International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Sandro Coretti

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2020
CRYPTO
Security Analysis and Improvements for the IETF MLS Standard for Group Messaging 📺
Secure messaging (SM) protocols allow users to communicate securely over untrusted infrastructure. In contrast to most other secure communication protocols (such as TLS, SSH, or Wireguard), SM sessions may be long-lived (e.g., years) and highly asynchronous. In order to deal with likely state compromises of users during the lifetime of a session, SM protocols do not only protect authenticity and privacy, but they also guarantee forward secrecy (FS) and post-compromise security (PCS). The former ensures that messages sent and received before a state compromise remain secure, while the latter ensures that users can recover from state compromise as a consequence of normal protocol usage. SM has received considerable attention in the two-party case, where prior work has studied the well-known double-ratchet paradigm, in particular, and SM as a cryptographic primitive, in general. Unfortunately, this paradigm does not scale well to the problem of secure group messaging (SGM). In order to address the lack of satisfactory SGM protocols, the IETF has launched the message-layer security (MLS) working group, which aims to standardize an eponymous SGM protocol. In this work we analyze the TreeKEM protocol, which is at the core of the SGM protocol proposed by the MLS working group. On a positive note, we show that TreeKEM achieves PCS in isolation (and slightly more). However, we observe that the current version of TreeKEM does not provide an adequate form of FS. More precisely, our work proceeds by formally capturing the exact security of TreeKEM as a so-called continuous group key agreement (CGKA) protocol, which we believe to be a primitive of independent interest. To address the insecurity of TreeKEM, we propose a simple modification to TreeKEM inspired by recent work of Jost et al. (EUROCRYPT '19) and an idea due to Kohbrok (MLS Mailing List). We then show that the modified version of TreeKEM comes with almost no efficiency degradation but achieves optimal (according to MLS specification) CGKA security, including FS and PCS. Our work also lays out how a CGKA protocol can be used to design a full SGM protocol.
2020
TCC
Continuous Group Key Agreement with Active Security 📺
A continuous group key agreement (CGKA) protocol allows a long-lived group of parties to agree on a continuous stream of fresh secret key material. CGKA protocols allow parties to join and leave mid-session but may neither rely on special group managers, trusted third parties, nor on any assumptions about if, when, or for how long members are online. CGKA captures the core of an emerging generation of highly practical end-to-end secure group messaging (SGM) protocols. In light of their practical origins, past work on CGKA protocols have been subject to stringent engineering and efficiency constraints at the cost of diminished security properties. In this work, we somewhat relax those constraints, instead considering progressively more powerful adversaries. To that end, we present 3 new security notions of increasing strength. Already the weakest of the 3 (passive security) captures attacks to which all prior CGKA constructions are vulnerable. Moreover, the 2 stronger (active security) notions even allow the adversary to use parties' exposed states combined with full network control to mount attacks. In particular, this is closely related to so-called insider attacks which involve malicious group members actively deviating from the protocol. Although insiders are of explicit interest to practical CGKA/SGM designers, our understanding of this class of attackers is still quite nascent. Indeed, we believe ours to be the first security notions in the literature to precisely formulate meaningful guarantees against (a broad class of) insiders. For each of the 3 new security notions we give a new CGKA scheme enjoying sub-linear (potentially even logarithmic) communication complexity in the number of group members (on par with the asymptotics of state-of-the-art practical constructions). We prove each scheme optimally secure, in the sense that the only security violations possible are those necessarily implied by correctness.
