International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Jeroen Pijnenburg


On Secure Ratcheting with Immediate Decryption
Jeroen Pijnenburg Bertram Poettering
Ratcheting protocols let parties securely exchange messages in environments in which state exposure attacks are anticipated. While, unavoidably, some promises on confidentiality and authenticity cannot be upheld once the adversary obtains a copy of a party's state, ratcheting protocols aim at confining the impact of state exposures as much as possible. In particular, such protocols provide forward security (after state exposure, past messages remain secure) and post-compromise security (after state exposure, participants auto-heal and regain security). Ratcheting protocols serve as core components in most modern instant messaging apps, with billions of users per day. Most instances, including Signal, guarantee immediate decryption (ID): Receivers recover and deliver the messages wrapped in ciphertexts immediately when they become available, even if ciphertexts arrive out-of-order and preceding ciphertexts are still missing. This ensures the continuation of sessions in unreliable communication networks, ultimately contributing to a satisfactory user experience. While initial academic treatments consider ratcheting protocols without ID, Alwen et al (EC'19) propose the first ID-aware security model, together with a provably secure construction. Unfortunately, as we note, in their protocol a receiver state exposure allows for the decryption of all prior undelivered ciphertexts. As a consequence, from an adversary's point of view, intentionally preventing the delivery of a fraction of the ciphertexts of a conversation, and corrupting the receiver (days) later, allows for correctly decrypting all suppressed ciphertexts. The same attack works against Signal. We argue that the level of (forward-)security realized by the protocol of Alwen et al, and mandated by their security model, is considerably lower than both intuitively expected and technically possible. The main contributions of our work are thus a careful revisit of the security notions for ratcheted communication in the ID setting, together with a provably secure proof-of-concept construction. One novel component of our model is that it reflects the progression of physical time. This allows for formally requiring that (undelivered) ciphertexts automatically expire after a configurable amount of time.
Key Assignment Schemes with Authenticated Encryption, revisited 📺
Jeroen Pijnenburg Bertram Poettering
A popular cryptographic option to implement Hierarchical Access Control in organizations is to combine a key assignment scheme with a symmetric encryption scheme. In brief, key assignment associates with each object in the hierarchy a unique symmetric key, and provides all higher-ranked “authorized” subjects with a method to recover it. This setup allows for encrypting the payloads associated with the objects so that they can be accessed by the authorized and remain inaccessible for the unauthorized. Both key assignment and symmetric encryption have been researched for roughly four decades now, and a plethora of efficient constructions have been the result. Surprisingly, a treatment of the joint primitive (key assignment combined with encryption, as used in practice) in the framework of provable security was conducted only very recently, leading to a publication in ToSC 2018(4). We first carefully revisit this publication. We then argue that there are actually two standard use cases for the combined primitive, which also require individual treatment. We correspondingly propose a fresh set of security models and provably secure constructions for each of them. Perhaps surprisingly, the two constructions call for different symmetric encryption primitives: While standard AEAD is the right tool for the one, we identify a less common tool called Encryptment as best fitting the other.