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Paper: QCB: Efficient Quantum-secure Authenticated Encryption

Authors: Ritam Bhaumik , Inria Xavier Bonnetain , University of Waterloo André Chailloux , Inria Gaëtan Leurent , Inria María Naya-Plasencia , Inria André Schrottenloher , Cryptology Group, CWI Yannick Seurin , ANSSI DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-92062-3_23 Search ePrint Search Google Slides ASIACRYPT 2021 It was long thought that symmetric cryptography was only mildly affected by quantum attacks, and that doubling the key length was sufficient to restore security. However, recent works have shown that Simon's quantum period finding algorithm breaks a large number of MAC and authenticated encryption algorithms when the adversary can query the MAC/encryption oracle with a quantum superposition of messages. In particular, the OCB authenticated encryption mode is broken in this setting, and no quantum-secure mode is known with the same efficiency (rate-one and parallelizable). In this paper we generalize the previous attacks, show that a large class of OCB-like schemes is unsafe against superposition queries, and discuss the quantum security notions for authenticated encryption modes. We propose a new rate-one parallelizable mode named QCB inspired by TAE and OCB and prove its security against quantum superposition queries.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{asiacrypt-2021-31472,
title={QCB: Efficient Quantum-secure Authenticated Encryption},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
doi={10.1007/978-3-030-92062-3_23},
author={Ritam Bhaumik and Xavier Bonnetain and André Chailloux and Gaëtan Leurent and María Naya-Plasencia and André Schrottenloher and Yannick Seurin},
year=2021
}