2020
JOFC
Non-malleable Encryption: Simpler, Shorter, Stronger
One approach toward basing public-key encryption (PKE) schemes on weak and credible assumptions is to build “stronger” or more general schemes generically from “weaker” or more restricted ones. One particular line of work in this context was initiated by Myers and Shelat (FOCS ’09) and continued by Hohenberger, Lewko, and Waters (Eurocrypt ’12), who provide constructions of multi-bit CCA-secure PKE from single-bit CCA-secure PKE. It is well known that encrypting each bit of a plaintext string independently is not CCA-secure—the resulting scheme is malleable . We therefore investigate whether this malleability can be dealt with using the conceptually simple approach of applying a suitable non-malleable code (Dziembowski et al., ICS ’10) to the plaintext and subsequently encrypting the resulting codeword bit by bit. We find that an attacker’s ability to ask multiple decryption queries requires that the underlying code be continuously non-malleable (Faust et al., TCC ’14). Since, as we show, this flavor of non-malleability can only be achieved if the code is allowed to “self-destruct,” the resulting scheme inherits this property and therefore only achieves a weaker variant of CCA security. We formalize this new notion of so-called indistinguishability under self-destruct attacks (IND-SDA) as CCA security with the restriction that the decryption oracle stops working once the attacker submits an invalid ciphertext. We first show that the above approach based on non-malleable codes yields a solution to the problem of domain extension for IND-SDA-secure PKE, provided that the underlying code is continuously non-malleable against (a reduced form of) bit-wise tampering. Then, we prove that the code of Dziembowski et al. is actually already continuously non-malleable against bit-wise tampering. We further investigate the notion of security under self-destruct attacks and combine IND-SDA security with non-malleability under chosen-ciphertext attacks (NM-CPA) to obtain the strictly stronger notion of non-malleability under self-destruct attacks (NM-SDA) . We show that NM-SDA security can be obtained from basic IND-CPA security by means of a black-box construction based on the seminal work by Choi et al. (TCC ’08). Finally, we provide a domain extension technique for building a multi-bit NM-SDA scheme from a single-bit NM-SDA scheme. To achieve this goal, we define and construct a novel type of continuous non-malleable code, called secret-state NMC , since, as we show, standard continuous NMCs are insufficient for the natural “encode-then-encrypt-bit-by-bit” approach to work.
2019
EUROCRYPT
The Double Ratchet: Security Notions, Proofs, and Modularization for the Signal Protocol
Joël Alwen Sandro Coretti Yevgeniy Dodis
Signal is a famous secure messaging protocol used by billions of people, by virtue of many secure text messaging applications including Signal itself, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Skype, and Google Allo. At its core it uses the concept of “double ratcheting,” where every message is encrypted and authenticated using a fresh symmetric key; it has many attractive properties, such as forward security, post-compromise security, and “immediate (no-delay) decryption,” which had never been achieved in combination by prior messaging protocols.While the formal analysis of the Signal protocol, and ratcheting in general, has attracted a lot of recent attention, we argue that none of the existing analyses is fully satisfactory. To address this problem, we give a clean and general definition of secure messaging, which clearly indicates the types of security we expect, including forward security, post-compromise security, and immediate decryption. We are the first to explicitly formalize and model the immediate decryption property, which implies (among other things) that parties seamlessly recover if a given message is permanently lost—a property not achieved by any of the recent “provable alternatives to Signal.”We build a modular “generalized Signal protocol” from the following components: (a) continuous key agreement (CKA), a clean primitive we introduce and which can be easily and generically built from public-key encryption (not just Diffie-Hellman as is done in the current Signal protocol) and roughly models “public-key ratchets;” (b) forward-secure authenticated encryption with associated data (FS-AEAD), which roughly captures “symmetric-key ratchets;” and (c) a two-input hash function that is a pseudorandom function (resp. generator with input) in its first (resp. second) input, which we term PRF-PRNG. As a result, in addition to instantiating our framework in a way resulting in the existing, widely-used Diffie-Hellman based Signal protocol, we can easily get post-quantum security and not rely on random oracles in the analysis.
2019
CRYPTO
Seedless Fruit Is the Sweetest: Random Number Generation, Revisited 📺
The need for high-quality randomness in cryptography makes random-number generation one of its most fundamental tasks.A recent important line of work (initiated by Dodis et al., CCS ’13) focuses on the notion of robustness for pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) with inputs. These are primitives that use various sources to accumulate sufficient entropy into a state, from which pseudorandom bits are extracted. Robustness ensures that PRNGs remain secure even under state compromise and adversarial control of entropy sources. However, the achievability of robustness inherently depends on a seed, or, alternatively, on an ideal primitive (e.g., a random oracle), independent of the source of entropy. Both assumptions are problematic: seed generation requires randomness to start with, and it is arguable whether the seed or the ideal primitive can be kept independent of the source. This paper resolves this dilemma by putting forward new notions of robustness which enable both (1) seedless PRNGs and (2) primitive-dependent adversarial sources of entropy. To bypass obvious impossibility results, we make a realistic compromise by requiring that the source produce sufficient entropy even given its evaluations of the underlying primitive. We also provide natural, practical, and provably secure constructions based on hash-function designs from compression functions, block ciphers, and permutations. Our constructions can be instantiated with minimal changes to industry-standard hash functions SHA-2 and SHA-3, or key derivation function HKDF, and can be downgraded to (online) seedless randomness extractors, which are of independent interest.On the way we consider both a computational variant of robustness, where attackers only make a bounded number of queries to the ideal primitive, as well as a new information-theoretic variant, which dispenses with this assumption to a certain extent, at the price of requiring a high rate of injected weak randomness (as it is, e.g., plausible on Intel’s on-chip RNG). The latter notion enables applications such as everlasting security. Finally, we show that the CBC extractor, used by Intel’s on-chip RNG, is provably insecure in our model.
