International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Nitin Singh

Publications and invited talks

Year
Venue
Title
2025
ASIACRYPT
Samaritan: Linear-time Prover SNARK from New Multilinear Polynomial Commitments
We study linear-time prover SNARKs and make the following contributions: We provide a framework for transforming a univariate polynomial commitment scheme into a multilinear polynomial commitment scheme. Our transformation is generic, can be instantiated with any univariate scheme and improves on prior transformations like Gemini (EUROCRYPT 2022) and Virgo (S&P 2020) in all relevant parameters: proof size, verification complexity, and prover complexity. Instantiating the above framework with the KZG univariate polynomial commitment scheme, we get SamaritanPCS -- the first multilinear polynomial commitment scheme with constant proof size and linear-time prover. The proof size is just 368 bytes, which is the smallest among all multilinear polynomial commitment schemes. Our scheme also has excellent batching properties, wherein proving k evaluations over the hypercube of size n incurs O(n+k\sqrt{n}) cryptographic work, resulting in substantially amortized prover work over several evaluations. We construct LogSpartan -- a new multilinear PIOP for R1CS based on recent techniques for lookup arguments. Compiling this PIOP using SamaritanPCS gives Samaritan -- a SNARK in the universal and updatable SRS setting. Samaritan has linear-time prover, logarithmic verification and logarithmic proof size. Concretely, its proof size is one of the smallest among other known linear-time prover SNARKs without relying on concretely expensive proof recursion techniques. For an R1CS instance with 1 million constraints, Samaritan (over the BLS12-381 curve) has a proof size of 6.2KB. We compare Samaritan with other linear-time prover SNARKs in the updatable setting. We asymptotically improve on the \log^2(n) proof size of Spartan. Unlike Libra (CRYPTO 2019), the argument size of Samaritan is independent of the circuit depth. Compared to Gemini (EUROCRYPT 2022), SamaritanPCS achieves 3x smaller argument size at 1 million constraints. We are competitive with the very recently proposed MicroSpartan (S&P 2025) and linear-time SNARKs for the Plonkish constraint system such as HyperPlonk (EUROCRYPT 2023).
2024
ASIACRYPT
Compute, but Verify: Efficient Multiparty Computation over Authenticated Inputs
Traditional notions of secure multiparty computation (MPC) allow mutually distrusting parties to jointly compute a function over their private inputs, but typically do not specify how these inputs are chosen. Motivated by real-world applications where corrupt inputs could adversely impact privacy and operational legitimacy, we consider a notion of authenticated MPC where the inputs are authenticated (for instance, signed using a digital signature) by some certification authority. We propose a generic and efficient compiler that transforms any linear secret sharing based honest-majority MPC protocol into one with input authentication. Our compiler achieves an ideal notion of authenticated MPC equipped with stronger and more desirable security guarantees than those considered in prior works, while incurring significantly lower computational costs and competitive communication overheads when compared to existing solutions. In particular, we entirely avoid the (potentially expensive) protocol-specific techniques and pre-processing requirements that are inherent to these solutions. For certain corruption thresholds, our compiler additionally preserves the stronger identifiable abort security of the underlying MPC protocol. No existing solution for authenticated MPC achieves this regardless of the corruption threshold. Along the way, we make several technical contributions that are of independent interest. This includes the notion of distributed proofs of knowledge and concrete realizations of the same for several relations of interest, such as proving knowledge of many popularly used digital signature schemes, and proving knowledge of opening of a Pedersen commitment.