CryptoDB
Tim Güneysu
NOTE: imports for ToSC and TCHES are no longer functioning.
Publications
Year
Venue
Title
2024
TCHES
HAETAE: Shorter Lattice-Based Fiat-Shamir Signatures
Abstract
We present HAETAE (Hyperball bimodAl modulE rejecTion signAture schemE), a new lattice-based signature scheme. Like the NIST-selected Dilithium signature scheme, HAETAE is based on the Fiat-Shamir with Aborts paradigm, but our design choices target an improved complexity/compactness compromise that is highly relevant for many space-limited application scenarios. We primarily focus on reducing signature and verification key sizes so that signatures fit into one TCP or UDP datagram while preserving a high level of security against a variety of attacks. As a result, our scheme has signature and verification key sizes up to 39% and 25% smaller, respectively, compared than Dilithium. We provide a portable, constanttime reference implementation together with an optimized implementation using AVX2 instructions and an implementation with reduced stack size for the Cortex-M4. Moreover, we describe how to efficiently protect HAETAE against implementation attacks such as side-channel analysis, making it an attractive candidate for use in IoT and other embedded systems.
2024
TCHES
Correction Fault Attacks on Randomized CRYSTALS-Dilithium
Abstract
After NIST’s selection of Dilithium as the primary future standard for quantum-secure digital signatures, increased efforts to understand its implementation security properties are required to enable widespread adoption on embedded devices. Concretely, there are still many open questions regarding the susceptibility of Dilithium to fault attacks. This is especially the case for Dilithium’s randomized (or hedged) signing mode, which, likely due to devastating implementation attacks on the deterministic mode, was selected as the default by NIST.This work takes steps towards closing this gap by presenting two new key-recovery fault attacks on randomized/hedged Dilithium. Both attacks are based on the idea< of correcting faulty signatures after signing. A successful correction yields the value of a secret intermediate that carries information on the key. After gathering many faulty signatures and corresponding correction values, it is possible to solve for thesigning key via either simple linear algebra or lattice-reduction techniques. Our first attack extends a previously published attack based on an instruction-skipping fault to the randomized setting. Our second attack injects faults in the matrix A, which is part of the public key. As such, it is not sensitive to side-channel leakage and has, potentially for this reason, not seen prior analysis regarding faults.We show that for Dilithium2, the attacks allow key recovery with as little as 1024 and 512 faulty signatures, with each signature generated by injecting a single targeted fault. We also demonstrate how our attacks can be adapted to circumvent several popular fault countermeasures with a moderate increase in the computational runtime and the number of required faulty signatures. These results are verified using both simulated faults and clock glitches on an ARM-based standard microcontroller. The presented attacks demonstrate that also randomized Dilithium can be subject to diverse fault attacks, that certain countermeasures might be easily bypassed, and that potential fault targets reach beyond side-channel sensitive operations. Still, many further operations are likely also susceptible, implying the need for increased analysis efforts in the future.
2023
PKC
A Holistic Approach Towards Side-Channel Secure Fixed-Weight Polynomial Sampling
Abstract
The sampling of polynomials with fixed weight is a procedure required by round-4 Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization (BIKE, HQC, McEliece) as well as NTRU, Streamlined NTRU Prime, and NTRU LPRrime. Recent attacks have shown in this context that side-channel leakage of sampling methods can be exploited for key recoveries. While countermeasures regarding such timing attacks have already been presented, still, there is no comprehensive work covering solutions that are also secure against power side channels.
To close this gap, the contribution of this work is threefold: First, we analyze requirements for the different use cases of fixed weight sampling. Second, we demonstrate how all known sampling methods can be implemented securely against timing and power/EM side channels and propose performance-enhancing modifications. Furthermore, we propose a new, comparison based methodology that outperforms existing methods in the masked setting for the three round-4 KEMs BIKE, HQC, and McEliece. Third, we present bitsliced and arbitrary-order masked software implementations and benchmarked them for all relevant cryptographic schemes to be able to infer recommendations for each use case. Additionally, we provide a hardware implementation of our new method as a case study and analyze the feasibility of implementing the other approaches in hardware.
