CryptoDB
Baptiste Lambin
NOTE: imports for ToSC and TCHES are no longer functioning.
ORCID: 0000-0002-3040-4503
Publications
Year
Venue
Title
2023
EUROCRYPT
Pitfalls and Shortcomings for Decompositions and Alignment
Abstract
In this paper we, for the first time, study the question under which circumstances decomposing a round function of a Substitution-Permutation Network is possible uniquely. More precisely, we provide necessary and sufficient criteria for the non-linear layer on when a decomposition is unique. Our results in particular imply that, when cryptographically strong S-boxes are used, the decomposition is indeed unique.
We then apply our findings to the notion of alignment, pointing out that the previous definition allows for primitives that are both aligned and unaligned simultaneously.
As a second result, we present experimental data that shows that alignment might only have limited impact. For this, we compare aligned and unaligned versions of the cipher PRESENT.
2023
TCHES
Cryptanalysis of ARX-based White-box Implementations
Abstract
At CRYPTO’22, Ranea, Vandersmissen, and Preneel proposed a new way to design white-box implementations of ARX-based ciphers using so-called implicit functions and quadratic-affine encodings. They suggest the Speck block-cipher as an example target.In this work, we describe practical attacks on the construction. For the implementation without one of the external encodings, we describe a simple algebraic key recovery attack. If both external encodings are used (the main scenario suggested by the authors), we propose optimization and inversion attacks, followed by our main result - a multiple-step round decomposition attack and a decomposition-based key recovery attack.Our attacks only use the white-box round functions as oracles and do not rely on their description. We implemented and verified experimentally attacks on white-box instances of Speck-32/64 and Speck-64/128. We conclude that a single ARX-round is too weak to be used as a white-box round.
2022
TOSC
Fast MILP Models for Division Property
Abstract
Nowadays, MILP is a very popular tool to help cryptographers search for various distinguishers, in particular for integral distinguishers based on the division property. However, cryptographers tend to use MILP in a rather naive way, modeling problems in an exact manner and feeding them to a MILP solver. In this paper, we show that a proper use of some features of MILP solvers such as lazy constraints, along with using simpler but less accurate base models, can achieve much better solving times, while maintaining the precision of exact models. In particular, we describe several new modelization techniques for division property related models as well as a new variant of the Quine-McCluskey algorithm for this specific setting. Moreover, we positively answer a problem raised in [DF20] about handling the large sets of constraints describing valid transitions through Super S-boxes into a MILP model. As a result, we greatly improve the solving times to recover the distinguishers from several previous works ([DF20], [HWW20], [SWW17], [Udo21], [EY21]) and we were able to search for integral distinguishers on 5-round ARIA which was out of reach of previous modeling techniques.
2021
ASIACRYPT
Strong and Tight Security Guarantees against Integral Distinguishers
📺
Abstract
Integral attacks belong to the classical attack vectors against any given block ciphers. However, providing arguments that a given cipher is resistant against those attacks is notoriously difficult.
In this paper, based solely on the assumption of independent round keys, we develop significantly stronger arguments than what was possible before: our main result is that we show how to argue that the sum of ciphertexts over any possible subset of plaintext is key-dependent, i.e., the non existence of integral distinguishers.
2020
ASIACRYPT
Lower Bounds on the Degree of Block Ciphers
📺
Abstract
Only the method to estimate the upper bound of the algebraic degree on block ciphers is known so far, but it is not useful for the designer to guarantee the security. In this paper we provide meaningful lower bounds on the algebraic degree of modern block ciphers.
2019
TOSC
Efficient Search for Optimal Diffusion Layers of Generalized Feistel Networks
📺
Abstract
The Feistel construction is one of the most studied ways of building block ciphers. Several generalizations were then proposed in the literature, leading to the Generalized Feistel Network, where the round function first applies a classical Feistel operation in parallel on an even number of blocks, and then a permutation is applied to this set of blocks. In 2010 at FSE, Suzaki and Minematsu studied the diffusion of such construction, raising the question of how many rounds are required so that each block of the ciphertext depends on all blocks of the plaintext. They thus gave some optimal permutations, with respect to this diffusion criteria, for a Generalized Feistel Network consisting of 2 to 16 blocks, as well as giving a good candidate for 32 blocks. Later at FSE’19, Cauchois et al. went further and were able to propose optimal even-odd permutations for up to 26 blocks.In this paper, we complete the literature by building optimal even-odd permutations for 28, 30, 32, 36 blocks which to the best of our knowledge were unknown until now. The main idea behind our constructions and impossibility proof is a new characterization of the total diffusion of a permutation after a given number of rounds. In fact, we propose an efficient algorithm based on this new characterization which constructs all optimal even-odd permutations for the 28, 30, 32, 36 blocks cases and proves a better lower bound for the 34, 38, 40 and 42 blocks cases. In particular, we improve the 32 blocks case by exhibiting optimal even-odd permutations with diffusion round of 9. The existence of such a permutation was an open problem for almost 10 years and the best known permutation in the literature had a diffusion round of 10. Moreover, our characterization can be implemented very efficiently and allows us to easily re-find all optimal even-odd permutations for up to 26 blocks with a basic exhaustive search
2018
TCHES
On Recovering Affine Encodings in White-Box Implementations
Abstract
Ever since the first candidate white-box implementations by Chow et al. in 2002, producing a secure white-box implementation of AES has remained an enduring challenge. Following the footsteps of the original proposal by Chow et al., other constructions were later built around the same framework. In this framework, the round function of the cipher is “encoded” by composing it with non-linear and affine layers known as encodings. However, all such attempts were broken by a series of increasingly efficient attacks that are able to peel off these encodings, eventually uncovering the underlying round function, and with it the secret key.These attacks, however, were generally ad-hoc and did not enjoy a wide applicability. As our main contribution, we propose a generic and efficient algorithm to recover affine encodings, for any Substitution-Permutation-Network (SPN) cipher, such as AES, and any form of affine encoding. For AES parameters, namely 128-bit blocks split into 16 parallel 8-bit S-boxes, affine encodings are recovered with a time complexity estimated at 232 basic operations, independently of how the encodings are built. This algorithm is directly applicable to a large class of schemes. We illustrate this on a recent proposal due to Baek, Cheon and Hong, which was not previously analyzed. While Baek et al. evaluate the security of their scheme to 110 bits, a direct application of our generic algorithm is able to break the scheme with an estimated time complexity of only 235 basic operations.As a second contribution, we show a different approach to cryptanalyzing the Baek et al. scheme, which reduces the analysis to a standalone combinatorial problem, ultimately achieving key recovery in time complexity 231. We also provide an implementation of the attack, which is able to recover the secret key in about 12 seconds on a standard desktop computer.
Coauthors
- Alex Biryukov (1)
- Patrick Derbez (3)
- Pierre-Alain Fouque (2)
- Phil Hebborn (2)
- Baptiste Lambin (7)
- Gregor Leander (3)
- Brice Minaud (1)
- Victor Mollimard (1)
- Patrick Neumann (1)
- Yosuke Todo (2)
- Aleksei Udovenko (1)