi-linear characteristics that are strictly better than the best Matsui's result for 3, 7, 11 and more rounds of DES.
We also study s5DES substantially stronger than DES against LC, yet for BLC we exhibit several unexpectedly strong biases, stronger even than existing for DES itself.
For more general Feistel schemes there is no reason whatsoever for BLC to remain only a small improvement over LC. We present a construction of a family of practical ciphers based on a big Rijndael-type S-box that are strongly resistant against linear cryptanalysis (LC) but can be easily broken by BLC, even with 16 or more rounds.

2004

EPRINT

Short Signatures, Provable Security, Generic Attacks and Computational Security of Multivariate Polynomial Schemes such as HFE, Quartz and Sflash
Abstract

This paper should be considered as a draft.
Part of it is an extended version
of the paper Generic Attacks and the Security of Quartz presented at PKC 2003 and at the second Nessie workshop. It also contains a lot of new material that is not published elsewhere:
-(yet another) discussion about what is and what isn't a secure signature scheme
-up-to-date security results fo Sflash and Quartz
-new results on computational security of Sflash w.r.t algebraic relation attacks in the light of Faug?re-Joux Crypto 2003 paper.
-and more...
Comments are welcome !

2003

EPRINT

SFLASHv3, a fast asymmetric signature scheme
Abstract

SFLASH-v2 is one of the three asymmetric signature schemes recommended by the European consortium for low-cost smart cards. The latest implementation report published at PKC 2003 shows that SFLASH-v2 is the fastest signature scheme known.
This is a detailed specification of SFLASH-v3 produced in 2003 for fear of v2 being broken. HOWEVER after detailed analysis by Chen Courtois and Yang [ICICS04], Sflash-v2 is not broken and we still recommend the previous version Sflash-v2, already recommended by Nessie, instead of this version.

2003

EPRINT

Did Filiol Break AES ?
Abstract

On January 8th 2003, Eric Filiol published on the eprint a paper (eprint.iacr.org/2003/003/) in which he claims that AES can be broken by a very simple and very fast ciphertext-only attack. If such an attack existed, it would be the biggest discovery in code-breaking since some 10 or more years.
Unfortunately the result is very hard to believe.
In this paper we present the results of computer simulations done by
several independent people, with independently written code.
Nobody has confirmed a single anomaly in AES,
even for much weaker versions of the bias claimed by the author.
We also studied the source code provided by the author to realize that the first version had various issues and bugs, and the latest version still does not confirm the claimed result on AES.

2003

EPRINT

Algebraic Attacks on Combiners with Memory and Several Outputs
Abstract

Algebraic attacks on stream ciphers proposed by Courtois et al. recover the key by solving an overdefined system of multivariate equations. Such attacks can break several interesting cases of LFSR-based stream ciphers, when the output is obtained by a Boolean function. As suggested independently by Courtois and Armknecht, this approach can be successfully extended also to combiners with memory, provided the number of memory bits is small. At Crypto 2003, Krause and Armknecht show that, for ciphers built with LFSRs and an arbitrary combiner using a subset of k LFSR state bits, and with l memory bits, a polynomial attack always do exist when k and l are fixed. Yet this attack becomes very quickly impractical: already when k and l exceed about 4. In this paper we give a much simpler proof of this result and prove a more general theorem. We show that much faster algebraic attacks exist for any cipher that (in order to be fast) outputs several bits at a time. In practice our results substantially reduce the complexity of the best attack known on four well known constructions of stream ciphers when the number of outputs is increased. We present attacks on modified versions of Snow, E0, LILI-128, Turing, and some other ciphers.

2003

EPRINT

What do DES S-boxes Say to Each Other ?
Abstract

DES is not only very widely implemented and used today, but triple DES and other derived schemes will probably still be around in ten or twenty years from now. We suggest that, if an algorithm is so widely used, its security should still be under scrutiny, and not taken for granted.
In this paper we study the S-boxes of DES. Many properties of these are already known, yet usually they concern one particular S-box. This comes from the known design criteria on DES, that strongly suggest that S-boxes have been chosen independently of each other.
On the contrary, we are interested in properties of DES S-boxes that concern a subset of two or more DES S-boxes. For example we study the properties related to Davies-Murphy attacks on DES, recall the known uniformity criteria to resist this attack, and discuss a stronger criterion.
More generally we study many different properties, in particular related to linear cryptanalysis and algebraic attacks. The interesting question is to know if there are any interesting properties that hold for subsets of S-boxes bigger than 2. Such a property has already been shown by Shamir at Crypto'85 (and independently discovered by Franklin), but Coppersmith et al. explained that it was rather due to the known S-box design criteria. Our simulations confirm this, but not totally.
We also present several new properties of similar flavour.
These properties come from a new type of algebraic attack on block ciphers that we introduce. What we find is not easily explained by the known S-box design criteria, and the question should be asked if the S-boxes of DES are related to each other, or if they follow some yet unknown criteria.
Similarly, we also found that the s5DES S-boxes have an unexpected common structure that can be exploited in a certain type of
generalised linear attack. This fact substantially decreases the credibility of s5DES as a DES replacement.
This paper has probably no implications whatsoever on the security of DES.

