CryptoDB

Paper: Impossibility on Tamper-Resilient Cryptography with Uniqueness Properties

Authors: Yuyu Wang Takahiro Matsuda Goichiro Hanaoka Keisuke Tanaka Search ePrint Search Google In this work, we show negative results on the tamper-resilience of a wide class of cryptographic primitives with uniqueness properties, such as unique signatures, verifiable random functions, signatures with unique keys, injective one-way functions, and encryption schemes with a property we call unique-message property. Concretely, we prove that for these primitives, it is impossible to derive their (even extremely weak) tamper-resilience from any common assumption, via black-box reductions. Our proofs exploit the simulatable attack paradigm proposed by Wichs (ITCS ’13), and the tampering model we treat is the plain model, where there is no trusted setup.
BibTeX
@article{pkc-2021-30965,
title={Impossibility on Tamper-Resilient Cryptography with Uniqueness Properties},
booktitle={Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2021},
publisher={Springer},
author={Yuyu Wang and Takahiro Matsuda and Goichiro Hanaoka and Keisuke Tanaka},
year=2021
}