International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Jintai Ding

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2015
EPRINT
2015
EUROCRYPT
2015
ASIACRYPT
2014
EPRINT
2014
EPRINT
2014
EPRINT
2011
CRYPTO
2009
CHES
2008
EPRINT
Algebraic Cryptanalysis of MQQ Public Key Cryptosystem by MutantXL
In this paper, we present an efficient attack to the multivariate Quadratic Quasigroups (MQQ) cryptosystem. Our cryptanalysis breaks MQQ cryptosystems by solving systems of multivariate quadratic polynomial equations using a modified version of the MutantXL algorithm. We present experimental results comparing the behavior of our implementation of MutantXL to Magma's implementation of $F_4$ on MQQ systems ($\geq$ 135 bit). Based on our results we show that the MutantXL implementation solves with much less memory than Magma's implementation of $F_4$ algorithm.
2008
EPRINT
New Differential-Algebraic Attacks and Reparametrization of Rainbow
A recently proposed class of multivariate quadratic schemes, the Rainbow-Like signature Schemes, in which successive sets of central variables are obtained from previous ones by solving linear equations, seem to lead to efficient schemes (TTS, TRMS, and Rainbow) that perform well on systems of low computational resources. Recently SFLASH ($C^{\ast-}$) was broken by Dubois, Fouque, Shamir, and Stern via a differential attack. In this paper, we exhibit similar attacks based on differentials, that will reduce published Rainbow-like schemes below their security levels. We will present a new type of construction of Rainbow-Like schemes and design signature schemes with new parameters for practical applications.
2008
EPRINT
Small Odd Prime Field Multivariate PKCs
We show that Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystems (MPKCs) over fields of small odd prime characteristic, say 31, can be highly efficient. Indeed, at the same design security of $2^{80}$ under the best known attacks, odd-char MPKC is generally faster than prior MPKCs over \GF{2^k}, which are in turn faster than ``traditional'' alternatives. This seemingly counter-intuitive feat is accomplished by exploiting the comparative over-abundance of small integer arithmetic resources in commodity hardware, here embodied by SSE2 or more advanced special multimedia instructions on modern x86-compatible CPUs. We explain our implementation techniques and design choices in implementing our chosen MPKC instances modulo small a odd prime. The same techniques are also applicable in modern FPGAs which often contains a large number of multipliers.
2008
EPRINT
Odd-Char Multivariate Hidden Field Equations
We present a multivariate version of Hidden Field Equations (HFE) over a finite field of odd characteristic, with an extra ``embedding'' modifier. Combining these known ideas makes our new MPKC (multivariate public key cryptosystem) more efficient and scalable than any other extant multivariate encryption scheme. Switching to odd characteristics in HFE-like schemes affects how an attacker can make use of field equations. Extensive empirical tests (using MAGMA-2.14, the best commercially available \mathbold{F_4} implementation) suggests that our new construction is indeed secure against algebraic attacks using Gr\"obner Basis algorithms. The ``embedding'' serves both to narrow down choices of pre-images and to guard against a possible Kipnis-Shamir type (rank-based) attack. We may hence reasonably argue that for practical sizes, prior attacks take exponential time. We demonstrate that our construction is in fact efficient by implementing practical-sized examples of our ``odd-char HFE'' with 3 variables (``THFE'') over $\mathrm{GF}(31)$. To be precise, our preliminary THFE implementation is $15\times$--$20\times$ the speed of RSA-1024.
2007
PKC
2007
PKC
2007
EPRINT
Multivariates Polynomials for Hashing
Jintai Ding Bo-Yin Yang
We propose the idea of building a secure hash using quadratic or higher degree multivariate polynomials over a finite field as the compression function, whose security relies on simple hard questions. We analyze some security properties and potential feasibility, where the compression functions are randomly chosen high-degree polynomials. Next, we propose to improve on the efficiency of the system by using some specially designed polynomials using composition of maps and certain sparsity property, where the security of the system would then relies on stronger assumptions.
2007
EPRINT
Kipnis-Shamir's Attack on HFE Revisited
Xin Jiang Jintai Ding Lei Hu
In this paper, we show that the claims in the original Kipnis-Shamir's attack on the HFE cryptosystems and the improved attack by Courtois that the complexity of the attacks is polynomial in terms of the number of variables are invalid. We present computer experiments and a theoretical argument using basic algebraic geometry to explain why it is so. Furthermore we show that even with the help of the powerful new Gr\"{o}bner basis algorithm like $F_4$, the Kipnis-Shamir's attack still should be exponential not polynomial. This again is supported by our theoretical argument.
