## CryptoDB

### Chethan Kamath

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2023

PKC

Certifying Giant Nonprimes
Abstract

GIMPS and PrimeGrid are large-scale distributed projects dedicated to searching giant prime numbers, usually of special forms like Mersenne and Proth primes. The numbers in the current search-space are millions of digits large and the participating volunteers need to run resource-consuming primality tests. Once a candidate prime $N$ has been found, the only way for another party to independently verify the primality of $N$ used to be by repeating the expensive primality test. To avoid the need for second recomputation of each primality test, these projects have recently adopted certifying mechanisms that enable efficient verification of performed tests. However, the mechanisms presently in place only detect benign errors and there is no guarantee against adversarial behavior: a malicious volunteer can mislead the project to reject a giant prime as being non-prime.
In this paper, we propose a practical, cryptographically-sound mechanism for certifying the non-primality of Proth numbers. That is, a volunteer can -- parallel to running the primality test for $N$ -- generate an efficiently verifiable proof at a little extra cost certifying that $N$ is not prime. The interactive protocol has statistical soundness and can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
Our approach is based on a cryptographic primitive called Proof of Exponentiation (PoE) which, for a group $\G$, certifies that a tuple $(x,y,T)\in\G^2\times\mathbb{N}$ satisfies $x^{2^T}=y$ (Pietrzak, ITCS 2019 and Wesolowski, J. Cryptol. 2020). In particular, we show how to adapt Pietrzak's PoE at a moderate additional cost to make it a cryptographically-sound certificate of non-primality.

2023

TCC

(Verifiable) Delay Functions from Lucas Sequences
Abstract

Lucas sequences are constant-recursive integer sequences with a long history of applications in cryptography, both in the design of cryptographic schemes and cryptanalysis. In this work, we study the sequential hardness of computing Lucas sequences over an RSA modulus.
First, we show that modular Lucas sequences are at least as sequentially hard as the classical delay function given by iterated modular squaring proposed by Rivest, Shamir, and Wagner (MIT Tech. Rep. 1996) in the context of time-lock puzzles. Moreover, there is no obvious reduction in the other direction, which suggests that the assumption of sequential hardness of modular Lucas sequences is strictly weaker than that of iterated modular squaring. In other words, the sequential hardness of modular Lucas sequences might hold even in the case of an algorithmic improvement violating the sequential hardness of iterated modular squaring.
Second, we demonstrate the feasibility of constructing practically-efficient verifiable delay functions based on the sequential hardness of modular Lucas sequences. Our construction builds on the work of Pietrzak (ITCS 2019) by leveraging the intrinsic connection between the problem of computing modular Lucas sequences and exponentiation in an appropriate extension field.

2022

CRYPTO

Practical Statistically-Sound Proofs of Exponentiation in any Group
📺
Abstract

A proof of exponentiation (PoE) in a group G of unknown order allows a prover to convince a verifier that a tuple (x, q, T, y) ∈G × N × N × G satisfies x^q^T= y. This primitive has recently found exciting applications in the constructions of verifiable delay functions and succinct arguments of knowledge. The most practical PoEs only achieve soundness either under computational assumptions, i.e., they are arguments (Wesolowski, Journal of Cryptology 2020), or in groups that come with the promise of not having any small subgroups (Pietrzak, ITCS 2019). The only statistically-sound PoE in general groups of unknown order is due to Block et al. (CRYPTO 2021), and can be seen as an elaborate parallel repetition of Pietrzak’s PoE: to achieve λ bits of security, say λ = 80, the number of repetitions required (and thus the blow-up in communication) is as large as λ.
In this work we propose a statistically-sound PoE for the case where the exponent q is the product of all primes up to some bound B. We show that, in this case, it suffices to run only λ/ log(B) parallel instances of Pietrzak’s PoE, which reduces the concrete proof-size compared to Block et al. by an order of magnitude. Furthermore, we show that in the known applications where PoEs are used as a building block such structured exponents are viable. Finally, we also discuss batching of our PoE, showing that many proofs (for the same G and q but different x and T) can be batched by adding only a single element to the proof per additional statement.

2022

TCC

PPAD is as Hard as LWE and Iterated Squaring
Abstract

One of the most fundamental results in game theory is that every game has a Nash equilibrium, an assignment of (randomized) strategies to players with the stability property that no individual player can benefit from deviating from the assigned strategy. It is not known how to efficiently *compute* such a Nash equilibrium --- the computational complexity of this task is characterized by the class PPAD, but the relation of PPAD to other problems and well-known complexity classes is not precisely understood. In recent years there has been mounting evidence, based on cryptographic tools and techniques, showing the hardness of PPAD.
We continue this line of research by showing that PPAD is as hard as *learning with errors* and the *iterated squaring* problem, two standard problems in cryptography. Our work improves over prior hardness results that relied either on (1) sub-exponential assumptions, or (2) relied on ``obfustopia,'' which can currently be based on a particular combination of three assumptions. Our work additionally establishes *public-coin* hardness for PPAD (computational hardness for a publicly sampleable distribution of instances) that seems out of reach of the obfustopia approach.
Following the work of Choudhuri et al. (STOC 2019) and subsequent works, our hardness result is obtained by constructing an *unambiguous and incrementally-updateable* succinct non-interactive argument for IS, whose soundness relies on polynomial hardness of LWE. The result also implies a verifiable delay function with unique proofs, which may be of independent interest.