2023
TCHES
Gadget-based Masking of Streamlined NTRU Prime Decapsulation in Hardware
Abstract
Streamlined NTRU Prime is a lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) that is, together with X25519, the default algorithm in OpenSSH 9. Based on lattice assumptions, it is assumed to be secure also against attackers with access to< large-scale quantum computers. While Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) schemes have been subject to extensive research in recent years, challenges remain with respect to protection mechanisms against attackers that have additional side-channel information, such as the power consumption of a device processing secret data. As a countermeasure to such attacks, masking has been shown to be a promising and effective approach. For public-key schemes, including any recent PQC schemes, usually, a mixture of Boolean and arithmetic techniques is applied on an algorithmic level. Our generic hardware implementation of Streamlined NTRU Prime decapsulation, however, follows an idea that until now was assumed to be solely applicable efficiently to symmetric cryptography: gadget-based masking. The hardware design is transformed into a secure implementation by replacing each gate with a composable secure gadget that operates on uniform random shares of secret values. In our work, we show the feasibility of applying this approach also to PQC schemes and present the first Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) – pre- and post-quantum – implementation masked with the gadget-based approach considering several trade-offs and design choices. By the nature of gadget-based masking, the implementation can be instantiated at arbitrary masking order. We synthesize our implementation both for Artix-7 Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) and 45nm Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), yielding practically feasible results regarding the area, randomness requirement, and latency. We verify the side-channel security of our implementation using formal verification on the one hand, and practically using Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) on the other. Finally, we also analyze the applicability of our concept to Kyber and Dilithium, which will be standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
2023
TCHES
A Tale of Snakes and Horses: Amplifying Correlation Power Analysis on Quadratic Maps
Abstract
We study the success probabilities of two variants of Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) to retrieve multiple secret bits. The target is a permutation-based symmetric cryptographic construction with a quadratic map as an S-box. More precisely, we focus on the nonlinear mapping X used in the Xoodoo and Keccak-p permutations, which is affine equivalent to the nonlinear mapping of Ascon. We thus consider three-bit and five-bit S-boxes. Our leakage model is the difference in power consumption of register cells before and after one round. It reflects that, >in hardware, the aforesaid cryptographic algorithms are usually implemented by deploying a round-based architecture. The power consumption difference depends on whether the targeted bits in the register flip. In particular, we describe two attacks based on the CPA methodology. First, we start with a standard CPA approach, for which, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to point out the differences between attacking a three-bit and a five-bit S-box. For CPA, the highest correlation coefficient is the most likely secret hypothesis. We improve on this with our novel combined Correlation Power Analysis (combined CPA), or Snake attack, which uses quadratic map cryptanalysis (e.g., of the function X) to achieve a better attack in terms of the number of traces required and computational complexity. For the Snake attack, sums of absolute or squared values of correlation coefficients are used to determine the most likely guess. As a result, we effectively show that our proposed Snake attack can recover the secret in n22 (or n22+n) intermediate results, compared to 22n for the CPA, where n is the length of the targeted S-Box. We collected power measurements from a hardware setup to demonstrate practical attack success probabilities according to the rank of the correct secret hypothesis both for Xoodoo and Keccak-p. In addition, we explain our success probabilities thanks to the Henery model developed for horse races. In short, after performing 16,896 attacks, the Snake attack or combined CPA on Xoodoo consistently recovers the correct secret bits with each attack using 43,860 traces on average and with only 12 correlations, compared to 61,380 traces for the standard CPA attack with 64 correlations. The Snake attack requires about one-fifth as many correlation values as the standard CPA. For Keccak-p, the difference is more drastic: the Snake attack recovers the secret bits invariably after 771,600 traces with just 20 correlations. In contrast, the standard CPA attack operates on 1,024 correlations (about fifty times more than the Snake attack) and requires 1,223,400 traces.
