## CryptoDB

### Weiqiang Wen

#### ORCID: 0000-0001-5272-2572

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2023

PKC

A Generic Transform from Multi-Round Interactive Proof to NIZK
Abstract

We present a new generic transform that takes a multi-round interactive proof for the membership of a language L and outputs a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (not of knowledge) in the common reference string model. Similar to the Fiat-Shamir transform, it requires a hash function H. However, in our transform the zero-knowledge property is in the standard model, and the adaptive soundness is in the non-programmable random oracle model (NPROM).
Behind this new generic transform, we build a new generic OR-composition of two multi-round interactive proofs. Note that the two common techniques for building OR-proofs (parallel OR-proof and sequential OR-proof) cannot be naturally extended to the multi-round setting. We also give a proof of security for our OR-proof in the quantum oracle model (QROM), surprisingly the security loss in QROM is independent from the number of rounds.

2022

CRYPTO

Partial Key Exposure Attacks on BIKE, Rainbow and NTRU
📺
Abstract

In a so-called partial key exposure attack one obtains some information about the secret key, e.g. via some side-channel leakage. This information might be a certain fraction of the secret key bits (erasure model) or some erroneous version of the secret key (error model). The goal is to recover the secret key from the leaked information.
There is a common belief that, as opposed to e.g. the RSA cryptosystem, most post-quantum cryptosystems are usually resistant against partial key exposure attacks. We strongly question this belief by constructing partial key exposure attacks on code-based, multivariate, and lattice-based schemes (BIKE, Rainbow and NTRU). Our attacks exploit the redundancy that modern PQ cryptosystems inherently use for efficiency reasons. The application and development of techniques from information set decoding plays a crucial role for achieving our results.
On the theoretical side, we show non-trivial information leakage bounds that allow for a polynomial time key recovery attack. As an example, for all schemes the knowledge of a constant fraction of the secret key bits suffices to reconstruct the full key in polynomial time.
Even if we no longer insist on polynomial time attacks, most of our attacks extend well and remain feasible up to large erasure and error rates. In the case of BIKE for example we obtain attack complexities around 60 bits when half of the secret key bits are erased, or a quarter of the secret key bits are faulty.
Our results show that even highly error-prone key leakage of modern PQ cryptosystems may lead to full secret key recoveries.

2022

JOFC

On the Hardness of Module Learning with Errors with Short Distributions
Abstract

The Module Learning With Errors ( $$\text {M-LWE}$$ M-LWE ) problem is a core computational assumption of lattice-based cryptography which offers an interesting trade-off between guaranteed security and concrete efficiency. The problem is parameterized by a secret distribution as well as an error distribution. There is a gap between the choices of those distributions for theoretical hardness results (standard formulation of $$\text {M-LWE}$$ M-LWE , i.e., uniform secret modulo q and Gaussian error) and practical schemes (small bounded secret and error). In this work, we make progress toward narrowing this gap. More precisely, we prove that $$\text {M-LWE}$$ M-LWE with uniform $$\eta $$ η -bounded secret for any $$1 \le \eta \ll q$$ 1 ≤ η ≪ q and Gaussian error, in both its search and decision variants, is at least as hard as the standard formulation of $$\text {M-LWE}$$ M-LWE , provided that the module rank d is at least logarithmic in the ring degree n . We also prove that the search version of $$\text {M-LWE}$$ M-LWE with large uniform secret and uniform $$\eta $$ η -bounded error is at least as hard as the standard $$\text {M-LWE}$$ M-LWE problem, if the number of samples m is close to the module rank d and with further restrictions on $$\eta $$ η . The latter result can be extended to provide the hardness of search $$\text {M-LWE}$$ M-LWE with uniform $$\eta $$ η -bounded secret and error under specific parameter conditions. Overall, the results apply to all cyclotomic fields, but most of the intermediate results are proven in more general number fields.

2020

CRYPTO

Faster Enumeration-based Lattice Reduction: Root Hermite Factor k^(1/(2k)) in Time k^(k/8 + o(k))
📺
Abstract

We give a lattice reduction algorithm that achieves root Hermite factor k^(1/(2k)) in time k^(k/8 + o(k)) and polynomial memory. This improves on the previously best known enumeration-based algorithms which achieve the same quality, but in time k^(k/(2e) + o(k)). A cost of k^(k/8 + o(k)) was previously mentioned as potentially achievable (Hanrot-Stehlé’10) or as a heuristic lower bound (Nguyen’10) for enumeration algorithms. We prove the complexity and quality of our algorithm under a heuristic assumption and provide empirical evidence from simulation and implementation experiments attesting to its performance for practical and cryptographic parameter sizes. Our work also suggests potential avenues for achieving costs below k^(k/8 + o(k)) for the same root Hermite factor, based on the geometry of SDBKZ-reduced bases.