2007
EPRINT
Identifying Ideal Lattices
Jintai Ding Richard Lindner
Micciancio defined a generalization of cyclic lattices, called ideal lattices. These lattices can be used in cryptosystems to decrease the number of parameters necessary to describe a lattice by a square root, making them more efficient. He proves that the computational intractability of classic lattice problems for these lattices gives rise to provably secure one-way and collision-resistant hash functions. This provable security relies on the assumption that reducing bases of ideal lattices is similar to reducing bases of random lattices. We give an indication that lattice problems in ideal lattices do not represent the general case by providing a distinguisher, which decides in time $O(n^4)$ whether a given basis of rank $n$ spans an ideal lattice or not. Using this algorithm we perform a statistical analysis for several dimensions and show that randomly generated lattices are practically never ideal.
2007
EPRINT
Breaking the Symmetry: a Way to Resist the New Differential Attack
Sflash had recently been broken by Dubois, Stern, Shamir, etc., using a differential attack on the public key. The $C^{\ast-}$ signature schemes are hence no longer practical. In this paper, we will study the new attack from the point view of symmetry, then (1) present a simple concept (projection) to modify several multivariate schemes to resist the new attacks; (2) demonstrate with practical examples that this simple method could work well; and (3) show that the same discussion of attack-and-defence applies to other big-field multivariates. The speed of encryption schemes is not affected, and we can still have a big-field multivariate signatures resisting the new differential attacks with speeds comparable to Sflash.
2007
EPRINT
Cryptanalysis of Rational Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystems
Jintai Ding John Wagner
In 1989, Tsujii, Fujioka, and Hirayama proposed a family of multivariate public key cryptosystems, where the public key is given as a set of multivariate rational functions of degree 4\cite{Tsujii-Fujioka:89}. These cryptosystems are constructed via composition of two quadratic rational maps. In this paper, we present the cryptanalysis of this family of cryptosystems. The key point of our attack is to transform a problem of decomposition of two rational maps into a problem of decomposition of two polynomial maps. We develop a new improved 2R decomposition method and other new techniques, which allows us to find an equivalent decomposition of the rational maps to break the system completely. For the example suggested for practical applications, it is extremely fast to perform the computation to derive an equivalent private key, and it requires only a few seconds on a standard PC.
2007
EPRINT
Cryptanalysis of Two New Instances of TTM Cryptosystem
Xuyun Nie Xin Jiang Lei Hu Jintai Ding
In 2006, Nie et al proposed an attack to break an instance of TTM cryptosystems. However, the inventor of TTM disputed this attack and he proposed two new instances of TTM to support his viewpoint. At this time, he did not give the detail of key construction --- the construction of the lock polynomials in these instances which would be used in decryption. The two instances are claimed to achieve a security of $2^{109}$ against Nie et al attack. In this paper, we show that these instances are both still insecure, and in fact, they do not achieve a better design in the sense that we can find a ciphertext-only attack utilizing the First Order Linearization Equations while for the previous version of TTM, only Second Order Linearization Equations can be used in the beginning stage of the previous attack. Different from previous attacks, we use an iterated linearization method to break these two instances. For any given valid ciphertext, we can find its corresponding plaintext within $2^{31}$ $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$-computations after performing once for any public key a computation of complexity less than $2^{44}$. Our experiment result shows we have unlocked the lock polynomials after several iterations, though we do not know the detailed construction of lock polynomials.
2007
EPRINT
Secure PRNGs from Specialized Polynomial Maps over Any $F_q$
We prove that a random map drawn from any class ${\frak C}$ of polynomial maps from $F_q^n$ to $F_q^{n+r}$ that is (i) totally random in the affine terms, and (ii) has a negligible chance of being not strongly one-way, provides a secure PRNG (hence a secure stream cipher) for any q. Plausible choices for ${\frak C}$ are semi-sparse (i.e., the affine terms are truly random) systems and other systems that are easy to evaluate from a small (compared to a generic map) number of parameters. To our knowledge, there are no other positive results for provable security of specialized polynomial systems, in particular sparse ones (which are natural candidates to investigate for speed). We can build a family of provably secure stream ciphers a rough implementation of which at the same security level can be more than twice faster than an optimized QUAD (and any other provably secure stream ciphers proposed so far), and uses much less storage. This may also help build faster provably secure hashes. We also examine the effects of recent results on specialization on security, e.g., Aumasson-Meier (ICISC 2007), which precludes Merkle-Damgaard compression using polynomials systems {uniformly very sparse in every degree} from being universally collision-free. We conclude that our ideas are consistent with and complements these new results. We think that we can build secure primitives based on specialized (versus generic) polynomial maps which are more efficient.
2006
PKC
2006
EPRINT
Zhuang-Zi: A New Algorithm for Solving Multivariate Polynomial Equations over a Finite Field
We present the Zhuang-Zi algorithm, a new method for solving multivariate polynomial equations over a finite field. We describe the algorithm and present examples, some of which cannot be solved with the fastest known algorithms.