2022
TCHES
Racing BIKE: Improved Polynomial Multiplication and Inversion in Hardware
Abstract
BIKE is a Key Encapsulation Mechanism selected as an alternate candidate in NIST’s PQC standardization process, in which performance plays a significant role in the third round. This paper presents FPGA implementations of BIKE with the best area-time performance reported in literature. We optimize two key arithmetic operations, which are the sparse polynomial multiplication and the polynomial inversion. Our sparse multiplier achieves time-constancy for sparse polynomials of indefinite Hamming weight used in BIKE’s encapsulation. The polynomial inversion is based on the extended Euclidean algorithm, which is unprecedented in current BIKE implementations. Our optimized design results in a 5.5 times faster key generation compared to previous implementations based on Fermat’s little theorem.Besides the arithmetic optimizations, we present a united hardware design of BIKE with shared resources and shared sub-modules among KEM functionalities. On Xilinx Artix-7 FPGAs, our light-weight implementation consumes only 3 777 slices and performs a key generation, encapsulation, and decapsulation in 3 797 μs, 443 μs, and 6 896 μs, respectively. Our high-speed design requires 7 332 slices and performs the three KEM operations in 1 672 μs, 132 μs, and 1 892 μs, respectively.
2022
TCHES
Randomness Optimization for Gadget Compositions in Higher-Order Masking
Abstract
Physical characteristics of electronic devices, leaking secret and sensitive information to an adversary with physical access, pose a long-known threat to cryptographic hardware implementations. Among a variety of proposed countermeasures against such Side-Channel Analysis attacks, masking has emerged as a promising, but often costly, candidate. Furthermore, the manual realization of masked implementations has proven error-prone and often introduces flaws, possibly resulting in insecure circuits. In the context of automatic masking, a new line of research emerged, aiming to replace each physical gate with a secure gadget that fulfills well-defined properties, guaranteeing security when interconnected to a large circuit. Unfortunately, those gadgets introduce a significant amount of additional overhead into the design, in terms of area, latency, and randomness requirements.In this work, we present a novel approach to reduce the demands for randomness in such gadget-composed circuits by reusing randomness across gadgets while maintaining security in the probing adversary model. To this end, we embedded the corresponding optimization passes into an Electronic Design Automation toolchain, able to construct, optimize, and implement masked circuits, starting from an unprotected design. As such, our security-aware optimization offers an additional building block for existing or new Electronic Design Automation frameworks, where security is considered a first-class design constraint.
2022
TCHES
VERICA - Verification of Combined Attacks: Automated formal verification of security against simultaneous information leakage and tampering
Abstract
Physical attacks, including passive Side-Channel Analysis and active Fault Injection Analysis, are considered among the most powerful threats against physical cryptographic implementations. These attacks are well known and research provides many specialized countermeasures to protect cryptographic implementations against them. Still, only a limited number of combined countermeasures, i.e., countermeasures that protect implementations against multiple attacks simultaneously, were proposed in the past. Due to increasing complexity and reciprocal effects, design of efficient and reliable combined countermeasures requires longstanding expertise in hardware design and security. With the help of formal security specifications and adversary models, automated verification can streamline development cycles, increase quality, and facilitate development of robust cryptographic implementations.In this work, we revise and refine formal security notions for combined protection mechanisms and specifically embed them in the context of hardware implementations. Based on this, we present the first automated verification framework that can verify physical security properties of hardware circuits with respect to combined physical attacks. To this end, we conduct several case studies to demonstrate the capabilities and advantages of our framework, analyzing secure building blocks (gadgets), S-boxes build from Toffoli gates, and the ParTI scheme. For the first time, we reveal security flaws in analyzed structures due to reciprocal effects, highlighting the importance of continuously integrating security verification into modern design and development cycles.
