International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Amin Sakzad


On the Integer Polynomial Learning with Errors Problem 📺
Several recent proposals of efficient public-key encryption are based on variants of the polynomial learning with errors problem (\textsf{PLWE}$^f$) in which the underlying \emph{polynomial} ring $\mZ_q[x]/f$ is replaced with the (related) modular \emph{integer} ring $\mZ_{f(q)}$; the corresponding problem is known as \emph{Integer Polynomial Learning with Errors} (\textsf{I-PLWE}$^f$). Cryptosystems based on \textsf{I-PLWE}$^f$ and its variants can exploit optimised big-integer arithmetic to achieve good practical performance, as exhibited by the \textsf{ThreeBears} cryptosystem. Unfortunately, the average-case hardness of \textsf{I-PLWE}$^f$ and its relation to more established lattice problems have to date remained unclear. We describe the first polynomial-time average-case reductions for the search variant of \textsf{I-PLWE}$^f$, proving its computational equivalence with the search variant of its counterpart problem \textsf{PLWE}$^f$. Our reductions apply to a large class of defining polynomials~$f$. To obtain our results, we employ a careful adaptation of R\'{e}nyi divergence analysis techniques to bound the impact of the integer ring arithmetic carries on the error distributions. As an application, we present a deterministic public-key cryptosystem over integer rings. Our cryptosystem, which resembles \textsf{ThreeBears}, enjoys one-way (OW-CPA) security provably based on the search variant of~\textsf{I-PLWE}$^f$.
Measure-Rewind-Measure: Tighter Quantum Random Oracle Model Proofs for One-Way to Hiding and CCA Security 📺
We introduce a new technique called `Measure-Rewind-Measure' (MRM) to achieve tighter security proofs in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). We first apply our MRM technique to derive a new security proof for a variant of the `double-sided' quantum One-Way to Hiding Lemma (O2H) of Bindel et al. [TCC 2019] which, for the first time, avoids the square-root advantage loss in the security proof. In particular, it bypasses a previous `impossibility result' of Jiang, Zhang and Ma [IACR eprint 2019]. We then apply our new O2H Lemma to give a new tighter security proof for the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform for constructing a strong (INDCCA) Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) from a weak (INDCPA) public-key encryption scheme satisfying a mild injectivity assumption.
Public-Key Puncturable Encryption: Modular and Compact Constructions 📺
We revisit the method of designing public-key puncturable encryption schemes and present a generic conversion by leveraging the techniques of distributed key-distribution and revocable encryption. In particular, we first introduce a refined version of identity-based revocable encryption, named key-homomorphic identity-based revocable key encapsulation mechanism with extended correctness . Then, we propose a generic construction of puncturable key encapsulation mechanism from the former by merging the idea of distributed key-distribution. Compared to the state-of-the-art, our generic construction supports unbounded number of punctures and multiple tags per message, thus achieving more fine-grained revocation of decryption capability. Further, it does not rely on random oracles , not suffer from non-negligible correctness error, and results in a variety of efficient schemes with distinct features. More precisely, we obtain the first scheme with very compact ciphertexts in the standard model, and the first scheme with support for both unbounded size of tags per ciphertext and unbounded punctures as well as constant-time puncture operation. Moreover, we get a comparable scheme proven secure under the standard DBDH assumption, which enjoys both faster encryption and decryption than previous works based on the same assumption, especially when the number of tags associated with the ciphertext is large.
MPSign: A Signature from Small-Secret Middle-Product Learning with Errors 📺
We describe a digital signature scheme $$mathsf {MPSign}$$ , whose security relies on the conjectured hardness of the Polynomial Learning With Errors problem ( $$mathsf {PLWE}$$ ) for at least one defining polynomial within an exponential-size family (as a function of the security parameter). The proposed signature scheme follows the Fiat-Shamir framework and can be viewed as the Learning With Errors counterpart of the signature scheme described by Lyubashevsky at Asiacrypt 2016, whose security relies on the conjectured hardness of the Polynomial Short Integer Solution ( $$mathsf {PSIS}$$ ) problem for at least one defining polynomial within an exponential-size family. As opposed to the latter, $$mathsf {MPSign}$$ enjoys a security proof from $$mathsf {PLWE}$$ that is tight in the quantum-access random oracle model. The main ingredient is a reduction from $$mathsf {PLWE}$$ for an arbitrary defining polynomial among exponentially many, to a variant of the Middle-Product Learning with Errors problem ( $$mathsf {MPLWE}$$ ) that allows for secrets that are small compared to the working modulus. We present concrete parameters for $$mathsf {MPSign}$$ using such small secrets, and show that they lead to significant savings in signature length over Lyubashevsky’s Asiacrypt 2016 scheme (which uses larger secrets) at typical security levels. As an additional small contribution, and in contrast to $$mathsf {MPSign}$$ (or $$mathsf {MPLWE}$$ ), we present an efficient key-recovery attack against Lyubashevsky’s scheme (or the inhomogeneous $$mathsf {PSIS}$$ problem), when it is used with sufficiently small secrets, showing the necessity of a lower bound on secret size for the security of that scheme.

Program Committees

Asiacrypt 2023
Eurocrypt 2022
Asiacrypt 2018