International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Özgür Dagdelen

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2014
EPRINT
2013
PKC
2013
ASIACRYPT
2011
CHES
2011
ASIACRYPT
2010
EPRINT
Parallel Enumeration of Shortest Lattice Vectors
Özgür Dagdelen Michael Schneider
Lattice basis reduction is the problem of finding short vectors in lattices. The security of lattice based cryptosystems is based on the hardness of lattice reduction. Furthermore, lattice reduction is used to attack well-known cryptosystems like RSA. One of the algorithms used in lattice reduction is the enumeration algorithm (ENUM), that provably finds a shortest vector of a lattice. We present a parallel version of the lattice enumeration algorithm. Using multi-core CPU systems with up to 16 cores, our implementation gains a speed-up of up to factor 14. Compared to the currently best public implementation, our parallel algorithm saves more than 90% of runtime.
2010
EPRINT
Random Oracles in a Quantum World
Once quantum computers reach maturity most of today’s traditional cryptographic schemes based on RSA or discrete logarithms become vulnerable to quantum-based attacks. Hence, schemes which are more likely to resist quantum attacks like lattice-based systems or code-based primitives have recently gained significant attention. Interestingly, a vast number of such schemes also deploy random oracles, which have mainly be analyzed in the classical setting. Here we revisit the random oracle model in cryptography in light of quantum attackers. We show that there are protocols using quantum-immune primitives and random oracles, such that the protocols are secure in the classical world, but insecure if a quantum attacker can access the random oracle via quantum states. We discuss that most of the proof techniques related to the random oracle model in the classical case cannot be transferred immediately to the quantum case. Yet, we show that “quantum random oracles” can nonetheless be used to show for example that the basic Bellare-Rogaway encryption scheme is quantum-immune against plaintext attacks (assuming quantum-immune primitives).