2021

CRYPTO

Limits on the Adaptive Security of Yao’s Garbling
📺
Abstract

Yao’s garbling scheme is one of the most fundamental cryptographic constructions. Lindell and Pinkas (Journal of Cryptograhy 2009) gave a formal proof of security in the selective setting assuming secure symmetric-key encryption (and hence one-way functions). This was fol- lowed by results, both positive and negative, concerning its security in the, stronger, adaptive setting. Applebaum et al. (Crypto 2013) showed that it cannot satisfy adaptive security as is, due to a simple incompressibility argument. Jafagholi and Wichs (TCC 2017) considered a natural adaptation of Yao’s scheme that circumvents this negative result, and proved that it is adaptively secure, at least for shallow circuits. In particular, they showed that for the class of circuits of depth d, the loss in security is at most exponential in d. The above results all concern the simulation-based notion of security.
In this work, we show that the upper bound of Jafargholi and Wichs is more or less optimal in a strong sense. As our main result, we show that there exists a family of Boolean circuits, one for each depth d ∈ N, such that any black-box reduction proving the adaptive indistinguishability- security of the natural adaptation of Yao’s scheme from any symmetric-key encryption has to lose a factor that is sub-exponential in d. Since indistinguishability is a weaker notion than simulation, our bound also applies to adaptive simulation.
To establish our results, we build on the recent approach of Kamath et al. (Eprint 2021), which uses pebbling lower bounds in conjunction with oracle separations to prove fine-grained lower bounds on loss in cryptographic security

2021

TCC

On Treewidth, Separators and Yao’s Garbling
📺
Abstract

We show that Yao’s garbling scheme is adaptively indistinguishable
for the class of Boolean circuits of size S and treewidth w
with only a S^{O(w)} loss in security. For instance, circuits with constant
treewidth are as a result adaptively indistinguishable with only a polynomial
loss. This (partially) complements a negative result of Applebaum
et al. (Crypto 2013), which showed (assuming one-way functions) that
Yao’s garbling scheme cannot be adaptively simulatable. As main technical
contributions, we introduce a new pebble game that abstracts out
our security reduction and then present a pebbling strategy for this game
where the number of pebbles used is roughly O(\delta w log(S)), \delta being the
fan-out of the circuit. The design of the strategy relies on separators, a
graph-theoretic notion with connections to circuit complexity.

2021

TCC

The Cost of Adaptivity in Security Games on Graphs
📺
Abstract

The security of cryptographic primitives and protocols against adversaries that are allowed to make adaptive choices (e.g., which parties to corrupt or which queries to make) is notoriously difficult to establish. A broad theoretical framework was introduced by Jafargholi et al. [Crypto'17] for this purpose. In this paper we initiate the study of lower bounds on loss in adaptive security for certain cryptographic protocols considered in the framework. We prove lower bounds that almost match the upper bounds (proven using the framework) for proxy re-encryption, prefix-constrained PRFs and generalized selective decryption, a security game that captures the security of certain group messaging and broadcast encryption schemes. Those primitives have in common that their security game involves an underlying graph that can be adaptively built by the adversary.
Some of our lower bounds only apply to a restricted class of black-box reductions which we term "oblivious" (the existing upper bounds are of this restricted type), some apply to the broader but still restricted class of non-rewinding reductions, while our lower bound for proxy re-encryption applies to all black-box reductions. The fact that some of our lower bounds seem to crucially rely on obliviousness or at least a non-rewinding reduction hints to the exciting possibility that the existing upper bounds can be improved by using more sophisticated reductions.
Our main conceptual contribution is a two-player multi-stage game called the Builder-Pebbler Game. We can translate bounds on the winning probabilities for various instantiations of this game into cryptographic lower bounds for the above mentioned primitives using oracle separation techniques.