2022
TCHES
Risky Translations: Securing TLBs against Timing Side Channels
Abstract
Microarchitectural side-channel vulnerabilities in modern processors are known to be a powerful attack vector that can be utilized to bypass common security boundaries like memory isolation. As shown by recent variants of transient execution attacks related to Spectre and Meltdown, those side channels allow to leak data from the microarchitecture to the observable architectural state. The vast majority of attacks currently build on the cache-timing side channel, since it is easy to exploit and provides a reliable, fine-grained communication channel. Therefore, many proposals for side-channel secure cache architectures have been made. However, caches are not the only source of side-channel leakage in modern processors and mitigating the cache side channel will inevitably lead to attacks exploiting other side channels. In this work, we focus on defeating side-channel attacks based on page translations.It has been shown that the Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) can be exploited in a very similar fashion to caches. Since the main caches and the TLB share many features in their architectural design, the question arises whether existing countermeasures against cache-timing attacks can be used to secure the TLB. We analyze state-ofthe-art proposals for side-channel secure cache architectures and investigate their applicability to TLB side channels. We find that those cache countermeasures are notdirectly applicable to TLBs, and propose TLBcoat, a new side-channel secure TLB architecture. We provide evidence of TLB side-channel leakage on RISC-V-based Linux systems, and demonstrate that TLBcoat prevents this leakage. We implement TLBcoat using the gem5 simulator and evaluate its performance using the PARSEC benchmark suite.
2021
TCHES
LifeLine for FPGA Protection: Obfuscated Cryptography for Real-World Security
📺
Abstract
Over the last decade attacks have repetitively demonstrated that bitstream protection for SRAM-based FPGAs is a persistent problem without a satisfying solution in practice. Hence, real-world hardware designs are prone to intellectual property infringement and malicious manipulation as they are not adequately protected against reverse-engineering.In this work, we first review state-of-the-art solutions from industry and academia and demonstrate their ineffectiveness with respect to reverse-engineering and design manipulation. We then describe the design and implementation of novel hardware obfuscation primitives based on the intrinsic structure of FPGAs. Based on our primitives, we design and implement LifeLine, a hardware design protection mechanism for FPGAs using hardware/software co-obfuscated cryptography. We show that LifeLine offers effective protection for a real-world adversary model, requires minimal integration effort for hardware designers, and retrofits to already deployed (and so far vulnerable) systems.
2021
TCHES
FIVER – Robust Verification of Countermeasures against Fault Injections
📺
Abstract
Fault Injection Analysis is seen as a powerful attack against implementations of cryptographic algorithms. Over the last two decades, researchers proposed a plethora of countermeasures to secure such implementations. However, the design process and implementation are still error-prone, complex, and manual tasks which require long-standing experience in hardware design and physical security. Moreover, the validation of the claimed security is often only done by empirical testing in a very late stage of the design process. To prevent such empirical testing strategies, approaches based on formal verification are applied instead providing the designer early feedback.In this work, we present a fault verification framework to validate the security of countermeasures against fault-injection attacks designed for ICs. The verification framework works on netlist-level, parses the given digital circuit into a model based on Binary Decision Diagrams, and performs symbolic fault injections. This verification approach constitutes a novel strategy to evaluate protected hardware designs against fault injections offering new opportunities as performing full analyses under a given fault models.Eventually, we apply the proposed verification framework to real-world implementations of well-established countermeasures against fault-injection attacks. Here, we consider protected designs of the lightweight ciphers CRAFT and LED-64 as well as AES. Due to several optimization strategies, our tool is able to perform more than 90 million fault injections in a single-round CRAFT design and evaluate the security in under 50 min while the symbolic simulation approach considers all 2128 primary inputs.
2020
TCHES
High-Speed Masking for Polynomial Comparison in Lattice-based KEMs
📺
Abstract
With the NIST post-quantum standardization competition entering the second round, the interest in practical implementation results of the remaining NIST candidates is steadily growing. Especially implementations on embedded devices are often not protected against side-channel attacks, such as differential power analysis. In this regard, the application of countermeasures against side-channel attacks to candidates of the NIST standardization process is still an understudied topic. Our work aims to contribute to the NIST competition by enabling a more realistic judgment of the overhead cost introduced by side-channel countermeasures that are applied to lattice-based KEMs that achieve CCA-security based on the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform. We present a novel higher-order masking scheme that enables an efficient comparison of polynomials as previous techniques based on arithmetic-to-Boolean conversions renders this (generally inexpensive) component extremely expensive in the masked case. Our approach has linear complexity in the number of shares compared to quadratic complexity of previous contributions and it applies to lattice based schemes with prime modulus. It comes with a proof in the probing model and an efficient implementation on an ARM Cortex-M4F microcontroller which was defined as a preferred evaluation platform for embedded implementations by NIST. Our algorithm can be executed in only 1.5-2.2 milliseconds on the target platform (depending on the masking order) and is therefore well suited even for lightweight applications. While in previous work, practical side-channel experiments were conducted using only 5,000 - 100,000 power traces, we confirm the absence of first-order leakage in this work by collecting 1 million power traces and applying the t-test methodology.
