International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Jongin Lim

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2011
CHES
2006
CHES
2006
JOFC
2006
EPRINT
Side Channel Attacks and Countermeasures on Pairing Based Cryptosystems over Binary Fields
Pairings on elliptic curves have been used as cryptographic primitives for the development of new applications such as identity based schemes. For the practical applications, it is crucial to provide efficient and secure implementations of the pairings. There have been several works on efficient implementations of the pairings. However, the research for secure implementations of the pairings has not been thoroughly investigated. In this paper, we investigate vulnerability of the pairing used in some pairing based protocols against side channel attacks. We propose an efficient algorithm secure against such side channel attacks of the eta pairing using randomized projective coordinate systems for the pairing computation.
2005
CRYPTO
2004
EPRINT
On security of XTR public key cryptosystems against Side Channel Attacks
The XTR public key system was introduced at Crypto 2000. Application of XTR in cryptographic protocols leads to substantial savings both in communication and computational overhead without compromising security. It is regarded that XTR is suitable for a variety of environments, including low-end smart cards, and XTR is the excellent alternative to either RSA or ECC. In \cite{LV00a,SL01}, authors remarked that XTR single exponentiation (XTR-SE) is less susceptible than usual exponentiation routines to environmental attacks such as timing attacks and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). In this paper, however, we investigate the security of side channel attack (SCA) on XTR. This paper shows that XTR-SE is immune against simple power analysis (SPA) under assumption that the order of the computation of XTR-SE is carefully considered. However we show that XTR-SE is vulnerable to Data-bit DPA (DDPA)\cite{Cor99}, Address-bit DPA (ADPA)\cite{IIT02}, and doubling attack \cite{FV03}. Moreover, we propose two countermeasures that prevent from DDPA and a countermeasure against ADPA. One of the countermeasures using randomization of the base element proposed to defeat DDPA, i.e., randomization of the base element using field isomorphism, could be used to break doubling attack. Thus if we only deal with SPA, DDPA, ADPA, and doubling attack as the attack algorithm for XTR-SE, XTR-SE should be added following countermeasures: randomization of the base element using field isomorphism (DDPA and doubling attack) + randomized addressing (ADPA). But the proposed countermeasure against doubling attack is very inefficient. So to maintain the advantage of efficiency of XTR a good countermeasure against doubling attack is actually necessary.
2003
FSE
2002
ASIACRYPT
2002
EUROCRYPT
2002
FSE
2002
FSE
2002
PKC
2002
PKC
2001
ASIACRYPT
2001
FSE
2000
FSE