2002

EPRINT

About Filliol's Observations on DES, AES and Hash Functions (draft)
Abstract

Recently Filiol proposed to test cryptographic algorithms
by making statistics on the number of low degree terms in the boolean functions.
The paper has been published on eprint on 23th of July 2002.
In this paper we reproduce some of Filiol's simulations.
We did not confirm his results:
our results suggest that DES, AES, and major hash functions
have no significative bias and their output bits behave just like random boolean functions.

2002

EPRINT

Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers with Overdefined Systems of Equations
Abstract

Several recently proposed ciphers are built with layers of small S-boxes, interconnected by linear key-dependent layers. Their security relies on the fact, that the classical methods of cryptanalysis (e.g. linear or differential attacks) are based on probabilistic characteristics, which makes their security grow exponentially with the number of rounds Nr.
In this paper we study the security of such ciphers under an additional hypothesis: the S-box can be described by an overdefined system of algebraic equations (true with probability 1). We show that this hypothesis is true for both Serpent (due to a small size of S-boxes) and Rijndael (due to unexpected algebraic properties).
We study general methods known for solving overdefined systems of equations, such as XL from Eurocrypt'00, and show their inefficiency. Then we introduce a new method called XSL that uses the sparsity of the equations and their specific structure.
The XSL attack is very powerful, but heuristic and it is very difficult to evaluate its complexity. The XSL attack has a parameter P, and in theory we show that P should be a constant. The XSL attack would then be polynomial in Nr, with a huge constant that is double-exponential in the size of the S-box.
We demonstrated by computer simulations that the XSL attack works well enough on a toy cipher. It seems however that P will rather increase very slowly with Nr. More simulations are needed for bigger ciphers.
Our optimistic evaluation shows that the XSL attack might be able to break Rijndael 256 bits and Serpent for key lengths 192 and 256 bits. However if only $P$ is increased by 2 (respectively 4) the XSL attack on Rijndael (respectively Serpent) would become slower than the exhaustive search. At any rate, it seems that the security of these ciphers does NOT grow exponentially with the number of rounds.

2002

EPRINT

Higher Order Correlation Attacks, XL algorithm and Cryptanalysis of Toyocrypt
Abstract

There is abundant literature on how to use linear approximations to break various stream ciphers. In this paper we show that it is possible to design an efficient attack based on higher degree approximations. We reduce the attack to solving an overdefined system of multivariate equations and use the XL algorithm from Eurocrypt 2000. The complexity of the XL algorithm is sometimes controversial, however in practice and for the cases relevant here (much more equations than variables), we show that the behaviour of XL is predictable with the utmost precision and 100% accuracy.
Our new attack allows to break efficiently stream ciphers that are known to be immune to all the previously known attacks. It has also surprisingly small and loose requirements on the keystream needed, giving powerful attack scenarios, leading even to (almost) ciphertext-only attacks.
For example, the new attack breaks the stream cipher Toyocrypt submitted to the Japanese government Cryptrec call for cryptographic primitives, and one of only two candidates accepted to the second phase of Cryptrec evaluation process. Toyocrypt is a 128-bit stream cipher and at the time of submission it was claimed to resist to all known attacks. Later, Mihaljevic and Imai showed that the effective key length in Toyocrypt is only 96 bits. Still Toyocrypt may be easily modified to avoid this attack and have full 128 bit key. Our best attack breaks both Toyocrypt and the modified versions taking exactly 2^92 CPU clocks for a 128-bit cipher. Moreover it works in much less restrictive conditions that the previous attack, for example knowing ONLY that the ciphertext is in English.

2002

EPRINT

On the Security of HFE, HFEv- and Quartz
Abstract

Quartz is a signature scheme based on an HFEv- trapdoor function published at Eurocrypt 1996. In this paper we study "inversion" attacks for Quartz, i.e. attacks that solve the system of multivariate equations used in Quartz. We do not cover some special attacks that forge signatures without inversion.
We are interested in methods to invert the HFEv- trapdoor function or at least to distinguish it from a random system of the same size. There are 4 types of attacks known on HFE: Shamir-Kipnis, Shamir-Kipnis-Courtois, Courtois, and attacks related to Gr\"{o}bner bases such as the F5/2 attack by Jean Charles Faug\`{e}re.
No attack has been published so far on HFEv- and it was believed to be more secure than HFE. In this paper we show that even modified HFE systems can be successfully attacked. It seems that the complexity of the attack increases by at least a factor of $q^{tot}$ with $tot$ being the total number of perturbations in HFE. From this and all the other known attacks we will estimate what is the complexity of the best "inversion" attack for Quartz.