2020

TCC

On Average-Case Hardness in TFNP from One-Way Functions
📺
Abstract

The complexity class TFNP consists of all NP search problems that are total in the sense that a solution is guaranteed to exist for all instances. Over the years, this class has proved to illuminate surprising connections among several diverse subfields of mathematics like combinatorics, computational topology, and algorithmic game theory. More recently, we are starting to better understand its interplay with cryptography.
We know that certain cryptographic primitives (e.g. one-way permutations, collision-resistant hash functions, or indistinguishability obfuscation) imply average-case hardness in TFNP and its important subclasses. However, its relationship with the most basic cryptographic primitive -- \ie one-way functions (OWFs) -- still remains unresolved. Under an additional complexity theoretic assumption, OWFs imply hardness in TFNP (Hubá?ek, Naor, and Yogev, ITCS 2017). It is also known that average-case hardness in most structured subclasses of TFNP does not imply any form of cryptographic hardness in a black-box way (Rosen, Segev, and Shahaf, TCC 2017) and, thus, one-way functions might be sufficient. Specifically, no negative result which would rule out basing average-case hardness in TFNP \emph{solely} on OWFs is currently known. In this work, we further explore the interplay between TFNP and OWFs and give the first negative results.
As our main result, we show that there cannot exist constructions of average-case (and, in fact, even worst-case) hard TFNP problem from OWFs with a certain type of simple black-box security reductions. The class of reductions we rule out is, however, rich enough to capture many of the currently known cryptographic hardness results for TFNP. Our results are established using the framework of black-box separations (Impagliazzo and Rudich, STOC 1989) and involve a novel application of the reconstruction paradigm (Gennaro and Trevisan, FOCS 2000).

2019

PKC

Adaptively Secure Proxy Re-encryption
Abstract

A proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme is a public-key encryption scheme that allows the holder of a key pk to derive a re-encryption key for any other key
$$pk'$$
. This re-encryption key lets anyone transform ciphertexts under pk into ciphertexts under
$$pk'$$
without having to know the underlying message, while transformations from
$$pk'$$
to pk should not be possible (unidirectional). Security is defined in a multi-user setting against an adversary that gets the users’ public keys and can ask for re-encryption keys and can corrupt users by requesting their secret keys. Any ciphertext that the adversary cannot trivially decrypt given the obtained secret and re-encryption keys should be secure.All existing security proofs for PRE only show selective security, where the adversary must first declare the users it wants to corrupt. This can be lifted to more meaningful adaptive security by guessing the set of corrupted users among the n users, which loses a factor exponential in , rendering the result meaningless already for moderate .Jafargholi et al. (CRYPTO’17) proposed a framework that in some cases allows to give adaptive security proofs for schemes which were previously only known to be selectively secure, while avoiding the exponential loss that results from guessing the adaptive choices made by an adversary. We apply their framework to PREs that satisfy some natural additional properties. Concretely, we give a more fine-grained reduction for several unidirectional PREs, proving adaptive security at a much smaller loss. The loss depends on the graph of users whose edges represent the re-encryption keys queried by the adversary. For trees and chains the loss is quasi-polynomial in the size and for general graphs it is exponential in their depth and indegree (instead of their size as for previous reductions). Fortunately, trees and low-depth graphs cover many, if not most, interesting applications.Our results apply e.g. to the bilinear-map based PRE schemes by Ateniese et al. (NDSS’05 and CT-RSA’09), Gentry’s FHE-based scheme (STOC’09) and the LWE-based scheme by Chandran et al. (PKC’14).

2019

EUROCRYPT

Reversible Proofs of Sequential Work
📺
Abstract

Proofs of sequential work (PoSW) are proof systems where a prover, upon receiving a statement
$$\chi $$
and a time parameter T computes a proof
$$\phi (\chi ,T)$$
which is efficiently and publicly verifiable. The proof can be computed in T sequential steps, but not much less, even by a malicious party having large parallelism. A PoSW thus serves as a proof that T units of time have passed since
$$\chi $$
was received.PoSW were introduced by Mahmoody, Moran and Vadhan [MMV11], a simple and practical construction was only recently proposed by Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18].In this work we construct a new simple PoSW in the random permutation model which is almost as simple and efficient as [CP18] but conceptually very different. Whereas the structure underlying [CP18] is a hash tree, our construction is based on skip lists and has the interesting property that computing the PoSW is a reversible computation.The fact that the construction is reversible can potentially be used for new applications like constructing proofs of replication. We also show how to “embed” the sloth function of Lenstra and Weselowski [LW17] into our PoSW to get a PoSW where one additionally can verify correctness of the output much more efficiently than recomputing it (though recent constructions of “verifiable delay functions” subsume most of the applications this construction was aiming at).

2016

EUROCRYPT

#### Program Committees

- TCC 2023

#### Coauthors

- Hamza Abusalah (1)
- Joël Alwen (1)
- Nir Bitansky (1)
- Binyi Chen (1)
- Arka Rai Choudhuri (1)
- Georg Fuchsbauer (1)
- Charlotte Hoffmann (3)
- Justin Holmgren (1)
- Pavel Hubáček (4)
- Zahra Jafargholi (1)
- Karen Klein (7)
- Vladimir Kolmogorov (1)
- Ilan Komargodski (1)
- Karel Král (1)
- Tomáš Krňák (1)
- Alex Lombardi (1)
- Omer Paneth (1)
- Krzysztof Pietrzak (9)
- Ron D. Rothblum (1)
- Veronika Slívová (1)
- Stefano Tessaro (1)
- Michael Walter (2)
- Daniel Wichs (2)