2019
JOFC
Probabilistic Termination and Composability of Cryptographic Protocols
When analyzing the round complexity of multi-party protocols, one often overlooks the fact that underlying resources, such as a broadcast channel, can by themselves be expensive to implement. For example, it is well known that it is impossible to implement a broadcast channel by a (deterministic) protocol in a sublinear (in the number of corrupted parties) number of rounds. The seminal works of Rabin and Ben-Or from the early 1980s demonstrated that limitations as the above can be overcome by using randomization and allowing parties to terminate at different rounds, igniting the study of protocols over point-to-point channels with probabilistic termination and expected constant round complexity. However, absent a rigorous simulation-based definition, the suggested protocols are proven secure in a property-based manner or via ad hoc simulation-based frameworks, therefore guaranteeing limited, if any, composability. In this work, we put forth the first simulation-based treatment of multi-party cryptographic protocols with probabilistic termination. We define secure multi-party computation (MPC) with probabilistic termination in the UC framework and prove a universal composition theorem for probabilistic termination protocols. Our theorem allows to compile a protocol using deterministic termination hybrids into a protocol that uses expected constant round protocols for emulating these hybrids, preserving the expected round complexity of the calling protocol. We showcase our definitions and compiler by providing the first composable protocols (with simulation-based security proofs) for the following primitives, relying on point-to-point channels: (1) expected constant round perfect Byzantine agreement, (2) expected constant round perfect parallel broadcast, and (3) perfectly secure MPC with round complexity independent of the number of parties.
2018
EUROCRYPT
2018
CRYPTO
Non-Uniform Bounds in the Random-Permutation, Ideal-Cipher, and Generic-Group Models 📺
Sandro Coretti Yevgeniy Dodis Siyao Guo
The random-permutation model (RPM) and the ideal-cipher model (ICM) are idealized models that offer a simple and intuitive way to assess the conjectured standard-model security of many important symmetric-key and hash-function constructions. Similarly, the generic-group model (GGM) captures generic algorithms against assumptions in cyclic groups by modeling encodings of group elements as random injections and allows to derive simple bounds on the advantage of such algorithms.Unfortunately, both well-known attacks, e.g., based on rainbow tables (Hellman, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory ’80), and more recent ones, e.g., against the discrete-logarithm problem (Corrigan-Gibbs and Kogan, EUROCRYPT ’18), suggest that the concrete security bounds one obtains from such idealized proofs are often completely inaccurate if one considers non-uniform or preprocessing attacks in the standard model. To remedy this situation, this workdefines the auxiliary-input (AI) RPM/ICM/GGM, which capture both non-uniform and preprocessing attacks by allowing an attacker to leak an arbitrary (bounded-output) function of the oracle’s function table;derives the first non-uniform bounds for a number of important practical applications in the AI-RPM/ICM, including constructions based on the Merkle-Damgård and sponge paradigms, which underly the SHA hashing standards, and for AI-RPM/ICM applications with computational security; andusing simpler proofs, recovers the AI-GGM security bounds obtained by Corrigan-Gibbs and Kogan against preprocessing attackers, for a number of assumptions related to cyclic groups, such as discrete logarithms and Diffie-Hellman problems, and provides new bounds for two assumptions. An important step in obtaining these results is to port the tools used in recent work by Coretti et al. (EUROCRYPT ’18) from the ROM to the RPM/ICM/GGM, resulting in very powerful and easy-to-use tools for proving security bounds against non-uniform and preprocessing attacks.
2016
CRYPTO
2016
TCC
2016
ASIACRYPT
2015
EPRINT
2015
TCC
2014
EPRINT
2013
ASIACRYPT