2001

EPRINT

MinRank problem and Zero-knowledge authentication
Abstract

A zero-knowledge protocol provides provably secure authentication based on a computational problem.
Several such schemes have been proposed since 1984, and the most practical ones rely on
problems such as factoring that are unfortunately subexponential.
Still there are several other (practical) schemes based on NP-complete problems.
Among them, the problems of coding theory
are in spite of some 20 years of significant research effort, still exponential to solve.
The problem MinRank recently arouse in cryptanalysis of HFE (Crypto'99) and TTM (Asiacrypt'2000) public key cryptosystems.
It happens to ba a strict generalization of those hard problems of (decoding) error correcting codes.
We propose a new Zero-knowledge scheme based on MinRank.
We prove it to be Zero-knowledge by black-box simulation.
We compare it to other practical schemes based on NP-complete problems.
The MinRank scheme allows also an easy setup for a public key shared by a few users, and thus allows anonymous group signatures.

2001

EPRINT

How to achieve a McEliece-based Digital Signature Scheme
Abstract

McEliece is one of the oldest known public key cryptosystems.
Though it was less widely studied that RSA, it is remarkable that
all known attacks are still exponential. It is widely believed that
code-based cryptosystems like McEliece does not allow practical
digital signatures. In the present paper we disprove this belief
and show a way to build a practical signature scheme based on coding
theory. It's security can be reduced in the random oracle model to
the well-known {\em syndrome decoding problem} and the
distinguishability of permuted binary Goppa codes from a random
code. For example we propose a scheme with signatures of $81$-bits
and a binary security workfactor of $2^{83}$.

2001

EPRINT

On multivariate signature-only public key cryptosystems
Abstract

In a paper published at Asiacrypt 2000 a signature scheme that (apparently) cannot be abused for encryption is published.
The problem is highly non-trivial and every solution should be looked upon with caution.
What is especially hard to achieve is to avoid that the public key should leak some information, to be used as a possible "shadow" secondary public key.
In the present paper we argument that the problem has
many natural solutions within the framework of the multivariate cryptography.
First of all it seems that virtually any non-injective multivariate public key is inherently unusable for encryption.
Unfortunately having a lot of leakage is inherent to multivariate cryptosystems. Though it may appear hopeless at the first sight, we use this very property to remove leakage. In our new scenario the Certification Authority (CA) makes extensive modifications of the public key such that the user can still use the internal trapdoor,
but has no control on any publicly verifiable property of the actual public key equations published by CA.
Thus we propose a very large class of multivariate non-encryption
PKI schemes with many parameters $q,d,h,v,r,u,f,D$.
The paper is also of independent interest, as it contains all variants of the HFE trapdoor public key cryptosystem.
We give numerous and precise security claims that HFE achieves or appears to achieve and establish some provable security relationships.

2001

EPRINT

Efficient Zero-knowledge Authentication Based on a Linear Algebra Problem MinRank
Abstract

A Zero-knowledge protocol provides provably secure entity authentication based on a hard computational problem. Among many schemes proposed since 1984, the most practical rely on factoring and discrete log, but still they are practical schemes based on NP-hard problems.
Among them, the problem SD of decoding linear codes
is in spite of some 30 years of research effort, still exponential.
We study a more general problem called MinRank that generalizes SD and contains also other well known hard problems.
MinRank is also used in cryptanalysis of several public key cryptosystems such as birational schemes (Crypto'93), HFE (Crypto'99), GPT cryptosystem (Eurocrypt'91), TTM (Asiacrypt'2000) and Chen's authentication scheme (1996).
We propose a new Zero-knowledge scheme based on MinRank.
We prove it to be Zero-knowledge by black-box simulation.
An adversary able to cheat with a given MinRank instance
is either able to solve it, or is able to compute a collision on a given hash function.
MinRank is one of the most efficient schemes based on NP-complete problems. It can be used to prove in Zero-knowledge a solution to any problem described by multivariate equations. We also present a version with a public key shared by a few users, that allows anonymous group signatures (a.k.a. ring signatures).

2000

EUROCRYPT

1998

ASIACRYPT

#### Program Committees

- Asiacrypt 2008
- FSE 2007
- CHES 2006
- Asiacrypt 2005

#### Coauthors

- Mehdi-Laurent Akkar (1)
- Gregory V. Bard (4)
- Côme Berbain (1)
- Guilhem Castagnos (1)
- Michalis Christofii (1)
- Magnus Daum (2)
- Blandine Debraize (2)
- Romain Duteuil (1)
- Patrick Felke (2)
- Matthieu Finiasz (2)
- Eric Garrido (1)
- Louis Goubin (8)
- Aline Gouget (1)
- Chris Jefferson. (1)
- Robert T. Johnson (1)
- Pascal Junod (1)
- Alexander Klimov (1)
- Willi Meier (2)
- Chris J. Mitchell (1)
- Theodosis Mourouzis (1)
- Karsten Nohl (1)
- Sean O'Neil (1)
- Jacques Patarin (4)
- Josef Pieprzyk (2)
- Thomas Pornin (1)
- Michael Scott (1)
- Nicolas Sendrier (2)
- Adi Shamir (1)
- Hervé Sibert (1)
- Guangyan Song (1)
- Jean-Daniel Tacier (1)
- David Wagner (2)