2020

ASIACRYPT

Towards Classical Hardness of Module-LWE: The Linear Rank Case
📺
Abstract

We prove that the module learning with errors (M-LWE) problem with arbitrary polynomial-sized modulus $p$ is \emph{classically} at least as hard as standard worst-case lattice problems, as long as the module rank $d$ is
not smaller than the ring dimension $n$.
Previous publications only showed the hardness under quantum reductions.
We achieve this result in an analogous manner as in the case of the learning with errors (LWE) problem.
First, we show the classical hardness of M-LWE with an exponential-sized modulus.
In a second step, we prove the hardness of M-LWE using a binary secret.
And finally, we provide a modulus reduction technique.
The complete result applies to the class of power-of-two cyclotomic fields.
However, several tools hold for more general classes of number fields and may be of independent interest.

2019

ASIACRYPT

Middle-Product Learning with Rounding Problem and Its Applications
Abstract

At CRYPTO 2017, Roşca et al. introduce a new variant of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem, called the Middle-Product LWE (
$${\mathrm {MP}\text {-}\mathrm{LWE}}$$
). The hardness of this new assumption is based on the hardness of the Polynomial LWE (P-LWE) problem parameterized by a set of polynomials, making it more secure against the possible weakness of a single defining polynomial. As a cryptographic application, they also provide an encryption scheme based on the
$${\mathrm {MP}\text {-}\mathrm{LWE}}$$
problem. In this paper, we propose a deterministic variant of their encryption scheme, which does not need Gaussian sampling and is thus simpler than the original one. Still, it has the same quasi-optimal asymptotic key and ciphertext sizes. The main ingredient for this purpose is the Learning With Rounding (LWR) problem which has already been used to derandomize LWE type encryption. The hardness of our scheme is based on a new assumption called Middle-Product Computational Learning With Rounding, an adaption of the computational LWR problem over rings, introduced by Chen et al. at ASIACRYPT 2018. We prove that this new assumption is as hard as the decisional version of MP-LWE and thus benefits from worst-case to average-case hardness guarantees.

2018

PKC

Learning with Errors and Extrapolated Dihedral Cosets
Abstract

The hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) problem is one of the most fruitful resources of modern cryptography. In particular, it is one of the most prominent candidates for secure post-quantum cryptography. Understanding its quantum complexity is therefore an important goal.We show that under quantum polynomial time reductions, LWE is equivalent to a relaxed version of the dihedral coset problem (DCP), which we call extrapolated DCP (eDCP). The extent of extrapolation varies with the LWE noise rate. By considering different extents of extrapolation, our result generalizes Regev’s famous proof that if DCP is in BQP (quantum poly-time) then so is LWE (FOCS 02). We also discuss a connection between eDCP and Childs and Van Dam’s algorithm for generalized hidden shift problems (SODA 07).Our result implies that a BQP solution for LWE might not require the full power of solving DCP, but rather only a solution for its relaxed version, eDCP, which could be easier.

2018

ASIACRYPT

Measuring, Simulating and Exploiting the Head Concavity Phenomenon in BKZ
Abstract

The Blockwise-Korkine-Zolotarev (BKZ) lattice reduction algorithm is central in cryptanalysis, in particular for lattice-based cryptography. A precise understanding of its practical behavior in terms of run-time and output quality is necessary for parameter selection in cryptographic design. As the provable worst-case bounds poorly reflect the practical behavior, cryptanalysts rely instead on the heuristic BKZ simulator of Chen and Nguyen (Asiacrypt’11). It fits better with practical experiments, but not entirely. In particular, it over-estimates the norm of the first few vectors in the output basis. Put differently, BKZ performs better than its Chen–Nguyen simulation.In this work, we first report experiments providing more insight on this shorter-than-expected phenomenon. We then propose a refined BKZ simulator by taking the distribution of short vectors in random lattices into consideration. We report experiments suggesting that this refined simulator more accurately predicts the concrete behavior of BKZ. Furthermore, we design a new BKZ variant that exploits the shorter-than-expected phenomenon. For the same cost assigned to the underlying SVP-solver, the new BKZ variant produces bases of better quality. We further illustrate its potential impact by testing it on the SVP-120 instance of the Darmstadt lattice challenge.

#### Coauthors

- Martin R. Albrecht (1)
- Shi Bai (3)
- Katharina Boudgoust (3)
- Zvika Brakerski (1)
- Dipayan Das (1)
- Andre Esser (1)
- Pierre-Alain Fouque (2)
- Adela Georgescu (1)
- Corentin Jeudy (2)
- Paul Kirchner (1)
- Elena Kirshanova (1)
- Alexander May (1)
- Chen Qian (1)
- Adeline Roux-Langlois (4)
- Damien Stehlé (3)
- Javier Verbel (1)
- Weiqiang Wen (8)
- Zhenfei Zhang (1)