International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Yiannis Tselekounis


Optimal Single-Server Private Information Retrieval
Mingxun Zhou Wei-Kai Lin Yiannis Tselekounis Elaine Shi
We construct a single-server pre-processing Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme with optimal bandwidth and server computation (up to poly-logarithmic factors), assuming the hardness of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem. Our scheme achieves amortized $\widetilde{O}_{\lambda}(\sqrt{n})$ server and client computation and $\widetilde{O}_\lambda(1)$ bandwidth per query, completes in a single roundtrip, and requires $\widetilde{O}_\lambda(\sqrt{n})$ client storage. In particular, we achieve a significant reduction in bandwidth over the state-of-the-art scheme by Corrigan-Gibbs, Henzinger, and Kogan (Eurocrypt'22): their scheme requires as much as $\widetilde{O}_{\lambda}(\sqrt{n})$ bandwidth per query, with comparable computational and storage overhead as ours.
Fork-Resilient Continuous Group Key Agreement
Joël Alwen Marta Mularczyk Yiannis Tselekounis
Continuous Group Key Agreement (CGKA) lets a evolving group of clients agree on a sequence of group keys. An important application of CGKA is scalable asynchronous end-to-end (E2E) encrypted group messaging. A major problem preventing the use of CGKA over unreliable infrastructure are so-called forks. A fork occurs when group members have diverging views of the group's history (and thus its current state); e.g. due to network or server failures. Once communication channels are restored, members resolve a fork by agreeing on the state of the group again. Today's CGKA protocols make fork resolution challenging, as natural resolution strategies seem to conflict with the way the protocols enforce group state agreement and forward secrecy. Meanwhile, secure group messaging protocols which do support fork resolution do not scale nearly as well as CGKA does. In this work, we pave the way to practical scalable E2E messaging over unreliable infrastructure. To that end, we generalize CGKA to Fork Resilient-CGKA which allows clients to process significantly more types of out-of-order network traffic. This is important for many natural fork resolution procedures as they are based, in part, on replaying missed traffic. Next, we give two FR-CGKA constructions: a practical one based on the CGKA underlying the MLS messaging standard and an optimally secure one (albeit with only theoretical efficiency). To further assist with fork resolution, we introduce a simple new abstraction to describe a client's local protocol state. The abstraction describes all and only the information relevant to natural fork resolution, making it easier for higher-level fork resolution procedures to work with and reason about. We define a black-box extension of an FR-CGKA which maintains such a description of a client's internal state. Finally, as a proof of concept, we give a basic fork resolution protocol.
Steel: Composable Hardware-based Stateful and Randomised Functional Encryption 📺
Trusted execution enviroments (TEEs) enable secure execution of program on untrusted hosts and cryptographically attest the correctness of outputs. As these are complex systems, it is hard to capture the exact security achieved by protocols employing TEEs. Crucially TEEs are typically employed in multiple protocols at the same time, thus composable security (with global subroutines) is a natural goal for such systems. We show that under an attested execution setup $\Gatt$ we can realise cryptographic functionalities that are unrealizable in the standard model. We propose a new primitive of Functional Encryption for Stateful and Randomised functionalities (FESR) and an associated protocol, Steel, that realizes it. We show that Steel UC-realises FESR in the universal composition with global subroutines model (TCC 2020). Our work is also a validation of the compositionality of earlier work (Iron}, CCS 2017) capturing (non-stateful) hardware-based functional encryption. As the existing functionality for attested execution of Pass et al. (Eurocrypt 2017) is too strong for real world use, we propose a weaker functionality that allows the adversary to conduct rollback and forking attacks. We show that the stateful variant of $\Steel$, contrary to the stateless variant corresponding to Iron, is not secure in this setting and propose several mitigation techniques.
Security Analysis and Improvements for the IETF MLS Standard for Group Messaging 📺
Secure messaging (SM) protocols allow users to communicate securely over untrusted infrastructure. In contrast to most other secure communication protocols (such as TLS, SSH, or Wireguard), SM sessions may be long-lived (e.g., years) and highly asynchronous. In order to deal with likely state compromises of users during the lifetime of a session, SM protocols do not only protect authenticity and privacy, but they also guarantee forward secrecy (FS) and post-compromise security (PCS). The former ensures that messages sent and received before a state compromise remain secure, while the latter ensures that users can recover from state compromise as a consequence of normal protocol usage. SM has received considerable attention in the two-party case, where prior work has studied the well-known double-ratchet paradigm, in particular, and SM as a cryptographic primitive, in general. Unfortunately, this paradigm does not scale well to the problem of secure group messaging (SGM). In order to address the lack of satisfactory SGM protocols, the IETF has launched the message-layer security (MLS) working group, which aims to standardize an eponymous SGM protocol. In this work we analyze the TreeKEM protocol, which is at the core of the SGM protocol proposed by the MLS working group. On a positive note, we show that TreeKEM achieves PCS in isolation (and slightly more). However, we observe that the current version of TreeKEM does not provide an adequate form of FS. More precisely, our work proceeds by formally capturing the exact security of TreeKEM as a so-called continuous group key agreement (CGKA) protocol, which we believe to be a primitive of independent interest. To address the insecurity of TreeKEM, we propose a simple modification to TreeKEM inspired by recent work of Jost et al. (EUROCRYPT '19) and an idea due to Kohbrok (MLS Mailing List). We then show that the modified version of TreeKEM comes with almost no efficiency degradation but achieves optimal (according to MLS specification) CGKA security, including FS and PCS. Our work also lays out how a CGKA protocol can be used to design a full SGM protocol.
Non-Malleable Codes for Partial Functions with Manipulation Detection 📺
Aggelos Kiayias Feng-Hao Liu Yiannis Tselekounis
Non-malleable codes were introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs (ICS ’10) and its main application is the protection of cryptographic devices against tampering attacks on memory. In this work, we initiate a comprehensive study on non-malleable codes for the class of partial functions, that read/write on an arbitrary subset of codeword bits with specific cardinality. Our constructions are efficient in terms of information rate, while allowing the attacker to access asymptotically almost the entire codeword. In addition, they satisfy a notion which is stronger than non-malleability, that we call non-malleability with manipulation detection, guaranteeing that any modified codeword decodes to either the original message or to $$\bot $$⊥. Finally, our primitive implies All-Or-Nothing Transforms (AONTs) and as a result our constructions yield efficient AONTs under standard assumptions (only one-way functions), which, to the best of our knowledge, was an open question until now. In addition to this, we present a number of additional applications of our primitive in tamper resilience.

Program Committees

Crypto 2022
Asiacrypt 2022