International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Joachim Breitner

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2017
CHES
Sliding Right into Disaster: Left-to-Right Sliding Windows Leak
It is well known that constant-time implementations of modular exponentiation cannot use sliding windows. However, software libraries such as Libgcrypt, used by GnuPG, continue to use sliding windows. It is widely believed that, even if the complete pattern of squarings and multiplications is observed through a side-channel attack, the number of exponent bits leaked is not sufficient to carry out a full key-recovery attack against RSA. Specifically, 4-bit sliding windows leak only 40% of the bits, and 5-bit sliding windows leak only 33% of the bits.In this paper we demonstrate a complete break of RSA-1024 as implemented in Libgcrypt. Our attack makes essential use of the fact that Libgcrypt uses the left-to-right method for computing the sliding-window expansion. We show for the first time that the direction of the encoding matters: the pattern of squarings and multiplications in left-to-right sliding windows leaks significantly more information about the exponent than right-to-left. We show how to extend the Heninger-Shacham algorithm for partial key reconstruction to make use of this information and obtain a very efficient full key recovery for RSA-1024. For RSA-2048 our attack is efficient for 13% of keys.