2020
TCHES
Side-Channel Analysis of the Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ Encryption Engine
📺
Abstract
The Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ (ZU+) is a powerful and flexible System-on- Chip (SoC) computing platform for next generation applications such as autonomous driving or industrial Internet-of-Things (IoT) based on 16 nm production technology. The devices are equipped with a secure boot mechanism in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the configuration files that are loaded during power-up. This includes a dedicated encryption engine which features a protocol-based countermeasure against passive Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) called key rolling. The mechanism ensures that the same key is used only for a certain number of data blocks that has to be defined by the user. However, a suitable choice for the key rolling parameter depends on the power leakage behavior of the chip and is not published by the manufacturer. To close this gap, this paper presents the first publicly known side-channel analysis of the ZU+ encryption unit. We conduct a black-box reverse engineering of the internal hardware architecture of the encryption engine using Electromagnetic (EM) measurements from a decoupling capacitor of the power supply. Then, we illustrate a sophisticated methodology that involves the first five rounds of an AES encryption to attack the 256-bit secret key. We apply the elaborated attack strategy using several new Deep Learning (DL)-based evaluation methods for cryptographic implementations. Even though we are unable to recover all bytes of the secret key, the experimental results still allow us to provide concrete recommendations for the key rolling parameter under realistic conditions. This eventually helps to configure the secure boot mechanism of the ZU+ and similar devices appropriately.
2019
PKC
Efficiently Masking Binomial Sampling at Arbitrary Orders for Lattice-Based Crypto
Abstract
With the rising popularity of lattice-based cryptography, the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem has emerged as a fundamental core of numerous encryption and key exchange schemes. Many LWE-based schemes have in common that they require sampling from a discrete Gaussian distribution which comes with a number of challenges for the practical instantiation of those schemes. One of these is the inclusion of countermeasures against a physical side-channel adversary. While several works discuss the protection of samplers against timing leaks, only few publications explore resistance against other side-channels, e.g., power. The most recent example of a protected binomial sampler (as used in key encapsulation mechanisms to sufficiently approximate Gaussian distributions) from CHES 2018 is restricted to a first-order adversary and cannot be easily extended to higher protection orders.In this work, we present the first protected binomial sampler which provides provable security against a side-channel adversary at arbitrary orders. Our construction relies on a new conversion between Boolean and arithmetic (B2A) masking schemes for prime moduli which outperforms previous algorithms significantly for the relevant parameters, and is paired with a new masked bitsliced sampler allowing secure and efficient sampling even at larger protection orders. Since our proposed solution supports arbitrary moduli, it can be utilized in a large variety of lattice-based constructions, like NewHope, LIMA, Saber, Kyber, HILA5, or Ding Key Exchange.
2018
TCHES
Practical CCA2-Secure and Masked Ring-LWE Implementation
📺
Abstract
During the last years public-key encryption schemes based on the hardness of ring-LWE have gained significant popularity. For real-world security applications assuming strong adversary models, a number of practical issues still need to be addressed. In this work we thus present an instance of ring-LWE encryption that is protected against active attacks (i.e., adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks) and equipped with countermeasures against side-channel analysis. Our solution is based on a postquantum variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform combined with provably secure first-order masking. To protect the key and message during decryption, we developed a masked binomial sampler that secures the re-encryption process required by FO. Our work shows that CCA2-secured RLWE-based encryption can be achieved with reasonable performance on constrained devices but also stresses that the required transformation and handling of decryption errors implies a performance overhead that has been overlooked by the community so far. With parameters providing 233 bits of quantum security, our implementation requires 4,176,684 cycles for encryption and 25,640,380 cycles for decryption with masking and hiding countermeasures on a Cortex-M4F. The first-order security of our masked implementation is also practically verified using the non-specific t-test evaluation methodology.
