## CryptoDB

### Eylon Yogev

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2021

CRYPTO

Subquadratic SNARGs in the Random Oracle Model
📺
Abstract

In a seminal work, Micali (FOCS 1994) gave the first succinct non-interactive argument (SNARG) in the random oracle model (ROM). The construction combines a PCP and a cryptographic commitment, and has several attractive features: it is plausibly post-quantum; it can be heuristically instantiated via lightweight cryptography; and it has a transparent (public-coin) parameter setup. However, it also has a significant drawback: a large argument size.
In this work, we provide a new construction that achieves a smaller argument size. This is the first progress on the Micali construction since it was introduced over 25 years ago.
A SNARG in the ROM is (t,ε)-secure if every t-query malicious prover can convince the verifier of a false statement with probability at most ε. For (t,ε)-security, the argument size of all known SNARGs in the ROM (including Micali's) is Õ((log (t/ε))^2) bits, *even* if one were to rely on conjectured probabilistic proofs well beyond current techniques. In practice, these costs lead to SNARGs that are much larger than constructions based on other (pre-quantum and costly) tools. This has led many to believe that SNARGs in the ROM are inherently quadratic.
We show that this is not the case. We present a SNARG in the ROM with a sub-quadratic argument size: Õ(log (t/ε) * log t). Our construction relies on a strong soundness notion for PCPs and a weak binding notion for commitments. We hope that our work paves the way for understanding if a linear argument size, that is O(log (t/ε)), is achievable in the ROM.

2021

TCC

Tight Security Bounds for Micali’s SNARGs
Abstract

Succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) in the random oracle model (ROM) have several attractive features: they are plausibly post-quantum; they can be heuristically instantiated via lightweight cryptography; and they have a transparent (public-coin) parameter setup.
The canonical construction of a SNARG in the ROM is due to Micali (FOCS 1994), who showed how to use a random oracle to compile any probabilistically checkable proof (PCP) with sufficiently-small soundness error into a corresponding SNARG. Yet, while Micali's construction is a seminal result, it has received little attention in terms of analysis in the past 25 years.
In this paper, we observe that prior analyses of the Micali construction are not tight and then present a new analysis that achieves tight security bounds. Our result enables reducing the random oracle's output size, and obtain corresponding savings in concrete argument size.
Departing from prior work, our approach relies on precisely quantifying the cost for an attacker to find several collisions and inversions in the random oracle, and proving that any PCP with small soundness error withstands attackers that succeed in finding a small number of collisions and inversions in a certain tree-based information-theoretic game.

2020

CRYPTO

Interactive Proofs for Social Graphs
📺
Abstract

We consider interactive proofs for social graphs, where the verifier has only oracle access to the graph and can query for the $i^{th}$ neighbor of a vertex $v$, given $i$ and $v$. In this model, we construct a doubly-efficient public-coin two-message interactive protocol for estimating the size of the graph to within a multiplicative factor $\epsilon>0$. The verifier performs $\widetilde{O}(1/\epsilon^2 \cdot \tau \cdot \Delta)$ queries to the graph, where $\tau$ is the mixing time of the graph and $\Delta$ is the average degree of the graph. The prover runs in quasi-linear time in the number of nodes in the graph.
Furthermore, we develop a framework for computing the average of essentially any (reasonable) function $f$ of vertices of the graph. Using this framework, we can estimate many health measures of social graphs such as the clustering coefficients and the average degree, where the verifier performs only a small number of queries to the graph.
Using the Fiat-Shamir paradigm, we are able to transform the above protocols to a non-interactive argument in the random oracle model. The result is that any social media company (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) can publish, once and for all, a short proof for the size or health of their social network. This proof can be publicly verified by any single user using a small number of queries to the graph.

2020

TCC

Transparent Error Correcting in a Computationally Bounded World
📺
Abstract

We construct uniquely decodable codes against channels which are computationally bounded. Our construction requires only a public-coin (transparent) setup. All prior work for such channels either required a setup with secret keys and states, could not achieve unique decoding, or got worse rates (for a given bound on codeword corruptions). On the other hand, our construction relies on a strong cryptographic hash function with security properties that we only instantiate in the random oracle model.

