International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Yiqun Lisa Yin

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2008
FSE
2006
ASIACRYPT
2006
EPRINT
Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions
Scott Contini Yiqun Lisa Yin
In this paper, we analyze the security of HMAC and NMAC, both of which are hash-based message authentication codes. We present distinguishing, forgery, and partial key recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC using collisions of MD4, MD5, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1. Our results demonstrate that the strength of a cryptographic scheme can be greatly weakened by the insecurity of the underlying hash function.
2005
CRYPTO
2005
CRYPTO
2005
EPRINT
Collision-Resistant usage of MD5 and SHA-1 via Message Preprocessing
Michael Szydlo Yiqun Lisa Yin
A series of recent papers have demonstrated collision attacks on popularly used hash functions, including the widely deployed MD5 and SHA-1 algorithm. To assess this threat, the natural response has been to evaluate the extent to which various protocols actually depend on collision resistance for their security, and potentially schedule an upgrade to a stronger hash function. Other options involve altering the protocol in some way. This work suggests a different option. We present several simple message pre-processing techniques and show how the techniques can be combined with MD5 or SHA-1 so that applications are no longer vulnerable to the known collision attacks. For some applications, this may a viable alternative to upgrading the hash function.
2004
FSE
2003
EPRINT
Improved Cryptanalysis of SecurID
Scott Contini Yiqun Lisa Yin
SecurID is a widely used hardware token for strengthening authentication in a corporate environment. Recently, Biryukov, Lano, and Preneel presented an attack on the alleged SecurID hash function~\cite{BLP}. They showed that {\it vanishing differentials} -- collisions of the hash function -- occur quite frequently, and that such differentials allow an attacker to recover the secret key in the token much faster than exhaustive search. Based on simulation results, they estimated that given a single 2-bit vanishing differential, the running time of their attack would be about $2^{48}$ full hash operations. In this paper, we first give a more detailed analysis of the attack in~\cite{BLP} and present several techniques to improve it significantly. Our theoretical analysis and implementation experiments show that the running time of our improved attack is about $2^{44}$ hash operations, though special cases involving $\ge$ 4-bit differentials (which happen about one third of the time) reduce the time further. We then investigate into the use of extra information that an attacker would typically have: multiple vanishing differentials or knowledge that other vanishing differentials do not occur in a nearby time period. When using the extra information, it appears that key recovery can always be accomplished within about $2^{40}$ hash operations.
2002
EUROCRYPT
1999
CRYPTO
1999
FSE
1995
CRYPTO

Program Committees

Eurocrypt 2010
Crypto 2009
FSE 2009
Crypto 2008
Crypto 2007
Crypto 2006
PKC 2006
Asiacrypt 2004
Crypto 2002