## CryptoDB

### Bhavana Kanukurthi

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2022

CRYPTO

Short Leakage Resilient and Non-malleable Secret Sharing Schemes
📺
Abstract

Leakage resilient secret sharing (LRSS) allows a dealer to share a secret amongst $n$ parties such that any authorized subset of the parties can recover the secret from their shares, while an adversary that obtains shares of any unauthorized subset of parties along with bounded leakage from the other shares learns no information about the secret. Non-malleable secret sharing (NMSS) provides a guarantee that even shares that are tampered by an adversary will reconstruct to either the original message or something independent of it.
The most important parameter of LRSS and NMSS schemes is the size of each share. For LRSS, in the "local leakage model" (i.e., when the leakage functions on each share are independent of each other and bounded), Srinivasan and Vasudevan (CRYPTO 2019), gave a scheme for threshold access structures with a share size of approximately 3.((message length) + $\mu$), where $\mu$ is the number of bits of leakage tolerated from every share. For the case of NMSS, the best-known result (again due to the above work) has a share size of 11.(message length).
In this work, we build LRSS and NMSS schemes with much improved share size. Additionally, our LRSS scheme obtains optimal share and leakage size. In particular, we get the following results:
-We build an information-theoretic LRSS scheme for threshold access structures with a share size of (message length + $\mu$).
-As an application of the above result, we obtain an NMSS with a share size of 4.(message length). Further, for the special case of sharing random messages, we obtain a share size of 2.(message length).

2021

CRYPTO

Adaptive Extractors and their Application to Leakage Resilient Secret Sharing
📺
Abstract

We introduce Adaptive Extractors, which unlike traditional randomness extractors, guarantee security even when an adversary obtains leakage on the source \textit{after} observing the extractor output. We make a compelling case for the study of such extractors by demonstrating their use in obtaining adaptive leakage in secret sharing schemes.
Specifically, at FOCS 2020, Chattopadhyay, Goodman, Goyal, Kumar, Li, Meka, Zuckerman, built an adaptively secure leakage resilient secret sharing scheme (LRSS) with both rate and leakage rate being $\mathcal{O}(1/n)$, where $n$ is the number of parties. In this work, we build an adaptively secure LRSS that offers an interesting trade-off between rate, leakage rate, and the total number of shares from which an adversary can obtain leakage. As a special case, when considering $t$-out-of-$n$ secret sharing schemes for threshold $t = \alpha n$ (constant $0<\alpha<1$), we build a scheme with constant rate, constant leakage rate, and allow the adversary leakage from all but $t-1$ of the shares, while giving her the remaining $t-1$ shares completely in the clear. (Prior to this, constant rate LRSS scheme tolerating adaptive leakage was unknown for \textit{any} threshold.)
Finally, we show applications of our techniques to both non-malleable secret sharing and secure message transmission.

2019

JOFC

Four-State Non-malleable Codes with Explicit Constant Rate
Abstract

Non-malleable codes (NMCs), introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs (ITCS 2010), provide a powerful guarantee in scenarios where the classical notion of error-correcting codes cannot provide any guarantee: a decoded message is either the same or completely independent of the underlying message, regardless of the number of errors introduced into the codeword. Informally, NMCs are defined with respect to a family of tampering functions $$\mathcal {F}$$ F and guarantee that any tampered codeword decodes either to the same message or to an independent message, so long as it is tampered using a function $$f \in \mathcal {F}$$ f ∈ F . One of the well-studied tampering families for NMCs is the t -split-state family, where the adversary tampers each of the t “states” of a codeword, arbitrarily but independently. Cheraghchi and Guruswami (TCC 2014) obtain a rate-1 non-malleable code for the case where $$t = \mathcal {O}(n)$$ t = O ( n ) with n being the codeword length and, in (ITCS 2014), show an upper bound of $$1-1/t$$ 1 - 1 / t on the best achievable rate for any t -split state NMC. For $$t=10$$ t = 10 , Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman (FOCS 2014) achieve a constant-rate construction where the constant is unknown. In summary, there is no known construction of an NMC with an explicit constant rate for any $$t= o(n)$$ t = o ( n ) , let alone one that comes close to matching Cheraghchi and Guruswami’s lowerbound! In this work, we construct an efficient non-malleable code in the t -split-state model, for $$t=4$$ t = 4 , that achieves a constant rate of $$\frac{1}{3+\zeta }$$ 1 3 + ζ , for any constant $$\zeta > 0$$ ζ > 0 , and error $$2^{-\varOmega (\ell / log^{c+1} \ell )}$$ 2 - Ω ( ℓ / l o g c + 1 ℓ ) , where $$\ell $$ ℓ is the length of the message and $$c > 0$$ c > 0 is a constant.

#### Program Committees

- Asiacrypt 2024
- Crypto 2023
- TCC 2023
- Eurocrypt 2020
- Crypto 2019
- TCC 2019
- PKC 2018

#### Coauthors

- Prabhanjan Ananth (1)
- Nishanth Chandran (5)
- Vipul Goyal (1)
- Yael Tauman Kalai (1)
- Bhavana Kanukurthi (10)
- Sai Lakshmi Bhavana Obbattu (5)
- Rafail Ostrovsky (2)
- Srinivasan Raghuraman (1)
- Leonid Reyzin (1)
- Amit Sahai (1)
- Sruthi Sekar (5)