2018
TCHES
Standard Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation on Embedded Devices
Abstract
Lattice-based cryptography is one of the most promising candidates being considered to replace current public-key systems in the era of quantum computing. In 2016, Bos et al. proposed the key exchange scheme FrodoCCS, that is also a submission to the NIST post-quantum standardization process, modified as a key encapsulation mechanism (FrodoKEM). The security of the scheme is based on standard lattices and the learning with errors problem. Due to the large parameters, standard latticebased schemes have long been considered impractical on embedded devices. The FrodoKEM proposal actually comes with parameters that bring standard lattice-based cryptography within reach of being feasible on constrained devices. In this work, we take the final step of efficiently implementing the scheme on a low-cost FPGA and microcontroller devices and thus making conservative post-quantum cryptography practical on small devices. Our FPGA implementation of the decapsulation (the computationally most expensive operation) needs 7,220 look-up tables (LUTs), 3,549 flip-flops (FFs), a single DSP, and only 16 block RAM modules. The maximum clock frequency is 162 MHz and it takes 20.7 ms for the execution of the decapsulation. Our microcontroller implementation has a 66% reduced peak stack usage in comparison to the reference implementation and needs 266 ms for key pair generation, 284 ms for encapsulation, and 286 ms for decapsulation. Our results contribute to the practical evaluation of a post-quantum standardization candidate.
2016
CRYPTO
2016
FSE
2013
CHES
2012
CHES
2012
ASIACRYPT
2011
ASIACRYPT
Program Committees
- Eurocrypt 2020
- Crypto 2019
- CHES 2018
- CHES 2017
- Eurocrypt 2016
- PKC 2016
- CHES 2015 (Program chair)
- CHES 2014
- CHES 2013
- CHES 2012
Coauthors
- Nils Albartus (1)
- Florian Bache (1)
- Julia Borghoff (1)
- Erik Boss (1)
- Ioan Gabriel Bucur (1)
- Wayne Burleson (1)
- Anne Canteaut (1)
- Ming-Shing Chen (1)
- Jung Hee Cheon (1)
- Hyeongmin Choe (1)
- Julien Devevey (1)
- Itai Dinur (1)
- Léo Ducas (1)
- Thomas Eisenbarth (1)
- Jakob Feldtkeller (2)
- Daniel Fennes (1)
- Marc Fyrbiak (1)
- Stefan Gehrer (1)
- Santosh Ghosh (1)
- Vincent Grosso (1)
- Anna Guinet (1)
- Aiden Gula (1)
- Tim Güneysu (30)
- Benjamin Hettwer (1)
- Stefan Heyse (3)
- Dongyeon Hong (1)
- James Howe (1)
- Markus Kasper (1)
- Elif Bilge Kavun (1)
- Simon Klix (1)
- Miroslav Knezevic (1)
- David Knichel (1)
- Lars R. Knudsen (1)
- Elisabeth Krahmer (1)
- Markus Krausz (3)
- Georg Land (4)
- Gregor Leander (2)
- Sebastien Leger (1)
- Lang Lin (1)
- Vadim Lyubashevsky (1)
- Greg Maitland (1)
- Adrian Marotzke (1)
- Ingo von Maurich (1)
- Marc Möller (1)
- Amir Moradi (6)
- Clemens Nasenberg (1)
- Ventzislav Nikov (1)
- Tobias Oder (4)
- Christof Paar (6)
- Clara Paglialonga (2)
- Peter Pessl (1)
- Thomas Pöppelmann (3)
- Christian Rechberger (1)
- Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi (1)
- Jan Richter-Brockmann (5)
- Peter Rombouts (1)
- Pascal Sasdrich (5)
- Tobias Schneider (5)
- Adi Shamir (1)
- Julian Speith (1)
- Damien Stehlé (1)
- Florian Stolz (2)
- Robert Szerwinski (1)
- Russell Tessier (1)
- Jan Philipp Thoma (1)
- Søren S. Thomsen (1)
- Tolga Yalçin (1)
- MinJune Yi (1)
- Ralf Zimmermann (1)