International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Christian Matt

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2021
TCC
Policy-Compliant Signatures 📺
We introduce policy-compliant signatures (PCS). A PCS scheme can be used in a setting where a central authority determines a global policy and distributes public and secret keys associated with sets of attributes to the users in the system. If two users, Alice and Bob, have attribute sets that jointly satisfy the global policy, Alice can use her secret key and Bob's public key to sign a message. Unforgeability ensures that a valid signature can only be produced if Alice's secret key is known and if the policy is satisfied. Privacy guarantees that the public keys and produced signatures reveal nothing about the users' attributes beyond whether they satisfy the policy or not. PCS extends the functionality provided by existing primitives such as attribute-based signatures and policy-based signatures, which do not consider a designated receiver and thus cannot include the receiver's attributes in the policies. We describe practical applications of PCS which include controlling transactions in financial systems with strong privacy guarantees (avoiding additional trusted entities that check compliance), as well as being a tool for trust negotiations. We introduce an indistinguishability-based privacy notion for PCS and present a generic and modular scheme based on standard building blocks such as signatures, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and a (predicate-only) predicate encryption scheme. We show that it can be instantiated to obtain an efficient scheme that is provably secure under standard pairing-assumptions for a wide range of policies. We further model PCS in UC by describing the goal of PCS as an enhanced ideal signature functionality which gives rise to a simulation-based privacy notion for PCS. We show that our generic scheme achieves this composable security notion under the additional assumption that the underlying predicate encryption scheme satisfies a stronger, fully adaptive, simulation-based attribute-hiding notion.
2019
EUROCRYPT
How to Leverage Hardness of Constant-Degree Expanding Polynomials over $\mathbb {R}$R to build $i\mathcal {O}$iO
In this work, we introduce and construct D-restricted Functional Encryption (FE) for any constant $$D \ge 3$$D≥3, based only on the SXDH assumption over bilinear groups. This generalizes the notion of 3-restricted FE recently introduced and constructed by Ananth et al. (ePrint 2018) in the generic bilinear group model.A $$D=(d+2)$$D=(d+2)-restricted FE scheme is a secret key FE scheme that allows an encryptor to efficiently encrypt a message of the form $$M=(\varvec{x},\varvec{y},\varvec{z})$$M=(x,y,z). Here, $$\varvec{x}\in \mathbb {F}_{\mathbf {p}}^{d\times n}$$x∈Fpd×n and $$\varvec{y},\varvec{z}\in \mathbb {F}_{\mathbf {p}}^n$$y,z∈Fpn. Function keys can be issued for a function $$f=\varSigma _{\varvec{I}= (i_1,..,i_d,j,k)}\ c_{\varvec{I}}\cdot \varvec{x}[1,i_1] \cdots \varvec{x}[d,i_d] \cdot \varvec{y}[j]\cdot \varvec{z}[k]$$f=ΣI=(i1,..,id,j,k)cI·x[1,i1]⋯x[d,id]·y[j]·z[k] where the coefficients $$c_{\varvec{I}}\in \mathbb {F}_{\mathbf {p}}$$cI∈Fp. Knowing the function key and the ciphertext, one can learn $$f(\varvec{x},\varvec{y},\varvec{z})$$f(x,y,z), if this value is bounded in absolute value by some polynomial in the security parameter and n. The security requirement is that the ciphertext hides $$\varvec{y}$$y and $$\varvec{z}$$z, although it is not required to hide $$\varvec{x}$$x. Thus $$\varvec{x}$$x can be seen as a public attribute.D-restricted FE allows for useful evaluation of constant-degree polynomials, while only requiring the SXDH assumption over bilinear groups. As such, it is a powerful tool for leveraging hardness that exists in constant-degree expanding families of polynomials over $$\mathbb {R}$$R. In particular, we build upon the work of Ananth et al. to show how to build indistinguishability obfuscation ($$i\mathcal {O}$$iO) assuming only SXDH over bilinear groups, LWE, and assumptions relating to weak pseudorandom properties of constant-degree expanding polynomials over $$\mathbb {R}$$R.
2019
CRYPTO
Indistinguishability Obfuscation Without Multilinear Maps: New Paradigms via Low Degree Weak Pseudorandomness and Security Amplification 📺
The existence of secure indistinguishability obfuscators ( $$i\mathcal {O}$$ ) has far-reaching implications, significantly expanding the scope of problems amenable to cryptographic study. All known approaches to constructing $$i\mathcal {O}$$ rely on d-linear maps. While secure bilinear maps are well established in cryptographic literature, the security of candidates for $$d>2$$ is poorly understood.We propose a new approach to constructing $$i\mathcal {O}$$ for general circuits. Unlike all previously known realizations of $$i\mathcal {O}$$ , we avoid the use of d-linear maps of degree $$d \ge 3$$ .At the heart of our approach is the assumption that a new weak pseudorandom object exists. We consider two related variants of these objects, which we call perturbation resilient generator ( $$\varDelta $$ RG) and pseudo flawed-smudging generator ( $$\mathrm {PFG}$$ ), respectively. At a high level, both objects are polynomially expanding functions whose outputs partially hide (or smudge) small noise vectors when added to them. We further require that they are computable by a family of degree-3 polynomials over $$\mathbb {Z}$$ . We show how they can be used to construct functional encryption schemes with weak security guarantees. Finally, we use novel amplification techniques to obtain full security.As a result, we obtain $$i\mathcal {O}$$ for general circuits assuming:Subexponentially secure LWEBilinear Maps $$\mathrm {poly}(\lambda )$$ -secure 3-block-local PRGs $$\varDelta $$ RGs or $$\mathrm {PFG}$$ s
2017
ASIACRYPT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
ASIACRYPT