2006
EPRINT
Note on Design Criteria for Rainbow-Type Multivariates
This was a short note that deals with the design of Rainbow or ``stagewise unbalanced oil-and-vinegar'' multivariate signature schemes. We exhibit new cryptanalysis for current schemes that relates to flawed choices of system parameters in current schemes. These can be ameliorated according to an updated list of security design criteria.
2006
EPRINT
High Order Linearization Equation (HOLE) Attack on Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystems
In the CT-track of the 2006 RSA conference, a new multivariate public key cryptosystem, which is called the Medium Field Equation (MFE) multivariate public key cryptosystem, is proposed by Wang, Yang, Hu and Lai. We use the second order linearization equation attack method by Patarin to break MFE. Given a ciphertext, we can derive the plaintext within $2^{23}$ $\F_{2^{16}}$-operations, after performing once for any public key a computation of complexity less than $2^{52}$. We also propose a high order linearization equation (HOLE) attack on multivariate public key cryptosystems, which is a further generalization of the (first and second order) linearization equation (LE). This method can be used to attack extensions of the current MFE.
2005
PKC
2005
EPRINT
Inoculating Multivariate Schemes Against Differential Attacks
Jintai Ding Jason E. Gower
We demonstrate how to prevent differential attacks on multivariate public key cryptosystems using the Plus (+) method of external perturbation. In particular, we prescribe adding as few as 10 Plus polynomials to the Perturbed Matsumoto-Imai (PMI) cryptosystem when $g=1$ and $r=6$, where $\theta$ is the Matsumoto-Imai exponent, $n$ is the message length, $g=\gcd{(\theta,n)}$, and $r$ is the internal perturbation dimension; or as few as $g+10$ when $g \neq 1$. The external perturbation does not significantly decrease the efficiency of the system, and in fact has the additional benefit of resolving the problem of finding the true plaintext among several preimages of a given ciphertext. We call this new scheme the Perturbed Matsumoto-Imai-Plus (PMI+) cryptosystem.
2004
PKC
2004
EPRINT
Cryptanalysis of SFlash v3
Jintai Ding Dieter Schmidt
Sflash is a fast multivariate signature scheme. Though the first version Sflash-v1 was flawed, a second version, Sflash-v2 was selected by the Nessie Consortium and was recommended for implementation of low-end smart cards. Very recently, due to the security concern, the designer of Sflash recommended that Sflash-v2 should not be used, instead a new version Sflash-v3 is proposed, which essentially only increases the length of the signature. The Sflash family of signature schemes is a variant of the Matsumoto and Imai public key cryptosystem. The modification is through the Minus method, namely given a set of polynomial equations, one takes out a few of them to make them much more difficult to solve. In this paper, we attack the Sflash-v3 scheme by combining an idea from the relinearization method by Kipnis and Shamir, which was used to attack the Hidden Field Equation schemes, and the linearization method by Patarin. We show that the attack complexity is less than 2^80, the security standard required by the Nessie Consortium.
2004
EPRINT
Multivariable public--key cryptosystems
Jintai Ding Dieter Schmidt
Recently Landau and Diffie gave in a series of articles in the Notices of the American Mathematical Society and in the American Mathematical Monthly excellent expositions on how the theory of multivariable polynomials are used in cryptography. However they covered only half of the story. They covered only the theory of polynomials in symmetric or secret cryptography. There is another half of the story, namely the story about the theory of multivariable polynomials in asymmetric or public key cryptosystems. We give an overview of the families of public key cryptosystems, which have been developed in the last ten years.
2003
EPRINT
Cryptanalysis of an implementation scheme of the Tamed Transformation Method cryptosystem
Jintai Ding Timonthy Hodges
A Tamed Transformation Method (TTM) cryptosystem was proposed by T.T.Moh in 1999. We describe how the first implementation scheme of the TTM system can be defeated. The computational complexity of our attack is $2^{33}$ computations on the finite field with $2^8$ elements.
2003
EPRINT
A defect of the implementation schemes of the TTM cryptosystem
Jintai Ding Dieter Schmidt
We show all the existing TTM implementation schemes have a defect that there exist linearization equations $$ \sum_{i=1,j=1}^{n,m} a_{ij}x_iy_j(x_1,\dots,x_{n})+ \sum_{i=1}^{n} b_ix_i+\sum_{j=1}^{m} c_jy_j(x_1,\dots,x_{n}) + d= 0, $$ which are satisfied by the components $y_i(x_1,\dots,x_n)$ of the ciphers of the TTM schemes. We further demonstrate that, for the case of the most recent two implementation schemes in two versions of the paper \cite{CM}, where the inventor of TTM used them to refute a claim in \cite{CG}, if we do a linear substitution with the linear equations derived from the linearization equations for a given ciphertext, we can find the plaintext easily by an iteration of the procedure of first search for linear equations by linear combinations and then linear substitution. The computation complexity of the attack on these two schemes is less than $2^{35}$ over a finite field of size $2^8$.

Program Committees

PKC 2013