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On the Hardness of Module Learning with Errors with Short Distributions

Authors:
Katharina Boudgoust
Corentin Jeudy
Adeline Roux-Langlois
Weiqiang Wen
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DOI: 10.1007/s00145-022-09441-3
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Abstract: The Module Learning With Errors  ( $$\text {M-LWE}$$ M-LWE ) problem is a core computational assumption of lattice-based cryptography which offers an interesting trade-off between guaranteed security and concrete efficiency. The problem is parameterized by a secret distribution as well as an error distribution. There is a gap between the choices of those distributions for theoretical hardness results (standard formulation of  $$\text {M-LWE}$$ M-LWE , i.e., uniform secret modulo  q and Gaussian error) and practical schemes (small bounded secret and error). In this work, we make progress toward narrowing this gap. More precisely, we prove that  $$\text {M-LWE}$$ M-LWE with uniform  $$\eta $$ η -bounded secret for any  $$1 \le \eta \ll q$$ 1 ≤ η ≪ q and Gaussian error, in both its search and decision variants, is at least as hard as the standard formulation of  $$\text {M-LWE}$$ M-LWE , provided that the module rank  d is at least logarithmic in the ring degree  n . We also prove that the search version of  $$\text {M-LWE}$$ M-LWE with large uniform secret and uniform  $$\eta $$ η -bounded error is at least as hard as the standard  $$\text {M-LWE}$$ M-LWE problem, if the number of samples  m is close to the module rank  d and with further restrictions on  $$\eta $$ η . The latter result can be extended to provide the hardness of search  $$\text {M-LWE}$$ M-LWE with uniform  $$\eta $$ η -bounded secret and error under specific parameter conditions. Overall, the results apply to all cyclotomic fields, but most of the intermediate results are proven in more general number fields.
BibTeX
@article{jofc-2022-32779,
  title={On the Hardness of Module Learning with Errors with Short Distributions},
  journal={Journal of Cryptology},
  publisher={Springer},
  volume={36},
  doi={10.1007/s00145-022-09441-3},
  author={Katharina Boudgoust and Corentin Jeudy and Adeline Roux-Langlois and Weiqiang Wen},
  year=2022
}