2020

TCC

Barriers for Succinct Arguments in the Random Oracle Model
📺
Abstract

We establish barriers on the efficiency of succinct arguments in the random oracle model. We give evidence that, under standard complexity assumptions, there do not exist succinct arguments where the argument verifier makes a small number of queries to the random oracle.
The new barriers follow from new insights into how probabilistic proofs play a fundamental role in constructing succinct arguments in the random oracle model.
*IOPs are necessary for succinctness.*
We prove that any succinct argument in the random oracle model can be transformed into a corresponding interactive oracle proof (IOP). The query complexity of the IOP is related to the succinctness of the argument.
*Algorithms for IOPs.*
We prove that if a language has an IOP with good soundness relative to query complexity, then it can be decided via a fast algorithm with small space complexity.
By combining these results we obtain barriers for a large class of deterministic and non-deterministic languages. For example, a succinct argument for 3SAT with few verifier queries implies an IOP with good parameters, which in turn implies a fast algorithm for 3SAT that contradicts the Exponential-Time Hypothesis.
We additionally present results that shed light on the necessity of several features of probabilistic proofs that are typically used to construct succinct arguments, such as holography and state restoration soundness. Our results collectively provide an explanation for "why" known constructions of succinct arguments have a certain structure.

2019

EUROCRYPT

Distributional Collision Resistance Beyond One-Way Functions
📺
Abstract

Distributional collision resistance is a relaxation of collision resistance that only requires that it is hard to sample a collision (x, y) where x is uniformly random and y is uniformly random conditioned on colliding with x. The notion lies between one-wayness and collision resistance, but its exact power is still not well-understood. On one hand, distributional collision resistant hash functions cannot be built from one-way functions in a black-box way, which may suggest that they are stronger. On the other hand, so far, they have not yielded any applications beyond one-way functions.Assuming distributional collision resistant hash functions, we construct constant-round statistically hiding commitment scheme. Such commitments are not known based on one-way functions, and are impossible to obtain from one-way functions in a black-box way. Our construction relies on the reduction from inaccessible entropy generators to statistically hiding commitments by Haitner et al. (STOC ’09). In the converse direction, we show that two-message statistically hiding commitments imply distributional collision resistance, thereby establishing a loose equivalence between the two notions.A corollary of the first result is that constant-round statistically hiding commitments are implied by average-case hardness in the class $${\textsf {SZK}}$$ (which is known to imply distributional collision resistance). This implication seems to be folklore, but to the best of our knowledge has not been proven explicitly. We provide yet another proof of this implication, which is arguably more direct than the one going through distributional collision resistance.

2018

CRYPTO

On Distributional Collision Resistant Hashing
📺
Abstract

Collision resistant hashing is a fundamental concept that is the basis for many of the important cryptographic primitives and protocols. Collision resistant hashing is a family of compressing functions such that no efficient adversary can find any collision given a random function in the family.In this work we study a relaxation of collision resistance called distributional collision resistance, introduced by Dubrov and Ishai (STOC ’06). This relaxation of collision resistance only guarantees that no efficient adversary, given a random function in the family, can sample a pair (x, y) where x is uniformly random and y is uniformly random conditioned on colliding with x.Our first result shows that distributional collision resistance can be based on the existence of multi-collision resistance hash (with no additional assumptions). Multi-collision resistance is another relaxation of collision resistance which guarantees that an efficient adversary cannot find any tuple of $$k>2$$ inputs that collide relative to a random function in the family. The construction is non-explicit, non-black-box, and yields an infinitely-often secure family. This partially resolves a question of Berman et al. (EUROCRYPT ’18). We further observe that in a black-box model such an implication (from multi-collision resistance to distributional collision resistance) does not exist.Our second result is a construction of a distributional collision resistant hash from the average-case hardness of SZK. Previously, this assumption was not known to imply any form of collision resistance (other than the ones implied by one-way functions).

2016

CRYPTO

#### Program Committees

- Eurocrypt 2020
- TCC 2020

#### Coauthors

- Prabhanjan Ananth (1)
- Nir Bitansky (1)
- Alessandro Chiesa (3)
- Ofer Grossman (1)
- Iftach Haitner (1)
- Shai Halevi (1)
- Justin Holmgren (1)
- Yuval Ishai (1)
- Abhishek Jain (1)
- Aayush Jain (1)
- Liran Katzir (1)
- Ilan Komargodski (12)
- Tal Moran (1)
- Moni Naor (9)
- Rafael Pass (1)
- Alon Rosen (1)
- Amit Sahai (2)
- Gil Segev (2)
- Clara Shikhelman (1)