International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Matthieu Finiasz

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2014
EPRINT
2014
FSE
2009
ASIACRYPT
2006
ASIACRYPT
2003
EUROCRYPT
2003
EPRINT
Using the Trace Operator to repair the Polynomial Reconstruction based Cryptosystem presented at Eurocrypt 2003
Daniel Augot Matthieu Finiasz Pierre Loidreau
In this paper, we present a modification of the Augot-Finiasz cryptosystem presented at EUROCRYPT 2003. Coron managed to design an attack against the original cryptosystem enabling an attacker to decrypt any intercepted ciphertext efficiently. We introduce here a modification of the scheme which appears to resist to this attack. We furthermore propose parameters thwarting the state of the art attacks.
2003
EPRINT
A Fast Provably Secure Cryptographic Hash Function
Daniel Augot Matthieu Finiasz Nicolas Sendrier
We propose a family of fast and provably secure cryptographic hash functions. The security of these functions relies directly on the well-known syndrome decoding problem for linear codes. Attacks on this problem are well identified and their complexity is known. This enables us to study precisely the practical security of the hash functions and propose valid parameters for implementation. Furthermore, the design proposed here is fully scalable, with respect to security, hash size and output rate.
2001
ASIACRYPT
2001
EPRINT
How to achieve a McEliece-based Digital Signature Scheme
McEliece is one of the oldest known public key cryptosystems. Though it was less widely studied that RSA, it is remarkable that all known attacks are still exponential. It is widely believed that code-based cryptosystems like McEliece does not allow practical digital signatures. In the present paper we disprove this belief and show a way to build a practical signature scheme based on coding theory. It's security can be reduced in the random oracle model to the well-known {\em syndrome decoding problem} and the distinguishability of permuted binary Goppa codes from a random code. For example we propose a scheme with signatures of $81$-bits and a binary security workfactor of $2^{83}$.